THOMISM AND CALVINISM IN THE THEOLOGY OF GIROLAMO ZANCHI (1516-1590)

by

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HIERONIMVS ZANCHIVS, BERGAMAS.

Ingenio præstans, nulli pietate secundus
Zanchius, hoc vultu conspiciendus erat:
Scripta probata viris sanctissima plurima doctis,
Interiora animi maxima dona ferunt. Cum priuilegio.

PREFACE

The last three decades, partly due to the impact of the theology of Karl Barth, have seen a re-examination of the thought of the Reformers, particularly Luther and Calvin. With regard to the latter, the result has been a rediscovery of the strongly christocentric orientation of Calvin's theology, especially in reference to his doctrine of predestination. This raises the problem, naturally, of the continuity of Calvin's thought among his immediate successors.

Recent Reformation studies, such as the book by J. Moltmann, Prädestination und Perseverang, or J. McLellan's study on Peter Martyr Vermigli, The Visible Words of God, tend to interpret the theology of Martyr and Zanchi in terms of Calvin's own thought. Considerable doubt, however, remains with regard to the extent of medieval Scholastic influences upon the Reformed theology of the outgoing sixteenth century, and the bearing this might have on a correct evaluation of the continuity of Reformation thought.

The only attempts in this direction are the valuable study by K. Heim, Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher, and -- to some extent -- the book by P. Althaus, Die Prinzipien der deutschen reformierten Dogmatik im Zeitalter der aristotelischen Philosophie. Both works suffer, however, from the authors' failure fully to appreciate the christocentric character of Calvin's theology.

The following study of Zanchi's doctrine of God and predestination will attempt to analyze the thought of this

Reformed theologian in comparison with Thomistic theology as well as that of Calvin. The result, it is hoped, will help to throw some light on the development of Reformed theology in the early Post-Reformation era.

I wish to acknowledge the invaluable advice, encouragement and friendship of Professor E.A. Dowey, as well as the helpful suggestions and corrections of Professor G.A. Barrois. In addition I am indebted to Mrs. Helen S. Butz, who not only produced this typescript but was of most valuable assistance in bibliographical research. Finally, my thanks are due to the librarian of Princeton Theological Seminary, Dr. K.S. Gapp, and to his staff for procuring the microfilmed source materials used in the preparation of this study.

O.G.

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TRANSLATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The English translations of Calvin's works listed in the Bibliography have been used for quotations in the text. Wherever alterations seemed advisable, they have been made without notation. All translations from Zanchi's works are my own, unless otherwise indicated.

The following are examples of abbreviations which are used:

OS III.261.17	--	Calvin's Opera Selecta, vol. III, page 261, line 17
CO 47.12	--	Calvini Opera, vol. 47, page 12
ST I.23.5	--	Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, part I, question 23, article 5
Opera, 2.83	--	Zanchii Operum Theologicorum, Tomus 2, column 83

Those volumes of Zanchi's works which contain more than one treatise or part are referred to as follows:

Opera, 8.3.319	--	Zanchii Operum Theologicorum, Tomus 8, part 3, column 319

O.G.

INTRODUCTION

The Aristotelian Tradition in the Sixteenth Century

Around the middle of the thirteenth century a nearly complete corpus of Aristotle's writings along with a considerable number of Arabic commentaries -- especially those by Averroes and Avicenna -- had been translated into Latin and soon became the basis of philosophical instruction at the Northern European universities, notably Oxford and Paris.[1] Under the impact of this new and widespread influence of Aristotle's thought the Scholastic theologians began to attempt a synthesis of Christian theology and Aristotelian philosophy of which the system of Thomas Aquinas became the outstanding example. Yet it must be remembered that except within his own Dominican order Thomas was by no means considered an authority among his contemporaries. Instead, the Aristotelianism of the later Middle Ages comprised a great variety of thinkers and ideas held together only by the common reference to the corpus of Aristotle's writings, which constituted the basic material of reading and discussion in the philosophical disciplines.[2]

A further characteristic of Scholastic Aristotelianism is the fact that through the Arabic and Latin commentators a considerable portion of Platonic and Neoplatonic thought was

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1. O. Kristeller, The Classics and Renaissance Thought, Cambridge, Mass., 1955, p. 31.
2. Ibid., p. 33.

taken over as Aristotelian and continued to exist as an integral component of medieval Scholasticism. Thus in Thomas Aquinas there is more of Augustinian and Platonic influence than is often realized.

During the fourteenth century Aristotelian philosophy, which until then had served chiefly in the interest and within the framework of theology, began to grow increasingly independent. Already by the fifteenth century the Scholastic synthesis of Aristotelian science and Christian faith which Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus had constructed had, for the most part, retreated to the monastic orders, at least in Italy.[1] Thomism and Scotism, the thirteenth century syntheses of science and religion, underwent a destructive criticism that came from two sources: the Ockhamites, who began in Oxford in the thirteenth century and later found a strong foothold in Paris, and the Latin Averroists, who began in Paris in the thirteenth century and shifted their seat to Padua at the beginning of the fourteenth.[2] Both schools soon advanced beyond mere criticism and turned away from the earlier Scholastic syntheses to the purely natural philosophy of Aristotle himself. Thus from the beginning of the fourteenth century there sets in a persistent and continuing reconstruction of the Aristotelian tradition which, directed to Aristotle's Physics on the one hand, eventually led to the mathematical

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1. John H. Randall, Jr., "The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua," Journal of the History of Ideas, I:2 (1940), p. 183.
2. Ibid., p. 180.

problems of the Galilean age, and directed to the Logic on the other hand, led to the formulation of the method and structure of science acclaimed by all the seventeenth century scientists.[1]

Aristotelianism in Italy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is characterized by a predominant interest in natural science and in the development of scientific method. Its center, the University of Padua, along with the schools at Bologna and Pavia, became the focal point of European scholarship. Far from representing a turning from Aristotle to Platonism as has frequently been claimed, the emerging science of nature remained loyal to the Aristotelian tradition despite its own continuing but constructive criticism of Aristotelian writings and ideas. Even Galileo occupied a chair at the University of Padua from 1592 to 1610, and in method and philosophy if not in physics he remained a typical Paduan Aristotelian.[2]

Randall suggests several reasons why Italian Aristotelianism was able to lead the European schools in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in the pursuit of an independent natural philosophy. The northern Italian cities had long enjoyed and taught in their universities a thoroughly secular philosophy expressive of their prosperous and this-worldly society, a fact which caused much opposition among ecclesi-

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1. Ibid., p. 180.
2. Ibid., p. 182.

astical circles.[1] Thus the Aristotelianism which reigned at the universities of Padua, Bologna, and Pavia made little attempt to accommodate itself to theological interests.[2]

Another important factor was the close alliance between the study of Aristotle and the study of medicine. In contrast to Paris, the Faculty of Arts at Padua led only to that of Medicine, and Aristotle was taught in preparation for a medical career, with chief emphasis upon Aristotle's physical writings and his scientific methodology.[3] The teachers at Padua normally held medical degrees, and the first representative of Padua's new Aristotelianism, Pietro of Abano (d. 1316), was a physician.[4]

Finally, the fact that Venice, the leading Italian anti-papal state, had guaranteed in Padua full liberty of teaching and speculation after its acquisition of the city in 1404, attracted the best minds from all over Italy and made Padua "the leading scientific school of Europe and the stronghold of Aristotelian qualitative physics, and the trainer even of those who were to break with it."[5] Cusanus, Purbach, and Copernicus, besides the Italians, all studied at Padua.[6]

The Paduan school reached its culmination with Zabarella, the greatest and most important of the Italian

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1. Randall, op. cit., p. 183; cf. K. Werner, Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters, IV,1, Wien, 1887, p. 141.
2. Randall, op. cit., p. 183.
3. Ibid.
4. Werner, op. cit., p. 139.
5. Randall, op. cit., p. 184.
6. Ibid.

Peripatetics of the outgoing sixteenth century, who "summed up the collective wisdom of the Paduan school" and "formulated the classic version of their teaching on method, in the terms and with the distinctions later so fruitfully employed and consciously expressed by Galileo."[1] Randall shows convincingly that it is the Aristotelianism of the Italian universities and its substantial achievements in the development of scientific method which forms the immediate background of the scientific movement that culminated in Galileo. To be sure, this Aristotelianism is no longer that of the Scholastics, and this is due in part to the impact of Humanism and its classical scholarship. The new translations of Aristotle's writings supplied by the Humanists and their discovery of ancient Greek commentaries combined to present a "purer" Aristotle than the one of medieval tradition.[2]

While Humanism through its return to the sources contributed indirectly to the development of Aristotelian natural philosophy and methodology in Italy, it exercised a direct influence upon Aristotelian studies at German universities. Here the emphasis shifted from metaphysics to Aristotle's Rhetoric, which had become an important text for Humanist rhetoricians, and to the Ethics and Poetics. Kristeller calls attention to the curious fact "that the authority of Aristotle's Poetics attained its climax in the same seven-

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1. Randall, op. cit., p. 196.
2. Kristeller, op. cit., p. 39.

teenth century which witnessed the overthrow of his Physics."[1] An example of this direct Humanist influence is the Aristotelianism of Melanchthon which is clearly distinct from that of the Italian Peripatetics as well as from that of the Scholastic tradition.

While all these developments and changes took place among the Aristotelian philosophers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Thomism continued to flourish among the theologians. In fact, its relative role and importance increased considerably during the sixteenth century, culminating in the papal decree of Pius V in 1567 which made Thomas Aquinas the fifth Doctor Ecclesiae.[2] This papal act, which put Rome's stamp of approval on Thomism, indicates the growing authority that became attached to Thomas during the sixteenth century, an authority which in turn was the result of a restoration of the medieval Scholastic tradition that began with the century. This restoration movement had its roots in the opposition to the naturalism of the Italian Peripatetics on the one hand, and to the excesses of Nominalist thought and the dangers it held for the Church, on the other. It was not until the new challenge of Reformation thought, however, that the need for Rome to rally all forces brought about the first real attempts at a unification of the various Scholastic traditions. It was only natural that the Thomist school

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1. Kristeller, op. cit., p. 40.
2. Joseph H. Fichter, Man of Spain: Francis Suarez, New York, 1940, p. 76.

should become the standard-bearer of Rome's counteroffensive, the only school with a completely developed corpus doctrinae, a school, moreover, which had an established high reputation among the Catholic schools of thought.[1] It seems equally natural that this attempt at unifying the doctrinal tradition of the Roman Church should take place in an environment removed from the cultural, scientific, and religious upheavals of that era. The only European country that offered such an environment was Spain, and the university that was to initiate and organize the Scholastic renaissance was the school of Salamanca.[2]

At the beginning of the sixteenth century the University of Salamanca reflected the typical situation of Scholastic theology at that time. Scholasticism was represented at Salamanca by all three of its traditional schools: there was a Cathedra Nominalium, a Cathedra Thomae, and a Cathedra Scoti from which the theological systems of the respective schools were being taught. In addition, there existed a so-called Cathedra major whose occupant, as the representative of the tradition as a whole, was obliged to base his lectures on the text of Lombard's Sentences.[3]

In 1526 Francis Vittoria was called to fill the Cathedra major at Salamanca -- the man who was soon to become the great organizer and founder of Neo-Scholasticism and of the

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1. Werner, op. cit., IV,2, p. 4.
2. Ibid., p. 5.
3. Ibid.

restoration of the medieval tradition.[1] Vittoria saw his chief task in the improvement of the Scholastic method through simplification of form and logic, and through the increased use of the Scriptures and the Church Fathers in theological argumentation. He also initiated the gradual replacement of Lombard's Sentences by Thomas' Summa Theologiae, and by 1561 a reform of the university's statutes declared the Summa the authoritative and general theological textbook at Salamanca.[2] Soon other Spanish universities followed the example of Salamanca and, notably through Jesuit efforts and influence, the Summa became eventually the established basis for theological instruction in all Catholic countries.[3]

Vittoria's pupils and successors continued along the directives and aims he had established. Melchior Cano, Vittoria's immediate successor at Salamanca, presented an extensive program of philosophical and theological reform in his chief work, De locis theologicis. Bartholomew of Medina and Dominicus Banez published commentaries on the first and second parts of Thomas' Summa, respectively, which reveal the same eloquence of style and clarity of thought that characterized the writing of Vittoria.[4]

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1. Fichter, op. cit., p. 81.
2. Werner, op. cit., p. 5.
3. Ibid.
4. M. Grabmann, "Die Disputationes metaphysicae des Franz Suarez in ihrer methodischen Eigenart und Fortentwicklung," Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, Bd. 1, München, 1926, p. 525 f. Vittoria himself wrote a commentary on the Summa Theologiae which has so far remained unpublished.

The Neo-Scholastic movement at Salamanca and the reputation of its teachers attracted not only Dominicans but students and scholars from other orders as well, particularly from the rapidly expanding Societas Jesu. The Jesuit students at Salamanca carried the movement over to their own schools at the universities of Coimbra and Alcala, from which it spread throughout the Iberian peninsula and well beyond the borders of Spain.[1]

Without doubt the most important Jesuit representative of the new Scholasticism is Francis Suarez. Himself a former student at Salamanca, Suarez returned there in 1593 after years of teaching at Rome and Alcala.[2] At Salamanca his chief philosophical work, Disputationes metaphysicae, was published in 1597. Suarez' Neo-Scholasticism can best be described as an eclecticism based on a thorough knowledge of the entire heritage of the Scholastic tradition, constantly striving for further development of this tradition while remaining firmly rooted in its essential ideas. One finds Suarez in full agreement with Thomas Aquinas with re-

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1. The Jesuits had their own college at Salamanca as early as 1548 but encountered there the bitter opposition of Melchior Cano. The order met, however, with a friendly welcome and support in Portugal, where Simon Rodriguez founded a Jesuit college at the University of Coimbra around the middle of the sixteenth century and where the Jesuits were entrusted with the teaching of philosophy. Fonseca (d. 1599) was the first outstanding Jesuit philosopher at Coimbra, and supervised and contributed to a new commentary on the complete corpus of Aristotle's writings, known as the Cursus Conimbricensium, published in 1591. Cf. Werner, op. cit., p. 70 ff.

2. Fichter, op. cit., p. 178.

gard to the basic metaphysical questions; for example, Thomas' doctrine of analogy is vigorously defended against the Scotist notion of the univocity of being. Regarding the universals Suarez displays the same moderate realism of Aquinas. On the other hand, there appear notable differences between the two thinkers. Thus Suarez rejects the Thomistic distinction between essence and existence in all created being.[1] Furthermore, he seems to have actively supported and contributed to the controversial doctrine of his fellow Jesuit and colleague, Molina, concerning the scientia media,[2] which was bitterly attacked by the Dominicans and caused a long and heated controversy which did not end until 1607 when Rome ordered both sides to abstain from any further discussion of the matter.[3]

The influence of Suarez' thought upon the philosophers and theologians of the following century was far-reaching, including Protestant thinkers.[4] Joachim Jungius and Johannes Skelerus in Rostock, J. Martini in Wittenberg, and especially Christoph Scheibler at the University of Giessen, who has been called the Protestant Suarez, are among those

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1. Grabmann, op. cit., p. 551 f.
2. This doctrine, later known as Molinism, has its roots in the thought of Fonseca, who was Molina's teacher. Molina developed Fonseca's ideas and published his doctrine in a work entitled: Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia. Cf. Werner, op. cit., p. 81 ff.
3. Fichter, op. cit., p. 231 ff.
4. Cf. the most valuable and thorough work of P. Petersen, Geschichte der Aristotelischen Philosophie im Protestantischen Deutschland, Leipzig, 1921.

German Protestants who show strong leanings toward Suarez' metaphysics. Scheibler's Opus metaphysicum, which was reprinted at Oxford, contributed in particular to Suarez' influence at German universities.[1]

From our survey it has become sufficiently clear that Aristotelian thought in the sixteenth century presents by no means a uniform picture which, indeed, it had never done. Each of the various trends and schools of thought within the broad stream of the Aristotelian tradition during that era has left its mark on Protestant Orthodox theology. Althaus is certainly correct in tracing Keckermann's thought to the Paduan Aristotelianism of Zabarella.[2] We have seen, however, that the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth century philosophy cannot simply be described as mainly that of the Italian Peripatetics. Melanchthon's influence, indeed, was still strong toward the end of the sixteenth century in such places as Bremen, Heidelberg and Marburg.[3] Already Heppe and again Moltmann have pointed out the difference in the theological position of the so-called German-Reformed theologians and that of the Geneva Calvinists. The question is whether this difference can be adequately explained by tracing

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1. Cf. Grabmann, op. cit., p. 539; also, E. Weber, Die Philosophische Scholastik des Deutschen Protestantismus im Zeitalter der Orthodoxie, Leipzig, 1907, p. 38 ff.

2. P. Althaus, Die Principien der Deutschen Reformierten Dogmatik im Zeitalter der Aristotelischen Scholastik, Leipzig, 1914, p. 22 f.

3. See, J. Moltmann, Christoph Pezel (1539-1604) und der Calvinismus in Bremen, Bremen, 1958; see also, Introduction to H. Heppe, Dogmatik des Deutschen Protestantismus im 16. Jahrhundert, Bd. 1, Gotha, 1857.

it to Melanchthon and Calvin, respectively, as Heppe and Moltmann do. If Melanchthon's influence upon the German-Reformed theologians is an undisputable fact, there seems to be considerably less congruity between the theology of Calvin and that of the Geneva Calvinists of the late sixteenth century than one is often led to believe. The following examination of the theology of Girolamo Zanchi, a leading and influential representative of the latter group,[1] will attempt to show that Zanchi's basic theological position and concern reveal a modified yet definite and direct influence of medieval Thomism, and a conscious if not uncritical return of Reformed theology to the medieval tradition.[2]

Zanchi's Life and Writings

Girolamo Zanchi -- or Hieronymus Zanchius -- was born on February 2, 1516, at Alzano near Bergamo in Northern Italy.[3] At the age of fifteen he entered, upon the death of

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1. Zanchi is usually associated with the so-called Geneva Calvinists because of his close connection with Beza. Cf. Heppe (op. cit.) and Moltmann (op. cit.).

2. Althaus deserves much credit for having shown the increasing interest in metaphysics among Protestant Orthodox theologians, especially in Keckermann and Alstedt, but also in Polanus and Junius (Althaus, op. cit., pp. 38, notes 1 and 4b); 92-95; 230 ff). He does not attribute this interest to a direct influence of Thomas, however, but rather to that of the Italian Peripatetics and the Jesuits (p. 92 f).

3. For a detailed biography of Zanchi see C. Schmidt, "Girolamo Zanchi," Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 32 (1859), pp. 625-708; also, M. Adam, Decades Duae Continentes Vitas Theologorum Exterorum Principum, Frankfurt, 1618. Valuable information, together with an extensive bibliography, is given in Realencyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche, 3. Aufl., ed. J.J. Herzog, Bd. XXI (1908) and XXIV (1913), article, "Zanchi," by C. Schmidt and Joh. Ficker.

his parents, the Bergamo monastary of the Augustinian Order of Regular Canons.[1] There the following ten years were devoted to the study of the classical languages, of Aristotle, and of the Scholastics. In view of the fact that most monastic orders, including the Augustinian Order of Regular Canons, had by that time recognized the authority of Thomas Aquinas, those ten years at Bergamo meant no less than a thorough training in Thomistic theology. In 1541 Zanchi was sent to Lucca where, under the guidance of the prior, Petrus Martyr Vermigli, he not only studied the Church Fathers but was introduced also to the writings of the German and Swiss reformers, notably Melanchthon and Butzer, but also Calvin and Luther. Zanchi's transition to Protestantism was a slow and gradual process and there was no sudden and abrupt break in his thinking during the eleven years he spent at Lucca.

In 1552 Zanchi left Italy to avoid arrest by the Inquisition and thus followed the example of Vermigli who had fled five years before. After a stay of ten months at Geneva, where he attended Calvin's lectures and listened to his sermons, Zanchi accepted a call to the University of Strassburg to fill the vacancy left by the death of Hedio.

Zanchi's stay at Strassburg, during which he lectured on Isaiah and Hosea as well as on Aristotle's Physics,

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1. Not to be confused with the Order of Augustinian Friars to which Luther had belonged. For further information, cf. Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 3. Aufl., Bd. 1, 1957, p. 748 f.

was marked by his long and bitter controversy with the Lutheran Johann Marbach over the Lord's Supper and the doctrine of predestination.[1] During this heated debate, which dragged on for years, Zanchi found little time or peace for writing. To end the controversy, he finally handed in his resignation and left Strassburg in the fall of 1563. After an interim of four years, during which he was pastor of the church at Chiavenna in Tyrol, Zanchi received a call to become the successor of Ursinus in the chair of theology at the University of Heidelberg. He arrived at Heidelberg in January of 1568 to begin the most significant and productive period of his career. His profound scholarship soon earned him widespread fame and recognition, and his counsel and judgment in theological matters and controversies was sought throughout the Reformed world of continental Europe and even England. When, upon the death of Friedrich III, Elector of the Palatinate, his son and successor, Ludwig VI, who was a Lutheran, expelled all Reformed professors from Heidelberg in 1576, Zanchi found refuge at Neustadt an der Hardt, where he became professor of New Testament at the newly founded Academy. Even after Heidelberg was restored to the Reformed faith a few years later, Zanchi chose to remain at Neustadt. He died on Novem-

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1. For the history of the controversy see W. Sohm, Die Schule Johann Sturms und die Kirche Strassburgs, München, 1912, pp. 195-235; Alex. Schweizer, Die Protestantischen Centraldogmen in ihrer Entwicklung innerhalb der Reformierten Kirche, Bd. 1, Zürich, 1854, pp. 425-436. Zanchi gives his own account of the controversy with Marbach in Miscellanea, Opera, 7.2.208-454.

ber 9, 1590, during a visit with friends at Heidelberg and was buried in the University Church of Heidelberg. His tombstone bears this epitaph:

> Here lies buried Hieronymus Zanchius,
> exiled from Italy, his fatherland, for the
> love of Christ.
> How great a theologian and philosopher he
> has been, is witnessed by his many books,
> by those whom he taught in the schools, and
> by those who heard him instruct the churches.
> And now, although his spirit has departed,
> yet he has remained with us by his
> illustrious name.[1]

At his death Zanchi left an impressive corpus of writings, many of which had already appeared in print, while other remained to be published. Zanchi's sons immediately began to collect his works, including correspondence, and in 1619 the complete edition, printed in Geneva by Samuel Crespin, appeared under the title, Zanchii Omnia Opera Theologica. The edition came out in three folio volumes divided into eight parts. Less complete collections had apparently been published prior to 1619. The edition available to this writer appeared in Geneva in 1613.

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1. Hieronymi hic sunt condita ossa Zanchii,
Itali, exsulantis, Christi amore, a patria:
Qui Theologus quantus fuerit et Philosophus,
Testantur hoc, Libri editi ab eo plurimi;
Testantur hoc, quos voce docuit in scholis;
Quique audiere eum docentem ecclesias.
Nunc ergo, quamvis hinc migrarit spiritu,
Claro tamen nobis remansit nomine.
Decessit A. MDXC. Die 19. Novemb.
Cited by the translator in a prefatory biography of Zanchi in, H. Zanchi, The Doctrine of Absolute Predestination, trans. A.M. Toplady, London, 1930, p. 39.

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The following list contains a selection of Zanchi's more important writings, including his major systematic works, arranged in chronological order.

Compendium praecipuorum capitum doctrinae christianae, Opera, 8.5.

Written at Lucca (between 1541 and 1551), this work is an abstract of Calvin's Institutes composed by Zanchi for his own use.

Aristoteles de naturali auscultatione seu de principiis, Strassburg, Wendelin Rihel, 1554.

Zanchi's only publication at Strassburg, containing the text of Aristotle's Physics with an introduction by Zanchi, and the text of a lecture on the necessity of philosophical studies. The work was to be used as a textbook by Zanchi's students. It is not included in the Opera, and I have been unable to locate it.

Miscellanea, Opera, 7.

Written at Chiavenna, the Miscellanea contain Zanchi's detailed account, supported by documents, of his controversy with Marbach. First published at Geneva in 1566, the work was later included in the Opera.

De conservando in ecclesia puro puto Dei verbo, Opera, 8.2.

Zanchi's inaugural lecture at Heidelberg University, given February 12, 1568.

De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.

Written presumably soon after his inaugural lecture

at Heidelberg. The exact year is not certain.

De incarnatione filii Dei, Opera, 8.1.

The work consists of two parts: The first contains Zanchi's lectures on Phil. 2:5-8, whereas the second part was written in refutation of Martin Chemnitz' views concerning the ubiquity of the body of Christ. The date of its first publication is uncertain.

De tribus Elohim sive de uno vero Deo aeterno, Patre, Filio et Spiritu Sancto, Opera, 1.

Represents Zanchi's first major systematic work, developing his doctrine of the Trinity. It is divided into two parts: the first presents the traditional doctrine with the help of detailed exegesis of Old and New Testament passages, while the second part deals with traditional and contemporary anti-Trinitarian heresies. The work was commissioned by the Elector Friedrich III to help prevent the spreading of anti-Trinitarian tendencies. It was first published in 1572.

De natura Dei seu de divinis attributis, Opera, 2.

Published originally in 1577, this work presents Zanchi's doctrine of God as the second installment of the series of his major systematic works. It was followed soon by a third volume on the doctrine of creation entitled:

De operibus Dei intra spatium sex dierum creatis, Opera, 3.

Zanchi closes the work announcing a fourth and final volume on the doctrine of redemption, including the doctrine of sin, the law, the person and work of Christ and "such

other doctrines as pertain to redemption." The first part of this planned treatise appeared under the title:

De primi hominis lapsu, de peccato et de lege Dei, Opera, 4.

It is the last of Zanchi's works written at Heidelberg. The death of the Elector and Zanchi's and his colleague's subsequent dismissal from the Heidelberg faculty prevented Zanchi from completing the volume as planned, and he never found the time to return to it later in Neustadt.

De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.4.

This work was first published at Neustadt in 1585. It is arranged in the form of short theses and was written by Zanchi for his children. The brief work became the most widely known of Zanchi's writings and is the source used by Heppe for his Reformed Dogmatics. It has often led to a one-sided and inaccurate understanding of Zanchi's position.

Zanchii epistolarum libri duo, Opera, 8, Appendix.

A collection of Zanchi's letters, first published separately in Hanover, 1609, and later added to the last volume of the Opera.

The above selection does not include numerous shorter tracts and treatises. They can easily be located, however, in the indices added to each of the eight volumes of the Opera.

The Problem

At the conclusion of our survey concerning sixteenth century developments within the Aristotelian tradition the object of the present study has already been indicated along general lines which now need to be made specific.

There can be no question that sixteenth century philosophy played an important role in the development of post-Reformation theology.[1] More recent Renaissance studies have left little doubt, furthermore, that the sixteenth century was still predominantly under the influence of the Aristotelian tradition which continued well into the seventeenth century, particularly at the universities.[2] In addition, our survey has shown that the Scholastic Aristotelianism in the form of Thomism and Scotism was very much a part of that tradition after having gone through a vigorous revival during the sixteenth century. This latter fact seems to provide reasonable grounds for assuming that such a renaissance of the Scholastic heritage did not remain entirely without influence upon Protestant theology, directly or indirectly. That a number of Protestant thinkers of the seventeenth century indeed show such influence has already been pointed out.[3] The question then arises whether similar traces of Scholastic influence can be found in the theology of the Reformed Aristotelians of the late sixteenth century, of whom Zanchi is a distinguished representative. His Thomistic back-

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1. Cf. Althaus, op. cit., pp. 9-17.
2. Kristeller, op. cit., pp. 24 f. and 34 f., 46 f.
3. Supra, pp. 10-11.

ground would lend first support to such an assumption, for it seems hardly conceivable that his thorough Scholastic training should have left no traces behind. Furthermore, Zanchi's general attitude toward tradition and the Roman Church stands in remarkable contrast to that of many of his contemporaries. For one thing, he had been considerably more reluctant than his teacher Vermigli and his friend Martinengo to leave the Church of Rome, always nursing the hope -- even during the darkest hours of the Inquisition -- for a reform from within the Church.[1] This hope he never quite abandoned, and throughout his life he insisted that the Roman Church had retained much of true Christian doctrine. Still shortly before his death he expressed the conviction that, should the Church of Rome restore its original purity, everyone would gladly return into its fold, for "what could be more desirable to a pious man than to remain until his death where he was dedicated to Christ by baptism, if only he can do so in obedience to God?"[2] All his life Zanchi was and wanted to be a "Catholic" theologian in the true sense of the word. For this reason he refused to be identified with Calvin, Luther, or Zwingli;[3] he wanted to depend on nothing but the Scriptures, free and ready to listen to any of the Reformers, the Church

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1. Schmidt, "Girolamo Zanchi," op. cit., p. 628.
2. De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.5.540, Quid enim pio cuique optatius, quam ut ubi per baptismum renati sumus, ibi etiam in finem usque vivamus?
3. Oratio de officio docentium, Opera, 8, Appendix, pp. 577-578.

Fathers, and the Scholastics wherever their views did not contradict the Word of God.

The question of possible Scholastic influence takes on concrete forms once we begin to investigate the very doctrine that has earned Zanchi the reputation of being a true Calvinist -- the doctrine of predestination. Contemporary Calvin research has convincingly disproved the validity of the traditional view that the predestinarian dogma occupies the center of Calvin's theology and that it is the material principle of his system. The very place of the doctrine in Calvin's Institutes as a part of soteriology would make such a view untenable. The whole doctrine of election in Calvin is meaningful only within a soteriological context.[1]

Even a first and superficial glance will inform us, however, that in Zanchi the situation is decidedly different. Already a confession concerning his doctrine of predestination, which Zanchi submitted to the City Council of Strassburg in defense of his views, is introduced by a brief treatise on the divine attributes for the sake of a proper understanding of predestination.[2] Zanchi's chief and most entensive exposition of the doctrine is found at the conclusion of his work, De natura Dei, containing the doctrine of the divine essence and attributes.[3] Again in the brief confession,

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1. Cf. P. Jacobs, Prädestination und Verantwortlichkeit bei Calvin, Kassel, 1937; E.A. Dowey, The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology, New York, 1952, p. 185 ff.; W. Niesel, Die Theologie Calvins, 2. Aufl., München, 1957.
2. Miscellanea, Opera, 7.279-336.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.477 ff.

De religione christiana fides, one of his last works, predestination occupies the same position.[1]

Thus it appears that for Zanchi the doctrine of predestination, from his first formulation of it until his last words, remained an integral part of the doctrine of God's essence. It was precisely this factor which cause the conflict between Zanchi and Marbach over predestination, and which explains why the German and Swiss theologians, whom Zanchi had asked for their opinion on the question, supported his theses only in part and in cautiously phrased language.[2] To be sure, none of them, not even Marbach himself, disputed or denied predestination as such. Marbach, in fact, had publicly agreed with Zanchi that predestination is taught by the Scriptures. But he insisted that this doctrine should not be presented a priori on the basis of God's eternal decree, but rather within the context of justification by faith in Christ, thereby leading the believer to the revealed will of God in Christ, for the comfort of the soul.[3]

The question, therefore, was not the doctrine of predestination as such, but rather its theological presuppositions. For Zanchi, the notion of God as first and final cause provided the true and logically necessary basis for this doctrine. According to him, predestination cannot be

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1. De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.5.485 f.
2. Especially the opinions from Marburg, Zurich (Vermigli and Bullinger), and Basel. Cf. Opera, 8, Zanchii epistolarum, Lib. I, pp. 248 f.; 258 ff.; 262 ff.
3. Schmidt, "Girolamo Zanchi," op. cit., p. 644 f.

properly understood without giving prior consideration to God's being and actions as they are in God, since the reason for man's election or reprobation cannot be found anywhere except in God himself.

It seems, then, that the key to an understanding of Zanchi's theology must be found in his doctrine of God. It is there that, page after page, we encounter the fruits of the spirit of medieval philosophy which in Calvin's Institutes are so conspicuously absent. To be sure, the differences between Calvin and Zanchi are not due to any new and original contributions of the latter. The differences can only be explained by Zanchi's return to the causal thinking of the Scholastics, from which Calvin, for the most part, had successfully freed himself. The following analysis of Zanchi's doctrine of God and of predestination will reveal his Thomistic heritage and the extent to which it influenced and determined his thinking and gave structure to the emerging Reformed orthodox dogmatics.

PART ONE

ZANCHI'S DOCTRINE OF GOD

CHAPTER I

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

> Tota fere sapientiae nostrae summa, quae vera demum ac solida sapientia censeri debeat, duabus partibus constat, Dei cognitione et nostri.[1]

This famous opening statement of Calvin's Institutes indicates, at the very outset of his major systematic work, the fundamental importance of the category of knowledge in Calvin's theology. The same is true also for Zanchi. Yet, as in the former, we search in vain for any exact definition of what is meant by the knowledge of God in Zanchi's writings. Instead, we must rely on an analysis of the epistemological presuppositions and principles which form the very basis of his theology, and which Zanchi reveals throughout his doctrine of God. These presuppositions, indicated by the six categories that are the divisions of the following chapter, center around the one basic problem which has, time and again, presented a major challenge for Christian theology: the problem of faith and reason, of the relationship between revealed and natural knowledge, between God as revealer and man as knower. The solution this problem found among the medieval schoolmen, particularly in the system of Thomas Aquinas, became a primary target of attack by Luther and Calvin. Despite some indications to the contrary, Calvin and Thomas are basically

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1. OS III,31,6-8.

divided on that issue. If therefore, as anticipated in our preliminary chapter, the following examination of Zanchi's doctrine of God is to show evidence of Thomistic influences, the position taken by Zanchi concerning the whole problem of the knowledge of God demands our first attention.

The Authority of Scripture

Man's salvation consists in the true knowledge of God and the Mediator, Jesus Christ, Zanchi declares in his inaugural lecture at Heidelberg University.[1] Such saving knowledge, however, is unattainable without God's Word, which God sent to us in order that in its light we might come to know the things which are necessary for our salvation.[2]

> Spiritual things cannot be perceived and truly known except through supernatural light; that (light), however, no one but God, who is above nature, can provide.[3]

With this statement Zanchi introduces Scripture as the sole authority for true and saving knowledge of God. This first and basic presupposition is reiterated time and again.

> Holy Scripture contains all that is necessary unto salvation, and that clearly and conspicuously; therefore, aside from the clear testimony of Scripture, nothing should be admitted as a necessarium for religious belief and deed.[4]

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1. De conservando in ecclesia puro puto Dei verbo, Opera, 8.2.[3] This work appears in the Opera as a preface to the treatise De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.319 ff. The pages are not numbered.
2. Ibid.
3. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.333. Res spirituales, non possunt nisi lumine supernaturali percipi et vere cognosci: illud autem donare non est, nisi illius, qui est supra naturam, Deus.
4. Ibid., 369. Scriptura sancta continet omnia, quae

1. The Primacy of Scripture and Theological Method:

As divine revelation of all that is necessary for salvation, the Scriptures become the foundation of the whole of theology. The entire corpus of Christian doctrine rests on this foundation and in all its parts is taken from Scripture. "What else is theology if not doctrine of God taken from God's Word?"[1] For that reason it is proper that the doctrine concerning Holy Scripture should precede all other theological loci in the order of discussion. With obvious reference to Calvin's Institutes, Zanchi criticizes those theologians who begin their loci with the doctrine of God on the grounds "that the knowledge of God is the first and chief part of the whole of Christian wisdom."[2] Since God cannot be known by us in a way sufficient for salvation without the Scriptures, a proper theological method must, therefore, begin with the doctrine of Holy Scripture.[3]

Zanchi suggests a combination of two methods to be used by a theologian: the analytical or resolutiva, and the synthetical or compositiva.[4] In order to understand Zanchi's procedure it is most important to recognize the origin of his

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ad salutem nostram necessaria sunt, idque perspicue: ac proinde nil citra apertum illius testimonium, admittendum est in religione, tanquam necessarium vel ad credendum, vel ad faciendum.

1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.319. Quid enim est theologia, nisi doctrina de Deo, ex verbo Dei desumpta?
2. Ibid., 319. ...quod cognitio Dei, prima ac praecipua pars sit totius Christianae sapientiae... Cf. J. Calvin, OS III.31.6-8; supra, p. 25.
3. Ibid., 319.
4. Ibid.

methodological principles. The double method which he introduces here is none other than the scientific method developed by the Paduan Aristotelians during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The two terms, "resolutive" and "compositive," are already used by Pietro d'Abano in the fourteenth century.[1] During the fifteenth century, the question of the double procedure involved in scientific method became the chief object of interest at Padua. Hugo of Siena, teacher of medicine, defines a complete science as dependent upon two modes of demonstration: resolution and composition. Both Methods are required, and it is impossible to use only one. Any proper scientific method must begin with the effects that are known to us, seek the cause, and then explain the effects from which it started by that cause.[2] The sixteenth century Paduans carried this development to its culmination represented by Zabarella. For him logic and method are interchangeable terms, because he regards logic not as a science, but purely as an instrument and tool to be sought not for its own sake but for its utility in furthering science. Scientific method must proceed from a careful analysis of instances to the general principle. After this analytic way of discovery has been pursued, we are then in a position to demonstrate deductively how effects follow from this principle,

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1. Cf. John H. Randall, Jr., "The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua," Journal of the History of Ideas, I:2 (1940), p. 185 f.
2. Ibid., p. 189 f.

going back from the principle to the systematized and ordered body of facts, to the doctrine itself formally expressed. This is what Zabarella and the sixteenth century Paduans call the combination of the resolutive and the compositive methods, which, in turn, became precisely the procedure and the terms of Galileo.[1] It is the method which, in mathematical terms, was called a combination of analysis and synthesis by Euclid and Archimedes.[2] This new scientific method stands in marked contrast to that of the many Humanist seekers who, revolting from the metaphysics of Scholasticism, yet emphasizing the place of a knowledge of nature in human wisdom, urged men to close their books and observe the world.[3] For the Paduan Aristotelians the only way of discovery is not mere observation and naive generalization of common experiences but a careful and precise analysis of facts. The principles thus discovered are, furthermore, not to be seen as true by any intuitive power of the intellect -- in rejection of the notion of the Scholastics, who had emphasized the power of the intellect to recognize the truth of first principles -- but they must return to the facts for confirmation and illustration.[4]

The use of the very terms "resolutive" and "compositive" in juxtaposition with "analytical" and "synthetical" by

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1. Randall, op. cit., p. 205 f.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 178.
4. For a discussion of Paduan Aristotelianism within the context of the Aristotelian tradition, cf. supra, pp. 3-5.

Zanchi indicates that he was well aware of an acquainted with the new developments in scientific methodology.[1] What is more important, he is the first Protestant theologian to advocate the employment of the new scientific method in theology. In this he was motivated not so much by the increasing tendency among his contemporaries to re-establish theology as a science -- a tendency which he nevertheless shared -- as by his acute awareness of the absolute primacy of Scripture as the source for theological knowledge. If Holy Scripture, as the only source of saving knowledge, is the proper foundation of the whole of theology, and if theology, in all its parts, is to be elicited from the Scriptures,[2] then this is a basic theological presupposition which must also find methodological expression -- hence Zanchi's indirect criticism of Calvin for devoting the first five chapters of the Institutes to the natural knowledge of God rather than to the doctrine of Holy Scripture.[3] For once that basic presupposition is expressed methodologically, it becomes obvious that the doctrine of Scripture must be the prolegomenon of the whole of Christian doctrine. Zanchi considers the double method of resolution

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1. Both P. Althaus and O. Ritschl point out the fact that Zanchi represents the first example of a deeper methodological reflection among Protestant theologians; they fail, however, to identify the background and origin of Zanchi's terminology. Cf. P. Althaus, Die Prinzipien der Deutschen Reformierten Dogmatik im Zeitalter der Aristotelischen Scholastik, Leipzig, 1914, p. 45 f.; O. Ritschl, Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus, Bd. 1, Göttingen, 1929, p. 175.
2. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.319.
3. Supra, p. 27.

and composition to be particularly adaptable to this purpose. For the Paduans this method meant the procedure from a precise analysis of given facts and their inter-relationship to the general principle, followed by a deductive return from the principle to the facts, thereby demonstrating these facts to be effects following from the general principle.[3] Zanchi outlines how this method applies in the formulation of Christian doctrine: Taking the statements of Scripture as our given facts, our first step must be the careful analysis and exposition of a specific scriptural context via the resolutive method. Such analysis will resolve, first of all, the scopus of the biblical author as well as the "arguments" connected with his scopus.[2] The analysis will then proceed to formulate the theological "questions or propositions" (quaestiones seu propositiones) indicated by those arguments;[3] and these collected propositions, finally, lead to the formulation of a specific locus communis. This is precisely the method by which the Paduan natural philosophy arrived at general and first principles. Thus Zanchi can call the loci communes the prima principia of Christian doctrine and, by way of illustration, refer to the principles of grammar as to the loci communes of linguistics.[4]

Once we have arrived at the loci communes by way of

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1. Supra, pp. 28-29.
2. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.319.
3. Ibid.
4. De conservando in ecclesia puro puto Dei verbo, Opera, 8.2.[8]

resolution from Scripture, the second method -- the compositive or synthetic method -- should then be followed in treating the *loci* themselves.[1] The process involves the clear and precise formulation of each question or proposition pertaining to a particular *locus*, followed by an explanation and a return to the biblical text for confirmation and illustration of the proposition.[2] The purpose in using the compositive or synthetic method is, in the first place, catechetical and pedagogical: as in all other sciences, the basic principles must be taught first. Thus in teaching Latin we first treat the grammar, then proceed to Cicero.[3] This is all the more important for theology since the consequence of committing errors are far more ruinous in theology than in any of the arts.[4] Hence the apostle's directive to interpret the Scriptures *ad analogiam fidei* (Rom. 12:6). The *analogia fidei* is none other than the sum of Christian doctrine handed down by the apostles themselves in the Symbolum Apostolicum and accepted by all the churches.[5] For this reason, no interpretation of Scripture can be permitted which would in any way contradict those principles of Christian doctrine.[6] The application of the *loci communes* toward a proper understanding of Scripture is, however, not the only purpose of the *methodus*

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1. *De Sacra Scriptura*, *Opera*, 8.3.319
2. *Ibid.*, 320.
3. *De conservando in ecclesia puro puto Dei verbo*, *Opera*, 8.2.[8]
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*

compositivus. The principles of doctrine, the loci theologici, must constantly be checked against, and confirmed by, the testimonies of Scripture. The confirmatio, as the final step, thus completes the methodical formulation of doctrine.[1]

The above presentation of Zanchi's views and reflections on theological method indicates his direct adaptation of the scientific "double" method, as developed by the Paduan Aristotelians, to his own specific purpose. The resolutive progress from instances to principle, and the compositive regress from principle to instances are but two parts of one methodical procedure toward a formal doctrine. It is thus misleading to say, as Althaus does,[2] that Zanchi suggests the analytical method for exegesis, the synthetical method for the theological loci. For Zanchi's whole purpose in his discussion of method is precisely to link the individual theological loci methodologically with Scriptural exegesis, and not -- as later in Keckermann, Alstedt and others -- to established a methodological basis for the systematic treatment of theology as a discipline.[3]

From Keckermann on it was the answer to the question whether theology is to be regarded as a theoretical or a praetical science, that decided the choice of method. Hence Keckermann, who was of the latter opinion, chose the analyti-

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1. De conservando in ecclesia puro puto Dei verbo, Opera, 8.2.[8]
2. Althaus, op. cit., p. 47.
3. Ibid., p. 40 ff.

cal method;[1] whereas Alstedt and most other Reformed theologians of the seventeenth century, who held that theology was both theoretical and practical, rejected the analytical in favor of the synthetical method.[2] For Zanchi the whole problem concerning the theoretical or practical nature of theology as a science had not yet arisen. He simply accepted the Thomistic view that theology is theoretical as well as practical,[3] without making this a basis for a general theological method. Zanchi refers to the above division in connection with his definition of faith as sapientia and prudentia, in which he follows the example of Butzer, whom he quotes.[4] The basis for this distinction is the relation between intellect and will and the two kinds of actions produced by each,[5] a problem to which we will return in a later chapter. What interests us here is the fact that even this distinction, despite its obvious methodological possibilities, has no connection with Zanchi's use of the analytical and synthetical methods.

The fact remains, then, that Zanchi's methodological reflections do not yet extend -- at least not in a conscious manner -- beyond the traditional form of the loci communes or disputationes.[6] However, his method is not simply the Scho-

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1. Althaus, op. cit., p. 26 f.
2. Ibid., pp. 36 ff., 51 ff.
3. De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.4.578. Tota autem doctrina Christiana, partim in theoria, partim in praxis posita est. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST I.1.4 and 5.
4. De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.4.578.
5. Ibid. Sunt etiam duo actionum fidei genera: unum in intellectu, alterum in voluntate.
6. Bohatec points this out correctly, although he overlooks Zanchi's definite tendency toward a more systematic --

lastic method, as Bohatec suggests,[1] but shows the basic characteristic of the scientific method of the Paduan Peripatetics: the combination of resolution and composition, or analysis and synthesis. We have suggested above[2] that Zanchi's use of this double method was apparently motivated by the fact that it offered an opportunity to express methodologically the primacy of Scripture and its function in the teaching of Christian doctrine. If Scripture is the foundation of the whole of Christian doctrine, then each theological proposition must not only be derived from Scripture but must also return to it for confirmation and illustration. It is precisely in this sense that Zanchi proposes to use the double method of resolution (or analysis) and composition (or synthesis) in his treatment of the theological loci.

Zanchi's preliminary discussion of the proper theological method has served not only to explain why the doctrine of Holy Scripture should precede all other theological loci, but to focus attention upon the authority of Scripture as the central problem and basic presupposition with regard to the knowledge of God. Thus Zanchi's doctrine of Scripture is dominated throughout by the question of certainty. If the theological method proposed at the outset recognized and presupposed the Scriptures as the foundation of the whole of Chris-

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and synthetical -- sequence, particularly in the doctrine of God. [J. Bohatec, "Die Methode der Reformierten Dogmatik," Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 81 (1908), p. 293 ff.]

1. Ibid., p. 293.
2. Supra, p. 34.

tian doctrine, then it must be asked, first of all, from where we derive the certain knowledge that the biblical canon is the inspired Word of God.[1]

2. The Authority of Scripture and the Witness of the Spirit:

Zanchi discusses the problem of the authority of Scripture under two aspects, namely first, that of the objective and inherent validity of the Scripture as Verbum Dei and divinitus inspirata,[2] and second, that of the believer's subjective recognition of the Bible's divine authority.[3] In treating these two problems separately, Zanchi obviously follows Calvin, who acknowledges the same distinction in chapter VII of the first book of his Institutes.[4]

It must be said at the outset, that the problem regarding the inspiration or origin of the Scriptures is without question a subordinate issue for Zanchi as well as for Calvin, even though he discusses it at great length.[5] Nowhere does Zanchi make an attempt to establish an independent doctrine of inspiration or divine dictation of the biblical text in any mechanical sense. At the same time, Zanchi leaves no

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.332. Nunc methodus ipsa postulat, ut videamus, quaenam sint illa media, quibus adduci homines possint, ut hosce Libros, quos Canonicos appellari, credant et agnoscant vere esse θεόπνευστος.

2. De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.4.481. ... Scripta Prophetica et Apostolica ipsissimum esse Verbum Dei. Ibid., 483. ... tenentes illud Apostoli: Omnes Scriptura divinitus inspirata; II Tim. 3:16.

3. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.332; see above note 1.

4. OS III,68-69; cf. E.A. Dowey, The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology, New York, 1952, p. 89.

5. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.356.

doubts that by divine inspiration of the Scriptures he means their literal dictation by the Holy Spirit to the biblical writers. For Zanchi this is the clear implication of the word θεόπνευστος in II Tim. 3:16. If the Scripture is divinely inspired then this means, first of all, that it proceeds from the mouth of God and the Spirit, and second, that it is transmitted to us through holy men inspired by God and the Spirit.[1] Zanchi declares that the "Church of Israel" as well as the "Christian Church" have always acknowledged the Canon of Scripture to be inspired by God, dictated by the Holy Spirit, and written down by the Prophets, Apostles and Evangelists.[2] If the mouth of God is the spring or fountain from which the Word of God proceeds, the biblical writers -- and specifically, their minds, mouths, and hands -- become the "channels" through which the Holy Spirit directs the Word to us.[3] The clear inference of these statements is that for Zanchi the verbum Dei is identical with the Canonici libri,

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.356. Est enim Scriptura θεόπνευστος : Ergo primum a Dei ore et Spiritu est. Deinde per homines sanctos, quibus fuit inspirata, ad nos transmissa. Haec duo consequantur est necesse ex hac dictione

2. Ibid., 325. Canonicos igitur libros vocarunt Patres, omnes eos, qui primum ad illus Mosis Canonem, deinde ad alterum etiam, Mosis scilicet simul et Prophetarum examinatos: Ecclesia primum Israelitica, deinde Ecclesia Christiana Spiritu Sancto edocta: constanter agnovit esse θεόπνευστος , et a Spiritu Sancto dictatos, perque ipsos Prophetas, Apostolos, atque Evangelistas conscriptos fuisse: eoque illos purum esse Dei verbum.

3. Ibid., 356. Hoc verbum ex Dei ore, tanquam ex fonte effluxit perque mentes, et ora, et manus horum sanctorum virorum, tanquam per Canales, opera Spiritus Sancti ad nos usque derivatum est....

the scripta Prophetica et Apostolica, whose real author is God.[1]

Zanchi's position with reference to the inspiration and origin of Scripture is remarkably similar to that of Calvin as expressed by the latter in his exposition of the same biblical passage.[2] Calvin refers to the biblical writers as "organs" of the Holy Spirit. The Law and the Prophets are a doctrine dictated by the Holy Spirit (dictante Spiritu sancto).[3] There can be little doubt that both theologians not only believed in but actually taught a literal inspiration of the Scriptures. To deny that Calvin holds such a view is not only to ignore the evidence[4] but also to misunderstand what Calvin has in mind. As Warfield has pointed out, Calvin is not interested in the mode of inspiration but rather in the result or the effects, namely, "the production of a pure Word of God free from all human admixtures."[5] Calvin's statements with reference to the literal inspiration of the biblical

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1. De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.4.481. Scripta Prophetica et Apostolica ipsissimum esse Verbum Dei. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.322. ...atqui Scriptura sancta, verbum est Dei. Etsi enim scripta fuit per homines: autor tamen illius est Deus. Fuit enim divinitus inspirata, nempe illis sanctis hominibus, Mosi, Prophetis, per quos scripta fuit.

2. Com. II Tim. 3:16 (CO LII.383)

3. Ibid., for further references see Dowey, op. cit., p. 91 ff.

4. Cf. W. Niesel, Die Theologie Calvins, 2. Aufl., München, 1957, pp. 31 ff. Niesel mentions the fact that Calvin speaks on several occasions about dictation by the Holy Spirit but attributes no significance to those statements. He denies categorically that Calvin teaches a verbal inspiration of Scripture.

5. B.B. Warfield, Calvin and Calvinism, New York, 1931, p. 63 f.

writings are meant to express the objective validity of the Bible as the Word of God. This objective validity and authenticity of Scripture is the result of inspiration, of the activity of the Holy Spirit in the men to whom God had spoken and revealed himself. "The Bible is not invested with validity by the believer or by the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit within the believer, but by special works of the Spirit in the chosen men to whom the divine oracles were originally given."[1] Thus Calvin can insist that Scripture is "αὐτόπιστος," self-authenticating, and "of itself commands our reverence by its own majesty."[2]

If it is true that the Bible has inherent validity, this does not yet constitute its authority for the believer, however. For Calvin the divine inspiration of Scripture is not a source of the believer's knowledge. The knowledge and certainty that God speaks in the Bible derives solely from the inner witness of God himself through the Spirit. It is by this witness alone that the intrinsic validity of Scripture is recognized and confirmed. God alone is the proper witness for his own Word, which will never find faith in human hearts unless it is sealed by the inner testimony of the Spirit. The same Spirit who spoke through the mouth of the Prophets must penetrate our hearts in order to convince us that they delivered faithfully what was divinely given.[3] In clear con-

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1. Dowey, op. cit., p. 91.
2. OS III.70.16 ff.
3. OS III.70.2-8. Nam sicut Deus solus de se idoneus est testis in suo sermone: ita etiam non ante fidem reperiet

trast to later orthodox thought, Calvin bases the certainty of the Bible's authority not upon a theory of verbal inspiration but upon the present witness of the same Spirit that inspired the Prophets; yet not in such a way as to circumvent, but rather as to confirm and to accredit that inspiration. It remains true that the Bible has intrinsic validity, "is self-authenticating and not subject to demonstrations and arguments."[1] But only the inner testimony of the Spirit can enable us to perceive the Bible's authentication and thus create within our hearts the certainty that the Scripture comes from the very mouth of God.[2] Calvin himself sums up his view on the relationship between Word and Spirit:

> The Word itself has not much certainty for us unless it is confirmed by the testimony of the Spirit. For the Lord has joined together by a kind of mutual connection the certainty of his Word and Spirit: so that a genuine reverence for the Word possesses our minds when the Spirit shines upon it, enabling us there to behold the face of God; and that, on the other hand, we embrace the Spirit without fear of illusion when we recognize him in his image, that is, in the Word.[3]

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sermo in hominum cordibus quam interiore Spiritus testimonio obsignetur. Idem ergo Spiritus qui per os Prophetarum loquutus est, in corda nostra penetret necesse est, ut persuadeat fideliter protulisse quod divinitus erat mandatum.

1. OS III.70.17-18. ...et hanc quidem esse αὐτόπιστον neque demonstrationi et rationibus subjici eam fas esse....

2. OS III.70.22-27. Illius [Spiritus] ergo virtute illuminati, ...credimus, a Deo esse Scripturam, ...ab ipsissimo Dei ore ad nos fluxisse.

3. OS III.84.13-20. ...Verbum ipsum non valde certum nobis esse nisi Spiritus testimonio confirmetur. Mutuo enim quodam nexu Dominus verbi Spiritusque sui certitudinem inter se copulavit: ut solida verbi religio animis nostris insidat, ubi affulget Spiritus qui nos illic Dei faciem contemplari faciat: ut vicissim nullo hallucinationis timore Spiritum amplexemur, ubi illus in sua imagine, hoc est in verbo, recognoscimus.

The term "mutual connection" expressed the very heart of Calvin's doctrine. Word and Spirit form a correlation the two elements of which cannot be separated. Both are connected in an inviolable union (inviolabili nexu).[1] Calvin's entire doctrine of the authority of Scripture is based on that correlation. On the one hand, the divinely inspired Scripture is identified as such only by the inner witness of the Spirit within the believer. No theory of inspiration can therefore become an independent source for the authority of Scripture apart from the Spirit's witness. On the other hand, the Spirit today reveals nothing else than what he revealed once through the Prophets and Apostles. Therefore, "we are not to expect the Holy Spirit from any other side than from the testimony of the Bible."[2] We might say that the Spirit identifies himself through the Word of Scripture or -- in the language of the Westminster Confession -- speaks to us "by and with the Word."[3]

In comparison, it would seem that the position taken by Zanchi is essentially that of Calvin as presented above. That the Scripture is θεόπνευστος we know only through the testimony of the Holy Spirit. We cannot be certain that the Bible is, indeed, the Word of God merely by reading it or by listening to it. The Scripture does not prove itself but is

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1. OS III.82.21.
2. Niesel, op. cit., p. 38.
3. The Westminster Confession of Faith, ch. I, art. 5, quoted in Ph. Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3, 4th ed., New York [1931], p. 603.

proven to us by the work of the Spirit within us.[1] "Spiritual things cannot be perceived and truly known except by that supernatural light which only God, who is above nature, can give."[2] If Scripture could prove itself, then all who read or hear it would be able to acknowledge its divine authority. Yet daily experience teaches that many, although they hear and read the Bible, do not recognize its authority.[3] To emphasize this point Zanchi makes use of the familiar traditional illustration: Holy Scripture is in itself a sol splendissimus -- like a most brilliant sun. But as the sunlight remains invisible to a blind man except his blindness be taken away by someone, so the light of Scripture is concealed from us due to the spiritual blindness of our minds, unless this blindness is removed through the illumination of the mind by the Holy Spirit.[4]

Up to this point Zanchi's thought has remained closely parallel to that of Calvin. But now he goes a dangerous step further in the effort to relate the objective and subjective elements that contribute to the believer's recogni-

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.332.
2. Ibid., 333; (supra, p. 26, note 3)
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. This illustration which was widely used throughout the Middle Ages to explain the infusio fidei or illuminatio (cf. K. Heim, Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher, Leipzig, 1911, p. 294) appears as early as the fifth century. I found it used for the first time by Dionysius Areopagita in his Ecclesiastical Hierarchy in describing the mind's capacity for immediate vision of the divine light (cf. J.P. Migne, ed., Patrologiae cursus completus... Series graeca. Patrologia graeca, T. 3 [Paris], col. 397D-400A.

tion of the authority of Scripture. There are four different media by which God leads his elect gradually, "step by step," toward the knowledge that the Bible is truly θεόπνευστος.[1] These four media constitute different stages in a certain ordo cognoscendi: the traditio ecclesiastica or testimonium Ecclesiae, the testimonium Dei in scriptura loquentis, the testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum and, finally, the various demonstrationes.[2]

Zanchi emphasizes that the first of these media, the testimony of the Church, must not be considered as first in rank and efficacy (primum praecipuum et efficacius), but rather as first in the order (primum ordine). According to Rom. 10:17 faith comes by hearing and preaching; preaching, however, is carried on per ecclesiam et non per alios.[3] The Church alone is sent to preach, it alone possesses the Word of God; and the first thing the Church preaches is the fact that what it preaches is the Word of God.[4] Thus the testimony of the Church is not only useful but necessary. What moved the people of Israel to believe that Moses' teaching was the Word of God was the witness and authority of Moses himself. Again, that which caused the Jews to accept the doctrine of John the Baptist as God's own Word was the authority of the Baptist as a holy man, as a man learned in the sacred Scriptures and thus

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.335.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

worthy of faith.[1] With reference to Augustine's confession, that it was the authority of the Church's witness by which he was moved to believe the Gospel, Zanchi asks simply: Is there anyone who has ever come to the Gospel in a different way? Indeed, he refers to his own experience, while still in Papatu -- under the papacy: "What was the reason that we -- while under the papacy -- have believed the Gospel to be the true Word of God? Because of the testimony and authority of the Church. It was the authority of the whole Church that first moved us to come to the Gospel."[2] And with deep-felt personal conviction Zanchi continues to say:

> That we now recognize the Scripture as the true Word of God we owe in no small measure to the testimony and tradition of the Church. Let us not in any manner despise or belittle a medium which God himself has considered worthy of leading us to the true knowledge of Scripture as God-inspired.[3]

One could hardly expect a more positive evaluation of the authority of the Church from a Reformed theologian than the one advanced by Zanchi. At the same time, however, he leaves no doubt that "whatever authority the Church has, it has from Holy Scripture. The doctrine of Scripture gives

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.336.
2. Ibid. Cur credidimus etiam in Papatu hoc esse Verbum Dei? propter testimonium et autoritatem Ecclesiae. Quid deinde primum nos permovit ut ad Evangelium accesserimus? Autoritas tot tantarumque Ecclesiarum.
3. Ibid. Ergo quod agnoscamus nunc vere, hanc Scripturam, verum esse Dei Verbum: non parum debemus Ecclesiae testimonio et traditio: et hujuscemodi medium, non debemus contemnere aut parvifacere, quonjam Deus dignatur hoc uti in deducendis nobis ad veram Scripturam, quod vere sit θεόπνευστος, cognitionem. Cf. also De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.4.483.

authority to the Church, not vice versa."[1] The authority of Scripture is far superior to that of the Church since it is derived directly from God, not from the Church.[2] Because it is God himself who speaks in and through the Bible, the latter has, indeed, authority in itself (in se) and by itself (a seipsa), an authority which is surely self-evident (ἀξιόπιστος) and therefore a second medium by which we are led to perceive the Bible's divine authorship.[3] If, in effect, we do not recognize this, it is not due to any defect of the Scripture but to our blindness.[4] To uphold the objective and de facto authority of Scripture Zanchi draws a distinction between autoritas per se and autoritas apud alios.[5] After David had been anointed by Samuel, he had full kingly authority; although it was not acknowledged by others. The Scripture has, therefore, authority in itself and is utterly trustworthy, quite independent of its recognition by men.[6] Zanchi stresses again and again the Bible's intrinsic authority and insists that it is ἀξιόπιστος, self-evident. Never is Scripture an ineffective medium as such and in se but only apud nos, because we are unable to see its divine authority due to our blindness.

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.343. Quicquid dignitatis habet Ecclesia: habet a Sacra Scriptura.... Ergo doctrina Scripturae, dat autoritatem Ecclesiae, non contra.
2. Ibid. Est autem certissima illa regula... longe majoris esse autoritatis Scripturam quam Ecclesiam. Cf. also Ibid., 340.
3. Ibid., 335 f., 340.
4. Ibid., 336.
5. Ibid., 340 f.
6. Ibid.

This inability on our part to see the Scripture's heavenly light and divine dignity makes it necessary that a third medium be added to persuade and convince us fully that it is God who speaks through the Scriptures: the inner witness of the Spirit. We noticed before that Calvin introduced the concept of the testimony of the Spirit specifically for the purpose of accrediting the Scriptures.[1] The term "illumination" appears only a few times in this connection and is not really introduced by Calvin until later in relation to faith. Zanchi, however, uses both concepts to describe the work of the Holy Spirit with regard to the believer's recognition of the authority of Scripture. In the first place (primo), the Spirit testifies in our hearts and persuades us that it is truly God who speaks in the Bible.[2] In direct correspondence to Calvin's concept of the testimonium internum, Zanchi defines this first phase of the Spirit's activity as testimony in the strict sense of the term: the Spirit testifies to the divine authorship of Scripture thereby accrediting its authority and authenticity. However, for Zanchi this is only part of the work of the Spirit.

> Moreover [deinde] the Spirit opens and illuminates the eyes of our mind in order that we may see the heavenly authority of Scripture and recognize that God, and not man or angel, is its author. It is then that we see the bright sun and brilliant light, it is then that Scripture identifies itself by its own power [sua vi]

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1. Supra, p. 40; cf. Dowey, op. cit., p. 124.
2. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.337.

as θεόπνευστος .[1]

Apart from the testimony of the Spirit by which we firmly believe and are fully convinced that the Scripture is the Word of God,[2] we receive through the Spirit the facultas videndi, the capacity of seeing for ourselves the heavenly truth and excellence of Scripture which we were unable to see before due to our blindness. Not only do we believe (credimus) the Spirit's testimony that the heavenly sun shines in the Scripture, as a blind man believes the testimony of one whom he trusts, but having received our eyesight from the Spirit, we actually see and recognize the sun itself, the inherent divine majesty and truth of Scripture.[3]

The fourth and final medium by which God leads us to recognize the authority of Scripture consists of the numerous rational arguments or demonstrationes which are partly contained in the Bible itself and partly the result of conclusions drawn from Scripture. Zanchi, after mentioning briefly the most familiar of these traditional "proofs," emphasizes that all of these arguments have no effect except with those whose minds have been previously illuminated by the Holy Spirit.[4] At the most, these demonstrations lend addi-

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.337. Deinde ita plene illustrat oculos, ut excellentiam dignitatemque Scripturae coelestem intueamur: quo intuitu magis ac magis agnoscimus, Deum vere huisce autorem esse, non hominem, aut Angelum. Tunc Solem splendentem, & lucernam accensam videmus: tunc verum est, Scripturam sese sua vi prodere, an sit θεόπνευστος.
2. Ibid., 335.
3. Ibid., 335, 336 and 337.
4. Ibid., 335 and 338.

tional support to our previously established conviction of the Bible's divine authority. But even such additional support or confirmation is superfluous and unnecessary for those who -- their blindness having been removed by the Spirit -- can see and recognize the heavenly truth of Scripture with their own eyes and to whom its authority is self-evident. Thus in his final summary of the media Zanchi leaves out the rational arguments altogether, reversing, at the same time, the order of the testimony of the Spirit and that of the Scripture itself: the latter, instead of preceding the testimony of the Spirit, now follows it.[1]

For an evaluation of Zanchi's doctrine of Scripture we return to the two aspects mentioned at the beginning: the objective validity of the Bible and the subjective recognition of it by the believer.[2]

We have noted that although Calvin recognized those two aspects of the problem, he combined them in a way that leaves room for the intrinsic validity of Scripture without making it an independent source of authority for the believer. Word and Spirit, in Calvin's view, form a strict correlation that cannot in any way be dissolved by formal distinctions. In Zanchi, however, this is precisely what has taken place. A key factor in Zanchi's approach to the problem is his use of the medieval image of sunlight and the eye in explaining

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.339.
2. Supra, p. 36.

the necessity of the testimony of the Spirit while trying to uphold the objective authority of Scripture. This image leads necessarily to a shift in the definition of the testimony of the Spirit, which is now understood primarily as illumination. Not only does the Spirit testify to the divine inspiration of the Bible, thereby convincing us of its authority; he also -- and this is of far greater importance to Zanchi -- illuminates our mind in that he gives us the facultas videndi enabling us actually to see and perceive the light itself in that its rays can now reach and penetrate our minds.[1] As a result, "we not only believe for certain [certe credimus] but we truly recognize [vere cognoscimus] that it is God who speaks in Scripture."[2] The emphasis placed by Zanchi upon the illumination of the mind as the chief function of the Spirit actually leaves the testimonium internum, in its original sense of accrediting Scripture as understood by Calvin, without real significance. The illuminated mind no longer needs to be convinced of that which it has been enabled to see by itself.

A far more significant development, however, must be seen in the fact that Zanchi's use of the Scholastic metaphor of sunlight and eye now makes the Bible itself a source of its authority for the believer.

> Holy Scripture has authority with believers... partly through the Holy Spirit who has opened their minds toward recognizing the dignity of Scripture, and partly through itself [a seipsa]

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1. Supra, p. 46 f.; De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.340.
2. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.335.

> in that -- just as a light -- it hits the previously opened eyes of believers with its rays and thus clearly manifests its own self-evidence. [1]

To my knowledge, this is the one instance where Zanchi uses the analogy of proportionality -- the proportionality referring to a likeness in function. In this sense the analogy is applied twice: first, in using the name vision or sight of both the eye and the mind as a common designation of similar functions, and second, by designating the functions of the sun and of Scripture with the name light. A concept is, on the grounds of like functions, transferred from one function to another similar function: eyesight (facultas videndi) is made to designate also the perceptivity of the mind; the light (lumen) going out from the sun is used to designate the divine majesty and dignity shining forth from the Bible. Finally, beyond referring to similar functions, the analogy is one of proportionality also with respect to a likeness in the relation, which is of a causal nature. It is, indeed, this likeness in relation which is most important in Zanchi's analogy. As the sun is related to the eye as a source of light by which the eye recognizes the sun, so the Bible is related to the mind as source of the divine light, by which the mind recognizes the Bible's authority. In other words, knowledge or cognition in each case is the result of a similar causal re-

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.340. Sancta Scriptura, apud fideles... autoritatem habet partim a Spiritu Sancto qui illorum mentes ad dignitatem Scripturae cognoscendam aperuit: partim a seipsa, quae seu lux, fidelium oculos jam apertos sua luce ita percellit, ut quam sit ἀξιόπιστος, ipsa per se aperte ostendat.

lation between the object and the subject of knowledge, the object itself being the cause or the source of the light which makes vision or cognition possible.

In view of this analogy we are now in a position properly to assess Zanchi's understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit as illuminatio. In the few instances where Calvin uses the concept illuminatio instead of testimonium it is to describe the Spirit as source of the light by which we recognize the Word of God in Scripture: "...the Spirit shines upon it [the Scripture], enabling us there to behold the face of God."[1] The objective out-thereness of God's face in Scripture does not radiate its own light but lights up, as it were, in reflection of the light aimed upon it by the Spirit.

In Zanchi, however, it is the Scripture whose light "hits" our eyes,[2] and by this transfer of a function, which in Calvin is attributed to the Spirit, Zanchi establishes Scripture as a source of its authority with us. The Spirit's function is no longer to "illuminate" the mind in the proper sense of the term, but is limited to supplying the mind with the facultas videndi, the latter to be understood as perceptivity, the capacity to receive the light which radiates from the Bible itself.[3] The Spirit's operation is like the operation performed by a surgeon upon a blind man's eye which removes the obstacle that barred the rays of light from pene-

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1. Supra, p. 40.
2. Supra, p. 49 f.
3. Ibid.

trating the eye. The obstacle that prevents man from perceiving the light of Scripture is his natural finiteness; only God "who is above nature" can therefore give the capacity to perceive spiritual things.[1]

While the operation of the Holy Spirit in the believer is thus maintained as a conditio sine qua non, it is definitely understood as a preparatory function; it creates the necessary condition for the following self-authentication and self-manifestation of Scripture which now "seu Lux, fidelium oculos jam apertos sua Luce ita percellit, ut quam sit ἀξιόπιστος , ipsa per se aperte ostendat."[2] This self-disclosure of the Bible's authority is further emphasized by Zanchi when he says that "we recognize [sentimus] in Scripture the most definite [certissimam] and living power of the highest Godhead [numinis altissimi], by which power we find ourselves gently drawn into cherishing, embracing and preserving the Scripture as a most precious treasure...."[3]

There can be no doubt, then, that Zanchi's view of the authority of Scripture as "partly" depending on the testimony of the Spirit, "partly" on itself,[4] and his return to the convenient Scholastic-Aristotelian distinction between

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.333; cf. supra, p. 26.
2. Ibid., 340; cf. supra, p. 50, note 1.
3. Ibid., 334. ...sentimus in hac Scriptura certissimam quandam numinis altissimi vim vigere, qua sentimus nos suavissime pertrahi ad hanc Scripturam amandam, amplectendam, et ut pretiosum thesaurum in corde conservandam.
4. Ibid., 340.

in se and *apud nos*,[1] represents the dissolution of the "inviolable mutual connection,"[2] the correlation between Word and Spirit, which Calvin maintained, and by which he had overcome the dualism of medieval Aristotelianism. With the return of Aristotelian thinking in Zanchi's approach to the problem the Reformers' view of Scripture suffered a first and serious damage. For as soon as a distinction is made between something existing *per se* and the believer's subjective appropriation of it, then it is inevitable that the former will be attributed with the primary authority, while the subjective experience of it receives only a secondary, derived authority. Thus we find that only a few years later Sadeel defines the *a se* existing authority of Scripture as an axiom of theology, the certainty of which is no longer founded upon the witness of the Spirit.[3]

Revelation and Faith

The above analysis of Zanchi's doctrine of Scripture has revealed a heavy, almost exclusive preoccupation on his part with presenting the Bible in terms of strong, objective authority. The Bible's authority is based, first of all, upon the inspiration of the prophets and apostles who, under the dictation of the Spirit, committed God's oral revelation to writing. Thus the resulting canon of sixty-six books is

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1. *De Sacra Scriptura*, *Opera*, 8.3.340; cf. *supra*, p. 45.
2. *Supra*, p. 41.
3. Cf. Heim, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

the "Word of God itself" (ipsissimum Verbum Dei), the "pure Word of God" (purum Verbum Dei), which in its entirety represents the objective revelation of all the things necessary for our salvation. Zanchi maintains that this objective authority of Scripture as divine revelation is self-evident (ἀξιόπιστος) and, to prove his point, he compares the Bible with the sun and a burning light. The antinomy between the self-evidence of Scripture and the inward illumination of the Spirit is solved with the help of the Thomistic-Aristotelian distinction between per se and apud nos. The illumination by the Spirit, defined as the gift of the facultas videndi, is related exclusively to the authority of Scripture.

All of this means, in short, that the epistemological problem posed by introducing the doctrine of Scripture as prolegomenon and foundation of the whole of theology -- specifically, of the knowledge of God and Christ, the Mediator -- has been disposed of and dealt with as a purely formal problem in terms of the authority of the canon. It is only after the objective authority of the canon has been established that Zanchi raises the question concerning the revelatory content of the canon in terms of the end and purpose (finis) for which it was given.

The Bible was inspired, written and handed down to us to the end that we should find salvation, that is, eternal life.[1] More specifically, Zanchi declares on the basis of

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.368.

II Tim. 3, that Scripture was given to us for the purpose of instructing us in all the things pertaining to eternal life.[1] The content of Scripture is thus understood as a divine instruction, a doctrina coelestis,[2] in all matters belonging to true piety, that is, in what should be believed and done in order to gain eternal life.[3] The things "necessary for salvation" are identified as matters of faith and practice, the dogmata pertaining to faith, the praecepta legis to practice.[4] A further distinction is made by Zanchi between those matters that are necessary per se, as belief in God and a pure life; and those which must necessarily be deduced from principles expressed in Scripture.[5] This means, in fact, that not only the biblical text as such, but also things deduced from the text by necessary consequence (e.g. infant baptism), constitute the body of "heavenly doctrine" needed for salvation.[6]

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1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.368. Scripturas ideo nobis esse traditas, ut per eas ita instruamur in iis, quae ad vitam pertinent aeternam....

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 370. Scriptura in hunc finem tradita est, ut nihil nos lateret eorum, quae ad veram putatem pertinent, et ad vitam aeternam consequendam necessaria sunt.

4. Ibid., 369. Scriptura sancta continet omnia quae ad salutem nostram necessaria sunt... vel ad credendum, vel ad faciendum.

Ibid., 370. Omnia enim aut ad fidem, aut ad opera et actiones pertinent: ad fidem, dogmata: ad actiones, praecepta legis.

5. Ibid., 369. Notandum duplex rerum ad salutem necessariarum genus: unum eorum, quae necessaria sunt per se... ut fidere Deo... sancte et caste vivere... aliud... est eorum, quae non per se... sed propter aliud observanda sunt.

Ibid., 370. Etsi enim non exter expressum praeceptum hac de re: colligitur tamen perspicue ex suis principiis, hoc est causis.

6. Cf. The Westminster Confession of Faith, ch. 1, art.

The task of theology, then, is that of analyzing and synthesizing -- by way of the double method defined at the outset -- this content of the canon. Theology presents the prima principia of religion, collected directly or by necessary consequence from Scripture. It is significant that in Zanchi's doctrine of Scripture we find no reference to Christ as the true scopus or finis of the Bible. True, the end in view is man's salvation unto eternal life, and the Scripture was given as an "instrument" to that end.[1] Its instrumental function, however, is not defined in terms of witness to Christ, nor is it limited to the Gospel. The Bible is called the only perfect instrument unto salvation precisely because it contains omnia quae ad salutem necessaria sunt, and for that reason nothing should be added nor should anything be taken away from it.[2] Salvation is thus clearly equated with the faithful acceptance of the whole Bible as a body of revealed truth.[3] With this equation, however, Zanchi has indicated a certain view of the relationship which exists between revelation and faith, that must now be further investigated within the context of his doctrine of faith proper.

6: "The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture.... (Quoted in Schaff, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 603)

1. De Sacra Scriptura, Opera, 8.3.368.

2. Ibid., 370. Propositio igitur certissima est. Illam de religione deque salute aeterna doctrinam, cui nihil addi, nihilve diminui potest, esse perfectam eoque continere omnia, quae ad salutem necessaria sunt.

3. Ibid., 368. Scriptura tota revelata est propter salutem omnium qui eam velint fide amplecti et custodire.

1. The Object of Faith:

As divine instruction of all things that are necessary for salvation, the whole Scripture, as a body of revealed truth, is the object of faith in Zanchi's view.

> Faith is the living and perpetuous virtue or power freely infused by the Father, because of Christ, through the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the elect; by which [virtue] we are persuaded that what is proposed in the writings of the prophets and apostles is the Word of God, all of which, law as well as gospel, we receive with certain and constant assent as the true Word of God.... That is my description of faith.[1]

This represents not a preliminary, but Zanchi's most comprehensive definition of faith and one of special significance as regards the nature of faith -- a problem which we shall consider later. What interests us at the moment is the fact that faith has as its object the whole Scripture, law and Gospel. In unequivocal terms faith, or the act of faith, is described as assent to the propositions of the entire body of Scripture as the true Word of God. If those propositions represent the truths that are necessary for salvation, as Zanchi maintains, then it is inevitable that faith should be defined as assent to those truths. The same view is expressed in Zanchi's brief compendium De religione christiana fides:

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1. "De perseverantia sanctorum in fide, Confessio," in Miscellanea, Opera, 7.1.352. Fides igitur est virtus, seu vis, eaque viva ac perpetua a Patre, propter Christum, per Spiritum sanctum in corda electorum gratis infusa: qua persuasi, id quod proponitur in scriptis Propheticis et Apostolicis, esse Verbum Dei: illud totum, tam legem, quam evangelium, ut verum Dei Verbum, indubitato et constanti assensu recipimus.... Haec est mea fidei descriptio.

> We understand faith as the gift of divine wisdom and prudence... by which we assent with a sincere, firm, and constant mind -- because of the authority of God's voice -- to the total Word of God revealed in the sacred books, most of all the gospel... and we truly recognize in the same [Word] God, the will of God, Christ the mediator and his benefits....[1]

The fact that in this passage special mention is made of the Gospel in no way weakens the emphasis on the total canon as the object of faith. The Gospel, as "the good news of redemption accomplished through Christ,"[2] is part of the whole body of revealed truth to which faith assents, although it is the most important part. The same is true also with regard to passages where Zanchi refers to faith in terms of "believing in Christ" (in Christum credimus).[3] That he is not referring to Christ as the specific object of faith is indicated by the fact that in the same paragraph faith is described as scientia and cognitio Dei,[4] and a little later as affectus conformus Legi Dei.[5] Furthermore, with reference to his above definition of faith as wisdom (sapientia) and prudence (prudentia), Zanchi explains that we must distinguish between two actions of faith, one of which proceeds from the intellect,

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1. De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.4.522. Nomine autem fidei donum divinae sapientiae atque prudentiae ... intelligimus: quo toti verbo Dei in sacris literis revelato, vero maxime evangelio... sincero, firmo et constanti animo, propter autoritatem loquentis Dei, assentientes, Deum in illo, Deique voluntatem, Christum Mediatorem, ejusque beneficia vere intelligimus....
2. Ibid. ...laetum nuntivum de redemptione per Christum facta...
3. "De perseverantia sanctorum in fide, Confessio," in Miscellanea, Opera, 7.1.348.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 349.

the other from the will.

> The intellect, through the light of faith, understands, assents to, and believes the things proposed by the Word, which the will, affected by faith, loves, wills and embraces as good.[1]

Again it is "the things proposed by the Word" which are defined as the object of faith. Finally, we have Zanchi's own comment on the definition of faith which we quoted above.[2] Referring to the phrase illud totum, tam Legem, quam Evangelium, Zanchi explains: "This whole [Scripture], law as well as Gospel, is the material of faith."[3]

Zanchi's position with regard to faith and its object again seems to indicate a deviation from the position taken by Calvin, as a brief comparison will show. It is true that Calvin defines faith, first of all, as the "knowledge of the divine will toward us received from his Word. And the foundation of it is a previous persuasion of the truth of God."[4] Faith can never be separated from the Word: "Take away the Word, and no faith will remain."[5] "Faith has a constant re-

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1. De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.4.578. Sunt enim duo actionum fidei genera: unum in intellectu, alterum in voluntate. Intellectus lumine fidei donatus, res per verbum propositas, intelligit, assentitur, credit. Voluntas efficacitate fidei affecta, eas [i.e., res per verbum propositas] ut bonas amat, vult, amplectitur.
2. Supra, p. 57.
3. "De perseverantia sanctorum in fide, Confessio," in Miscellanea, Opera, 7.1.353. Illud totum, tam Legem, quam Evangelium, haec est materia fidei.
4. OS IV.15.10-13. Fidem esse divinae erga nos voluntatis notitiam ex ejus verbo perceptam. Hujus antem fundamentum est, praesumpta de veritate Dei persuasio.
5. OS IV.14.27. Tolle igitur verbum, et nulla jam restabit fides.

lation to the Word and can no more be separated from it than the rays from the sun."[1] Thus Calvin can define the veracity of God, that is, his truth and trustworthiness, as the general object of faith.[2] Complete trust in God's truth or veracity is the very foundation of faith.[3]

But this is merely a preliminary definition of faith's object. Scripture is not the exact object of faith. In a sense, only part of Scripture can be called the proper object of faith:

> Since the heart of man is not aroused to faith by every utterance [vocem] of God, we must now inquire what it is in the word that faith properly respects... what faith finds in God's word upon which to lean and rest.[4]

Although Calvin does not deny that faith "subscribes to the veracity of God whenever, wherever and in whatever manner he speaks,"[5] he declares the gratuitous promise, the promise of mercy (gratuita promissio, misericordiae promissio) the real foundation of faith. Faith properly begins with the promise of mercy, although it holds that God is true in whatever he says. Nothing can really establish faith, however, except the Gospel, the "Word of faith," the "free embassy, by which

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1. OS IV.14.8. Perpetuam esse fidei relationem cum verbo, nec magis ab eo posse divelli, quam radios a sole unde oriuntur.
2. OS IV.39.37. Fateor, ut jam dixi, generale fidei objectum (ut loquuntur) esse Dei veritatem.
3. OS IV.15.10-13
4. OS IV.15.19-21,27. Sed quonjam nec ad vocem Dei quamlibet cor hominis in fidem erigitur, inquirendum adhuc est, quid proprie fides in verbo respiciat... quid in verbo Domini reperiat fides, quo nitatur et recumbat.
5. OS IV.15.25.

God reconciles the world to himself."[1] The foundation and proper object of faith is the Gospel, not the precepts and promises of the law.[2] Faith and Gospel are correlatives.[3] To point to the Gospel as object of faith, however, is to point to Christ.

> It is Christ alone on whom faith properly must look.[4]
>
> Thus Christ proposes himself as the object to which our faith should be directed....[5]
>
> Everything which faith should contemplate is exhibited to us in Christ....[6]

The Gospel is called the "doctrine of faith" (doctrina fidei) by the apostle Paul, because it manifests Christ more fully than Moses and the prophets.[7] For if the same apostle calls the advent of faith the end of the law, he means to convey a new genus of teaching, by which the Father's mercy is exhibited far greater; and our salvation is given a more certain witness where Christ is the teacher.[8] Calvin calls this narrowing down of faith's object from Scripture as a whole to God's promise of mercy in the Gospel a descent from "genus to species."[9]

Calvin, then, clearly distinguishes between the whole

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1. OS IV.39.1-21. Fidei fundamentum facimus gratuitam promissionem, quod in ipsa proprie fides consistat... quando nihil est quod fidem stabilire queat, nisi liberalis illa legatio qua sibi Deus mundum reconciliat.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Comm. John 3:16, CO 47.64.
5. Comm. John 14:1, CO 47.321,322.
6. Comm. Eph. 3:12, CO 51.183.
7. OS IV.13.23-14:1.
8. OS IV.14:2-5
9. OS IV.14.7

Scripture -- what Zanchi called totum tam Legem, quam Evangelium -- as a general object of faith, and the gratuitous promise of God in Christ as the proper object of faith. Although faith believes every word of Scripture, it cannot be identified with the acceptance of whatever God says, but has as its specific and proper object the promise of God's mercy in Jesus Christ.[1]

The above brief description of Calvin's position with regard to the object of faith may suffice to show the difference between Calvin and Zanchi. There can be no doubt that Calvin's view of faith is strongly christocentric, and that he, like Luther, "found Christ and not a book the real center and object of faith."[2] Zanchi, on the other hand, shows a marked tendency toward the bibliocentric position characteristic of Reformed orthodoxy. The materia of faith is the total content of the Scripture, Law as well as Gospel. Faith is the acceptance of whatever is proposed in Scripture for our instruction in all the things that must be believed and performed in order to find salvation and eternal life. There is no discrepancy in Zanchi between the authority of Scripture and faith in Christ -- the two elements which are never clearly related in Calvin. The authoritative canon of Scripture is for Zanchi both the foundation and the object of faith.

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1. Cf. Dowey, The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology, p. 159.
2. Ibid., p. 163.

2. The Nature of Faith:

Faith, inasmuch as it is directly related to God's revelation in his Word, is therefore a certain and explicit knowledge both for Calvin and Zanchi. The difference we observed between Calvin and Zanchi in discussing their views on the object of faith's knowledge now widens considerably as we consider the question of the nature of faith itself. Faith is not sufficiently described merely in terms of its object, not even if that object is Christ and God's promise of grace. For both theologians the knowledge of faith is in no way a natural perception of God's revelation, but rather the work of the Holy Spirit.

It is here, in his doctrine of faith, that Calvin introduces the term "illumination" to describe the inner work of the Holy Spirit. Although faith, as knowledge of God's will toward us, is received from the Word,[1] "the Word accomplishes nothing without the illumination by the Holy Spirit."[2] This illumination is described in various ways by Calvin. It is the renewal of the mind[3] to hear and understand the preaching of Christ,[4] the "interior"[5] and "effectual"[6] call, by which the "word preached," the "universal call" is caused "to sink into our hearts."[7] Illumination is the inward gift of

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1. OS IV.15.10; cf. supra, p. 59.
2. OS IV.44.9. Sine Spiritus sancti illuminatione, verbo nihil agitur.
3. OS III.263.9.
4. OS III.262.32 ff.
5. OS IV.412.31.
6. OS IV.410.27.
7. OS IV.419.15-22.

the Spirit enabling the elect to accept and receive the external manifestation of revelation through Scripture and preaching. Through illumination the Spirit overcomes our sinfulness which makes our minds "wholly blind and stupid" toward divine things.[1] All these statements refer to the noetic aspect of faith, to man's knowledge of God's revelation as brought about through the illumination of the mind by the Holy Spirit. But for Calvin faith is more than mere knowledge of God's promise in Christ, more than a simple assent to the objective truth and abstract certainty of revelation, as the Scholastics falsely held.[2] Rather than in the certainty of knowledge, the real nature of faith's certainty is seen by Calvin in man's personal appropriation of God's promise,[3] that is, in personal assurance of salvation. Faith is the "assurance and trust [fiducia] of the heart" in God's mercy.[4]

> This is the chief axis on which faith turns, that we should not think of God's promises of mercy to be true apart from us and not in us, but rather make them ours by embracing them inwardly. From this arises that trust [fiducia] which the same [apostle] in another place calls peace.[5]

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1. OS III.261.17.
2. OS IV.44.11-14. Nec satis fuerit mentem esse Dei Spiritu illuminatam, nisi et ejus virtute vor obfirmetur ac fulciatur. In quo tota terra scholastici aberrant, qui in fidei consideratione nudum ac simplicem ex notitia assensum arripiunt....
3. Dowey, op. cit., p. 181.
4. OS IV.44.15. ...cordis fiducia et securitate.
5. OS IV.26.29-33. Hic praecipuus fidei cardo vertitur, ne quas Dominus offert misericordiae promissiones, extra nos tantum veras esse arbitremur, in nobis minime: sed ut potius eas intus complectendo nostras faciamus. Hinc demum nascitur fiducia illa quam alibi pacem idem vocat.

That is the very heart of Calvin's doctrine of faith. Faith is a firm and certain conviction of one's own personal salvation in Christ.

> In short, no one is truly a believer, unless he is firmly persuaded that God is a propitious and benevolent Father to him and promises him all things from his goodness; unless he depends on the promise of divine benevolence toward himself and feels an undoubting expectation of salvation.[1]

These two elements, knowledge and personal assurance of God's gratuitous promise in Christ, describe the nature of faith as Calvin sees it. Both are the work of the Holy Spirit. Thus Calvin gives his formal definition of faith:

> Now we shall have a right definition of faith, if we say that it is a firm and certain knowledge [cognitionem] of the divine benevolence toward us which, founded upon the truth of the gratuitous promise in Christ, is both revealed to our minds and sealed in our hearts by the Holy Spirit.[2]

The above brief description of Calvin's doctrine of faith does not intend to give a complete picture. But in pointing to the heart of Calvin's doctrine, it may suffice as a basis for comparison with the view advanced by Zanchi, to which we shall now turn.

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1. OS IV.26.39-27.4. In summa, vere fidelis non est nisi qui solida persuasione Deum sibi propitium benevolumque patrem esse persuasus, de ejus benignitate omnia sibi polliceatur: nisi qui divinae erga se benevolentiae promissionibus fretus, indubitatam salutis expectationem praesumit.

2. OS 4.16.31-35. Nunc justa fidei definitio nobis constabit si dicamus esse divina erga nos benevolentiae firmam certamque cognitionem, quae gratuitae in Christo promissionis veritate fundata, per Spiritum sanctum et revelatur mentibus nostris et cordibus obsignatur.

Zanchi's most extensive treatise on the nature of faith appears in the already quoted work, "De perseverantia sanctorum in fide, Confessio,"[1] where he gives the following formal definition:

> True and justifying faith, which is common in all the elect, is of a twofold nature [bifariam]. On the one hand, it is the habit [habitus] of faith itself, or the power [vis] and virtue [virtus] infused by the Holy Spirit into the hearts of the elect, out of which [habit] the act, by which we actually [actualiter] believe in Christ, is born and -- as the schools say -- elicited. For faith is, as will be shown, a virtue or power and, therefore, a quality infused by the Holy Spirit. On the other hand, faith is taken for the act of faith, by which we believe in Christ himself, knowingly and faithfully.[2]

Zanchi admits thatall this is not indicated in so many syllables by Scripture, but the distinction between the habit and act of faith, so he insists, is clearly taught in the Bible. No one doubts that the Scripture refers to faith in terms of the actus credendi. To be justified and receive remission of sins is impossible without actual faith (sine actuali fide).[3] On the other hand, the Scripture clearly demonstrates faith to be a "habit adhering and remaining in

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1. In Miscellanea, Opera, 7.1.347 ff; cf. supra, p. 57 ff.

2. Ibid., 348. Fides vera et justificans, omnibus electibus communis, bifariam capitur. Aliquando pro ipso habitu fidei, seu pro ipsa vi atque virtute, per Spiritum Sanctum in corda electorum infusa: e qua actus, quo in Christum actualiter, ut ita loquar, credimus, gignitur, atque ut Scholae loquuntur, elicitur. Est enim fides revera, ut mox ostendam, virtus, seu vis quaedam, ac proinde qualitas infusa per Spiritum Sanctum. Aliquando fides accipitur pro ipso fidei actu: quo in ipsum Christum reapse cogitando et fidendo credimus.

3. Ibid.

in the hearts of the elect,"[1] when it says that "the just shall live by his faith,"[2] or that "without faith it is impossible to please God." Certainly the just must be said to live by their faith even while they sleep and do not know about Christ by any actual faith.[3] Even in children, in whom there can be no act of knowledge, or perception or trust (fiduciae), there dwells the "spirit and power of faith itself."[4]

Zanchi notes that he is following Butzer as well as the Scholastics when he understands faith as a divinely infused habit and virtue:[5]

> What the Scholastics refer to as a habitual gift of grace is that which the Apostle calls the inner man [internum hominem]. And who will deny, that faith is a gift of God, a faculty infused by the Holy Spirit by which we believe in Christ? That faith is thus to be understood on the one hand as an act and on the other hand as a habit -- one that is infused but not acquired -- is beyond all controversy.[6]

Again, in another comment on the term virtue, Zanchi reveals that his view of faith is close to that of the medieval tradition: As one of the three theological virtues[7]

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1. "De perseverantia sanctorum in fide, Confessio," in Miscellanea, Opera, 7.1.348. ... Habitus vero in cordibus electorum haerente atque manente.
2. Ibid. ... Justum vivere ex fide sua.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. ...ipsum tamen fidei spiritum atque vim inesse....
5. Ibid., 348 and 352.
6. Ibid., 348 f. Quod scholastici habituale gratiae donum appellant id, quod Apostolus internum hominem vocat. Et quis neget, fidem esse Dei donum, facultatemque per Spiritum Sanctum infusam, qua credimus in Christum? Iidem igitur aliquando pro Actu, aliquando pro Habitu, non quidem acquisito, sed infuso, accipi: extra controversiam esto.
7. Ibid., 352. Vulgo quoque obtinuit, ut fides, spes, et caritas, virtutes theologicae appellantur.

faith is to be defined as a gift of God in a certain sense; "for there is a distinction between the gift, by which we believe, and the motion of the soul, the action of believing."[1]

The act of faith, also referred to as "living faith" or "life of faith" (fides viva, vita fidei) is described as a motion in the heart of the homo fidelis: a "new motion," (novus motus), a "new knowledge" (nova cogitatio) a "new desire" (novum desiderium) a "new affect conforming to the law of God" (novus affectus conformus Legi Dei).

The habit or virtue of faith is described as the perpetuity (perpetuitas) of faith.[2] Zanchi points to Abraham as an example of perpetual faith, that cannot be extinguished even in temptation and sin. Thus "perpetuity is an essential property of justifying faith and one which leads to eternal life."[3] If the Apostle teaches that we are justified by no other faith than the one that was in Abraham, then this means that no other faith is justifying except one that has the quality of perpetuity.[4]

To make his position quite clear Zanchi states at the end of his treatise on faith that he has not followed the definition of many others "who define faith as trust [fiducia] in the promise of mercy through the Son of God."[5] Although

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1. "De perseverantia sanctorum in fide, Confessio," in Miscellanea, Opera, 7.1.352. Est igitur discrimen inter donum, quo credimus, et inter ipsum motum animi, actionem credendi.
2. Ibid., 349.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 354. ...qui sic definiunt fidem ut eam dicant esse fiduciam misericordiae promissae propter Filium Dei.

trust (fiducia) is not to be separated from true faith, yet it is not the same as faith, but rather an effect of it.[1]

Thus there can be no doubt that Zanchi's view represents a conscious and clear return to the Thomistic understanding of faith as an infused habit and virtue, a supernatural quality by which we believe.[2] Faith is a habit and virtue according to Zanchi, a perpetual quality and faculty divinely infused into all the elect, including children. Out of this faculty or habit then emerges the act of faith, which is an act of the intellect assenting to the content of Scripture,[3] as well as an act of the will directed to the things proposed by Scripture as good ends.[4] In either case, intellect and will become disposed or affected toward their actions by the habit or virtue of faith.[5] This, however, is in substance the position taken by Thomas Aquinas.[6]

Zanchi's definition of faith as a habit and virtue now throws further light on the object of faith. It is precisely by the infused virtus fidei that we are caused to assent to what is proposed in the whole Scripture, which is the materia or object of faith. Zanchi calls this assent to the

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1. "De perseverantia sanctorum in fide, Confessio," in Miscellanea, Opera, 7.1.354. Aliud tamen esse fiduciam, et aliud fidem; illam facit hujus effectum. Hac igitur de causa, malui Bucerum secutus, ita fidem definire, ut dicerem eam esse virtutem gratis in corda electorum infusam.
2. ST II-II, 4, 6.
3. De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.4.578.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.; also "De perseverantia sanctorum in fide, Confessio," in Miscellanea, Opera, 7.1.348.
6. ST II-II, 4.2, 5 and 6.

whole Scripture the first effect (primum effectum) of the virtue of faith.[1] The things pertaining to the Law are then called special effects (specialia effecta), the truths pertaining to the Gospel and Christ are described as chief effects (praecipua effecta). Further effects are hope and charity, which are preceded by faith in the order of virtues.[2] In this, again, Zanchi reflects the view of Thomas.[3]

In order to realize fully the far-reaching difference between Zanchi and Calvin with regard to their view on the nature of faith, it was necessary for us to go beyond the aspect of knowledge. For both Calvin and Zanchi there is more to say on the subject of faith than can be expressed in terms of knowledge, when we turn our attention to the individual believer himself. We have noted before Calvin's use of the word trust (fiducia) as an expression for the believer's certainty of faith. In Zanchi we have encountered now another significant term: perpetuity (perpetuitas).

For Calvin, too, the concept of faith's constancy or perpetuity is of greatest importance. For even experience shows that faith is of little value if perseverence is not added to it.[4] But if we are in doubt and besieged by anxiety concerning our calling and the certainty of our election, we

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1. "De perseverantia sanctorum in fide, Confessio," in Miscellanea, Opera, 7.1.353.
2. Ibid.; cf. De religione christiana fides, Opera, 8.4.578.
3. ST II-II, 1.1 and 8.3
4. OS IV.417.21-23. Denique ipsa experientia satis docemur, parvi esse vocationem ac fidem, nisi accedat perseverantia, quae non omnibus contingit.

are to turn to Christ who dispels all doubt and liberates us from anxiety by his certain promises.[1]

> There can be no doubt that Christ, when he prays for all the elect, asks the same for them that he asked for Peter, namely that their faith should never cease. From this we may gather that they are in no danger of defection, since the Son of God has prayed for the constancy of their piety, and has not been repulsed.[2]

The constancy or perpetuity of faith consists in that God himself, through Christ's intercession, is the guardian and preserver of our faith, even in midst of sin and temptation. Faith will persevere in the elect, no matter what doubts befall them, because man is held by God, who is faithful to his promise. However the believers may be afflicted, "they will never fall and depart from that certain trust [fiducia] which they have conceived in God's mercy."[3]

Ultimately it is the relationship between the believer and Christ which for Calvin guarantees the continuity of faith within the believer. For by faith we are indissolubly connected with the body of Christ,[4] who dwells within us,[5] in whose body we have been implanted[6] through the secret work

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1. OS IV.417.23-29.
2. Ibid. Iam vero neque hoc dubium est, quum orat Christus pro omnibus electis, quin idem illis precetur quod Petro, ut nunquam deficiat fides eorum. Ex quo elicimus, extra periculum defectionis esse, quia eorum pietati constantiam postulans Filius Dei, repulsam passus non est.
3. OS IV.27.32-34. ...qualemcunque in modum afflictentur, decidere ac desciscere negamus a certa illa, quam de misericordia Dei conceperunt, fiducia.
4. OS IV.35.7-11.
5. Ibid.
6. OS IV.40.14.

of the Holy Spirit. "Through the grace and power of that same Spirit we are made his members, so that he keeps us under him and we, in turn, possess him."[1]

It is in terms of this intimate, living relationship between the believer and Christ, this "sacred marriage,"[2] that Calvin understands the perpetuity of faith.

This strictly christocentric basis for the continuity of faith that we find in Calvin, has been clearly abandoned by Zanchi, for whom the perpetuitas of faith becomes a divinely infused habit, a supernatural qualitas inhering within the believer.[3] As such it is understood as the cause of the subsequent actions of intellect and will, while hope, trust, and charity are likewise called effects of the inherent habitus. The entire life of faith in all its aspects is seen as an actualization of the infused habitus fidei, which is in itself the direct effect of God's eternal predestination. Here we anticipate the ultimate connection between predestination and the ordo salutis in Zanchi's thought, which we shall investigate in a later chapter.

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1. OS IV.5.11-13. Solo autem Spiritu unit se nobiscum. Ejusdem Spiritus gratia et virtute efficimur illius membra, ut nos sub se contineat, vicissimque illus possideamus.
2. Ibid., 8-9. ...sacrum illud conjugium....
3. The entire treatise "De perseverantia sanctorum in fide," unfortunately, has been overlooked by Moltmann, who consequently mentions Junius as the first Reformed theologian to introduce the Aristotelian concept of habitus, while he sees Zanchi as representative of Calvin's view. Cf. J. Moltmann, Pradestination und Perseveranz, "Beiträge zur Geschichte und Lehre der Reformierten Kirche," XII, Neukirchen, 1961, p. 140; J. Moltmann, "Erwählung und Beharrung der Gläubigen," Calvin-Studien 1959, ed. by J. Moltmann, Neukirchen, 1960, pp. 52 and 55.

Revelation and Reason

Returning to the problem of knowledge, we recall that for Calvin the certainty of faith is truly knowledge -- although the aspect of knowledge does not exhaust the meaning of faith. This knowledge (notitia), however, is not of the natural intellect or reason, but rather a supernatural knowledge which depends entirely upon the work and revelation of the Spirit. It is the Holy Spirit who raises the human mind above itself and gives it a supernatural certainty rather than comprehension.[1] The mind attaining to this knowledge does not "comprehend what it perceives, but being persuaded of that which it cannot comprehend it understands more by the certainty of this persuasion, than it would comprehend of any human object by the exercise of its natural capacity."[2] "For... what our mind apprehends by faith is absolutely infinite" and therefore "this kind of knowledge far exceeds all understanding. Yet, because God has revealed to his saints the secret of his will... therefore faith is in Scripture justly called ... knowledge."[3]

Faith is indeed a certain knowledge, but one that is not "taught by any demonstration of reason."[4]

For Calvin, then, natural reason contributes nothing to what faith knows. The natural man cannot understand the

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1. OS IV.25.11-23.
2. Ibid.
3. OS IV.25.
4. Ibid.

things of God, and our understanding is wholly blind and stupid; we are despoiled of any faculty for spiritual understanding.[1] Indeed, human reason is so despoiled, so confused and defective that the first step toward advancement in the school of God is to abandon reason altogether.[2] Thus not only the finiteness but also the sinfulness of man's reason stands in the way of any knowledge of God.

> There is no other way in which man can be prepared for receiving the doctrine of the Gospel... than by withdrawing all their senses from the world and turning to God alone, and seriously considering that it is with God that they have to do.[3]

Knowledge of God for Calvin begins with revelation. It is nothing but the knowledge of what God has revealed. Although it is, indeed, man's mind that knows, it is able to do so only through the work of the Holy Spirit who raises the mind above its natural state to a supernatural knowledge and certainty.

For Zanchi too, as we have seen so far, the only true foundation for theology as knowledge of God is Holy Scripture, since it alone contains the things we need to know for our salvation. It is through the Scripture that God reveals to us the saving truths to which human reason is unable to attain. There is, then, no quarrel between Zanchi and Calvin on this point. Yet Zanchi's view concerning the role of nat-

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1. OS III.261.13 ff.
2. OS IV.45.4-6; cf. Dowey, The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology, p. 177.
3. Comm. John 6.44 - CO 47.12.

ural reason reveals a remarkably different attitude than that of Calvin, and, consequently, Zanchi's regard for philosophy stands in marked contrast to that of the Reformers. According to Zanchi, much concerning the divine attributes, for example, cannot be explained or understood without philosophy. Although one can, indeed, be a Christian without philosophy, one can never be a theologian.[1] Not only logic and dialectic are necessary as tools for the theologian, but also metaphysics are indispensible for theology.[2] Introducing the second part of his doctrine of creation, Zanchi explains and defends his intended use of Aristotle's Physics by asserting that although physics is a part of philosophy, theology -- since it includes everything relating to our knowledge of God -- must also include physics as the science of creation and of creatures and as such is worthy in the highest degree of a Christian's study.[3] How, then, does Zanchi view the role of natural reason, and what does it contribute to our knowledge of God's revelation? A significant answer is given by Zanchi in the introductory remarks to his chapter on the life of God:

> Holy Scripture teaches clearly that God is a living God... that we should know what is sufficient for our salvation. But what this life of God is, and in what manner it is to be understood [intelligendum] that God lives, that is not clearly explained in [Scripture]... That we learn, however, from philosophy. Thus we must see, in the first place, what can truly

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1. C. Schmidt, "Girolamo Zanchi," Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 32 (1859), p. 694.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 698.

> be said to live. Thereafter, what "life" and "to live" is in living creatures. Finally, by removing whatever signifies imperfection in the life of created things, we arrive at the knowledge [cognitio] of the most simple and perfect life of God himself.[1]

What are the implications of this statement? In the first place, it confirms the fundamental importance which Zanchi attributes to Holy Scripture. In the Scripture God has revealed all that man needs to know in order to be saved. This knowledge derived from revelation is grounded on faith in the divine authority of Holy Scripture, as was pointed out before; a knowledge which is absolutely certain, once the Holy Spirit has convinced us in our hearts that it is God who speaks in the Scripture (Deus loquens in Scriptura). Quite clearly the source of all necessary knowledge concerning God is Holy Scripture, and we need not and, indeed, should not begin anywhere else. But neither need we nor should we stop there. For, although Scripture makes clear statements as to God's nature and acts, yet it does not explain what God is in his various modes of being nor quomodo intelligendum sit. And it is precisely at this point where the intellect has its proper place and function, as Zanchi sees it.

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.83. Scriptura quidem sancta, aperte tradit, Deum vivere, et esse Deum viventem... id quod ad salutem nobis satis est, novisse. Caeterum, quid sit haec Dei vita et quomodo intelligendum sit Deum vivere, non ita perspicue in eis explicatur... Hoc autem discitur ex Philosophia... Ergo priori loco videndum nobis est, quaenam vere dicantur vivere. Deinde, quid sit vita et vivere in creaturis viventibus. Inde vero, remotione eorum, quae in vita rerum creatarum imperfectionem significant, quasi defaecando, in cognitionem simplicissimae et perfectissimae vitae ipsius Dei perducemur.

Theological knowledge is thus a synthesis of two things. It is based, first of all, on God's revelation. But it also contains our rational understanding (intellegere) of this revelation. Theology explains with the aid of reason what has been revealed. Theological knowledge, we might say, is revelation received into human understanding. Although this rational understanding is by no means necessary for our salvation, it nevertheless is related to it and most useful, since it makes the saving Word more and more explicit and guards against error.

Admittedly, the relationship between revelation and reason, theology and philosophy as described so far in Zanchi's thought could well be understood merely in terms of methodology and logic as, indeed, it has been.[1] Both Althaus and Schweizer categorize Zanchi as an Aristotelian mainly on the basis of Zanchi's advocacy of the synthetic method for theological treatises. But Zanchi's high esteem for Aristotelian logic was shared by many of his contemporaries in every camp, and in the use of the synthetic method he himself was not always consistent. At any rate, neither of the two factors

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1. Cf. P. Althaus, Die Prinzipien der Deutschen Reformierten Dogmatik im Zeitalter der Aristotelischen Scholastik, Leipzig, 1914; Alex. Schweizer, Die Geschichte der Protestantischen Zentraldogmen, Bd. 1, Zürich, 1854; P. Petersen, Geschichte der Aristotelischen Philosophie im Protestantischen Deutschland, Leipzig, 1921. Petersen cites as proof for Zanchi's true Aristotelianism a letter to Fortunatus Crellius, which is printed in the latter's Isagoge Logica (cf. Fortunatus Crellius, Isagoge Logica, Neustadt i.d. Pfalz, 1581; 2d ed., 1584). In that letter Zanchi discusses the value and usefulness of Aristotelian logic, and declares it indispensable for theology.

make Zanchi a true Aristotelian, much less do they prove any Thomistic influence upon his thought. We must, therefore, ask a further question: What is the nature of human knowledge? Zanchi's answer to this question will lead us further in our evaluation of his view regarding the relation between revelation and reason and, at the same time, show the extent of Thomistic-Aristotelian influence upon Zanchi's thought.

1. The Nature of Human Knowledge:

In the same chapter on the vita Dei which we mentioned before[1] we find the following explanation of the nature of the intellect:

> The nature of our intellect is such, that it apprehends composites first; thereafter, by removing the parts of the composition, it arrives at knowledge of the simple. By no other method can we obtain natural knowledge. This [method] becomes all the more mandatory for us, if we want to arrive at knowledge of divine things by way of things that are created.[2]

This statement, in effect, reflects Zanchi's epistemological presuppositions in which he, like Thomas Aquinas, follows Aristotle exclusively. As does Thomas, Zanchi holds that all natural human knowledge is derived from the sensible world via our senses.[3] All knowledge enters the soul from without and comes from material things. In its first stage,

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1. Supra, p. 75 f.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.83. Natura enim noster intellectus talis est, ut primo apprehendat composita; deinde, remotione partium compositionis, in cognitionem simplicium veniat. Neque aliis ratione horum cognitionem naturaliter assequi potest. Id vero multo magis faciendum nobis est, si in cognitionem rerum divinarum, per ea, quae facta sunt, adduci velimus.
3. Ibid., 196 f.

knowledge is produced by a thing effecting one of our senses, resulting in sensory observations and percepts. Such sensory knowledge, however, relates only to individual things. True knowledge relates to what is generally and universally applicable, that is, to the essences of things, which are beyond the reach of the senses. Such knowledge, which is of much greater perfection than mere sensory knowledge, comes about through the function of the intellect, and is, therefore, called intellectual or rational knowledge.[1] The intellect abstracts general concepts and truths from the sensory perceptions, and through this process of abstraction produces knowledge which is rational and generally applicable. Abstraction means to apprehend the essences of things while disregarding their individual characteristics. The result is the apprehension of the general species of a thing as being a union or composition of a form and the matter common to the genus. Thus the intellect, through the process of abstraction, comes to apprehend and define the structure of being as a composition, or rather, compositions, such as matter and form, act and potency, substances and accidents, and essence and existence.[2] This rational or intellectual knowledge, which is the end result of a process of abstraction from sensory perceptions, Zanchi calls evidens cognitio.[3] It is as such to be carefully distinguished from the knowledge we have through

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.84.
2. Ibid., 65.
3. Ibid., 196.

faith in revelation:

> Faith is a certain but not evident knowledge. For neither do we believe through faith what is the object of our senses, nor the things that are perceived in the light of the natural intellect. Therefore faith is not evident knowledge. Nevertheless [faith] is a certain knowledge [certa notitia] because we know for certain that he, who reveals, is perfectly true....[1]

The notitia fidei, therefore, is knowledge based solely on the authority of divine revelation, an authority which is guaranteed by the supreme veracity of God himself. The evidens cognitio of the intellect, on the other hand, in order to be evidens cognitio, must depend on rational demonstration by way of abstraction from sensory perceptions.

In view of the fact, then, that natural human knowledge is restricted to forms and concepts abstracted from sense perceptions, it follows that man's knowledge of God is decisively limited since God and divine things are outside the sphere of sense reality. Indeed, apart from revelation, any direct knowledge of God would appear to be impossible to obtain. Yet Zanchi -- like Thomas -- apparently does ascribe to the cognitive powers of the natural intellect the ability to arrive at some general knowledge and understanding of the divine nature, however imperfect. Such general knowledge can be obtained in two ways: by negation, and by analogy.

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.196. Fides certa est, sed non evidens cognitio. Neque enim quae fide credimus, aut sub sensum cadunt, aut lumine naturalis intellectus percipiuntur: ideo cognitio evidens non est. Certa tandem est notitia: quia certo novimus eum qui revelavit, veracissimum esse....

2. Knowledge of God through Negation:

As was stated before, the intellect in attempting to define the nature of an object first apprehends its composita, thereby determining its essence in general. By then adding to the genus all the differences or accidents which distinguish this object from others, the intellect arrives at a knowledge (evidens cognitio) concerning the nature of the object in question.

But when dealing with the nature of God as an object of human knowledge, obviously this procedure is not possible. Since the divine essence is utterly beyond the grasp of the human intellect, we cannot state positively what it is. But we can say what it is not. By distinguishing God from everything that is not God, we can thus, through negations, arrive at some positive knowledge about the divine essence.

Calvin, too, can say that divine attributes -- he prefers the term "epithets" -- like the immensity, spirituality, and simplicity of God are not positive descriptions, but negative assertions, which mean merely that God is not finite, not material, not divisible -- and therefore not comprehensible.[1] For Calvin even the simplicity of the divine essence is but "a fare and empty name which floats in our brain, but not the true God."[2] It contributes nothing to a positive knowledge of God, which consists in the knowledge of God's will and actions as far as they are directed toward us (erga

1. OS III.108.23-109.1.
2. OS III.109.22.

nos).[1] The knowledge of himself, Calvin advises, we should leave to God, and not engage in any speculation beyond the temporal and spatial limitations, not in any speculation concerning God's nature and activities that do not directly concern man.[2] Rather, we should contemplate God in those of his actions in which he approaches us and communicates himself to us.[3]

In these statements we encounter the real difference between Calvin's and Zanchi's theological position, a basic difference in the orientation of thinking that will become increasingly apparent as we go along. Calvin's theology deals with Deus erga nos, the God who reveals himself in his dealings with men, and above all, in Christ. Subpersonal metaphysical categories are almost entirely absent in Calvin. Zanchi's thinking, on the other hand, is characterized throughout by the basic Scholastic distinction in se - quoad nos. This distinction, which we have met before in Zanchi's view of the authority of Scripture, is also at the basis of his entire doctrine of God.

At the very outset of his discussion of God's nature Zanchi deals with the notion of the simplicity of the divine essence -- in direct parallel to Thomas Aquinas.[4] Remembering the fact that the adequate object of man's reason is the

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1. OS III.53.18-23.
2. OS III.153.5-37.
3. Ibid.
4. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.65; ST I.1.7, Reply Obj. 1; I.3.

essence of that which the senses do apprehend,[1] it is obvious that it is incapable of conceiving of a simplicity such as God's. However, it would be possible to conceive of simplicity in a negative way; that is, to understand the divine simplicity as a way of being that is absolutely free of any kind of composition. Consequently, Zanchi proceeds to describe the simplicity of God's nature by demonstrating the absence in God of the compositions of matter and form, of substance and accidents, of act and potency, and of essence and existence.[2] The following chapter will deal in detail with Zanchi's doctrine on the divine simplicity. Suffice it at this point to show that Zanchi follows Thomas' epistemological method of negation in order to affirm the simplicity of God's essence. We shall see later how Zanchi proceeds from there in adding further attributes which follow necessarily from the divine simplicity, such as the perfection, infinity, immutability, and eternity of God.

3. Knowledge of God through Analogy:

Zanchi understands theology as divine revelation received into human understanding, and that means, into the categories of human knowledge. This, obviously, is the reason why he assigns such an important role to reason and philosophy. We have seen how Zanchi regards the nature of human knowledge and the function of the intellect. Man draws all his concepts from sensory knowledge by way of abstraction. For that reason

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.196.
2. Ibid., 65.

it is impossible for human understanding to apprehend the pure simplicity of God's being in any direct positive way, and only by denying him any composition can we affirm and indicate God's simplicity.

Yet sensible, created things, from which we derive knowledge, are effects of God who as Creator is their efficient cause, and it is this fact which opens up another way for the intellect to obtain knowledge of God's nature. By examining and analyzing the nature of the effect we can, via the relationship existing between an effect and its cause, make positive predications concerning the nature of the cause, i.e., God.

Any description of God's nature means to attribute certain virtues, perfections, or attributes to him; in short, it means to give God various names. Thus we find a great number of divine names in the Scriptures which designate perfections in God that are also predicated of creatures. How, then, can names that denote perfections in creatures be fitting descriptions of the divine nature?

The underlying principle, here, is that God as efficient cause of all created things must possess in an eminent degree all the perfections that can be found in creatures -- precisely because all creatures, being effects of God, bear a relationship and resemblance to him as their cause, the resemblance which every effect retains in relation to its cause.

The statements we make about God on this basis are, therefore, not univocal, because God's effects are not one

with God either in name or in nature, which would be the necessary basis on which univocal statement can alone become possible.[1]

But neither can we say that the names we give to God are merely equivocal. Some things bear identical names although they are by nature altogether different. They are thus purely equivocal for their name is all that they have in common. This, however, is not the case with God and creatures between whom exists the relationship of cause and effect. The names that we attribute to God are not purely equivocal by reason of this causal relationship and the resemblance it implies. And this, precisely, Zanchi calls analogy -- following, in fact, the definition of Thomas:

> Things having the same name, are called analogical, not in that they are altogether the same, nor in that they are of different ratio or definition, but in that they have a proportion to one primary thing.[2]

Like Thomas, Zanchi points out two kinds of analogy. In the first case we have several things in relation to one other thing, the relation being a different one each time. Zanchi employs the same illustration used by Aquinas: We can speak of a healthy body, a healthy medicine, a healthy pulse. There exists an analogy between all things that are called healthy, because of their common relationship to health, or

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.23.
2. Ibid. Analogica dicuntur, quorum idem quidem est nomen, sed neque eadem omnino, neque prorsus diversa ratio aut definitio, sed proportionem ita habent... ad unum primum. Cf. ST I.13.5.

a state of healthiness. It is not in this manner, however, that we can speak analogically of God. For God, who is the first efficient cause, has nothing prior to him, to which both God and creatures could be related.[1]

In the second case, the analogy is not one that binds several things together by virtue of their common relationship to one other thing, but rather an analogy binding two things together because of the relationship one of them has to the other. Thus a medicine is healthy and a person is healthy, because a medicine causes the health of a person. Accordingly, the analogy in this case is that of the relation between a cause and its effect.[2] The name healthy cannot be attributed to medicine and person univocally, neither purely equivocally, but analogically.

The type of analogy used here by both Zanchi and Thomas is called by the latter an analogia unius ad alterum, in contrast to an analogia plurium ad unum or analogia ad tertium. This latter type of analogy is emphatically rejected, as we have seen, by Thomas and Zanchi, since that would put creation and God on the same level in relation to a superior third. Analogy must always be conceived so that God remains the superior and his sovereignty is not threatened. There is, and must be, only one direction -- from God to creation. Creation is like God, but God is never like creation. For this

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.24; cf. ST I.13.5.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.24; cf. ST I.13.5.

reason they can never be alike by agreement with something common to both, for they would then be on the same level and could be mutually compared. The analogy between God and creatures, however, is always an analogy in which the creature imitates God.

Thomas' explanation of the analogia unius ad alterum in I.13.5 of the Summa Theologiae has -- ever since Cajetanus -- been interpreted to mean an analogy of attribution by some and proportionality by others. According to Cajetanus, whose definitions are followed by most Thomists, the analogy of attribution is characterized by the fact that one or more things are designated by an extrinsic designation from a first term, the primum analogatum, to which the secondary analogates are related by a causal relation. The term attribution implies that something is attributed from the outside by the intellect. The analogous property is realized intrinsically and in its proper sense in the primum analogatum only. For this reason the analogy of attribution is rejected by Thomists as a metaphysical analogy, since it can state nothing proper of God. It can be used to express the relation between God and the world only in the sense that creation may be designated extrinsically after God.[1] In the analogy of proportionality, on the other hand, which is based on a proportional likeness of different things, the analogous concept states something that is proper to all the analogates involved. Thus it says

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1. Cf. H. Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World, Uppsala, 1952, pp. 218 ff.

no more of the one than of the other, only that the same is in all, proportionally but indeterminately.[1]

If we accept those definitions of attribution and proportionality, an examination of I.13.5 of the Summa Theologiae shows that the analogia unius ad alterum means neither attribution nor proportionality. We find that the basic ontological condition underlying the analogy between God and creation is the likeness of the effect to its cause, and that this likeness is due to the perfections in the things corresponding to a far superior perfection in God. It is this ontological foundation that makes analogous statements of God possible, due to the order (ordo) existing between creation as the effect and God as the cause. This seems to rule out any possibility of proportionality. The likeness of which Thomas speaks here is an intrinsic likeness of creation to God, based on the likeness of effect to cause, which enables the effect to express something intrinsic and inherent of the cause. The term proportio is used here by Thomas in the general sense of relation and immediately explained as referring to the causal relationship.

On the other hand, if this were an analogy of attribution, then -- since God is undoubtedly the first analogate ontologically -- the designation should be issuing from God, according to our previous definition, as for instance when creation is called good from the divine goodness. But in our

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1. Lyttkens, op. cit., p. 221 f.

passage God is instead designated as an unknown first analogate from that which is really secondary, namely creation. At best, we could speak here of a reversed analogy of attribution, although it cannot really be called by that name any longer, as we are proceeding from an intrinsic property of creation as a secondary analogate, stating it with reference to something essential in God. There remains one question, however: Are the names, or the analogous concepts, which we predicate of God, primarily predicated of creatures or of God? In other words, is not creation really the first analogate, and do not, accordingly, our names state something extrinsic to God? Thomas solves the problem by distinguishing between the modus significandi and the res significata which is a direct parallel to the distinction between the ordo cognoscendi and the ordo essendi. The things designated by our names are primarily in God, but their import, the impositio nominum, appertains primarily to creation, because we learn to know this first. Thus the ordo cognoscendi stands in inverse ratio to the ordo essendi.[1]

It is precisely in this manner that Zanchi uses analogy as a means by which we can arrive at some positive knowledge concerning the divine nature. And this he sees confirmed by the Apostle Paul: "Sunt enim invisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, conspicienda et intelligenda."[2] Thus we know with

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1. ST I.13.6.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.83.

certainty, that whenever a thing has a perfection, that perfection is in God in the very manner in which an effect pre-exists in its cause. What we call goodness, wisdom, life, etc., in a creature is, therefore, certainly in God, since God is the cause of it.

At the same time, Zanchi realizes that the effect is like its cause in a deficient mode of being. The effects of God are not one with him in nature and therefore inferior to him in their perfections. This is the meaning of Zanchi's statement that all res creatae are partly similar, and partly dissimilar to God: similar, as far as whatever perfections they possess they have from God as their cause; dissimilar, in that they have these perfections in an inferior way and not in the same way they exist in God.[1] To attribute a certain perfection to God by way of analogy, therefore, is to say in each case that in God is, indeed, that perfection, but pre-eminently so and perfectissime.[2] To say that God is good, for example, means that whatever is goodness in creatures, pre-exists in God, and in a far more perfect degree.[3] In other words, perfections are not to be predicated of creatures first and then also of God, but first of God, and then of creatures. For the creature is only the recipient of and a participant in the perfections which exist first in God and are diffused by him into the creature.[4]

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1. Ibid., 16 f; cf. ST I.4.2-3; I.13.5, Reply Obj. 2.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.13.
3. Ibid.; cf. ST I.13.2.
4. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.18 f.; cf. ST I.4.3.

Two errors must be guarded against at this point. First, to say that God is good means not simply that God is not bad. Second, it does not mean that God is good merely in the sense in that he is the cause of goodness in others.[1] To clarify this point, Zanchi repeats Thomas' distinction between res, per nomina significata and the nominum impositiones, i.e., between a perfection itself, designated by a name, and the knowledge which we have of that perfection. If we attribute any perfection to God, we attribute to him our concept of it, a concept formed from creation. But the res significata, the perfection itself, pre-exists in God as the effect pre-exists in the cause.[2] In all perfections it is the effect which resembles the cause and not vice versa, which would be absurd.[3]

From all this it becomes clear that the analogy does not affirm that God is like the creature. Rather, it is based upon the certainty that, since every effect resembles its cause, the creature from which we take our concepts does resemble the Creator. Hence we attribute to God various perfections such as good, just, wise, etc. However, these names do not indicate the existence of several, distinct perfections in God. Instead, each of them does nothing but affirm the one, divine essence itself.[4] Our intellect grasps God in

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.12; cf. ST I.13.6; I.13.2.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.19.
3. Ibid., 13; this is precisely the underlying ontological principle of Thomas' analogia unius ad alterum, ST I.13.5.
4. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.13.

many ways, just as God's creatures represent him in many ways.[1] Still, these various names are therefore not synonyms; for since our intellect conceives of distinct things through each name, each of those names represents its own, distinct ratio.[2]

What Zanchi understands by knowledge of God through analogy is that it consists in our ability to form valid affirmative propositions about him. Again and again he emphasizes that each of these propositions indicates the same thing, namely, the one and simple divine essence; because each of them affirms the identity of a certain divine perfection with God's essence itself. The fact that our intellect is incapable of grasping the pure simplicity of God explains also why perfections are predicated of God not only *in concreto* but also *in abstracto*: God is not only good and *esse*, but also goodness and *essentia*. Of the creature, with which we start, only concrete propositions can be made, for the creature is whatever it is by participation only. God, however, is whatever we attribute to him *per se* and *a seipsa*. As he is his essence, so he is good, just, etc. *per se*, and not by participation.[3]

Had Zanchi been more consistent in his reasoning, he should have arrived at the same conclusion as Thomas: namely, that after all is said and done, after we have shown what the

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1. *De natura Dei*, *Opera*, 2.14.
2. *Ibid.*, 16; cf. ST I.13.4.
3. *De natura Dei*, *Opera*, 2.13 and 18.

divine attributes are, we still do not know what God is. For he is infinitely more than the result of a multiplication of all the affirmative propositions describing him. Indeed, all that Zanchi has said calls for that conclusion. Yet he insists that the names and perfections which we can attribute to God by analogy do teach us quid sit Deus and qualis sit Dei essentia.[1]

> Through the knowledge of the perfections of created things, however, we arrive at the knowledge of the most perfect God.[2]

Indeed, Zanchi sees in the analogy that exists between creature and Creator, a divine purpose and God-given means intended by God to lead us to him as the end of all things:

> For God is the efficient and final cause of created things. Therefore, they exist in an order [ordinem] toward the former partly as effects toward the efficient cause, and partly as means toward the end to which all things are ordained.... From this follows a second ratio: namely that through created things we are led to knowledge of the Creator as through the effects to the cause....[3]

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.14.
2. Ibid., 17. Perfectionibus autem rerum creatarum cognitis: in Dei perfectissimi cognitionem adducimur.
3. Ibid., 23. Est enim Deus causa et efficiens et finalis rerum conditarum. Proinde ordinem habent ad illam, partim tanquam effecta ad causam efficientem, unde sunt: partim tanquam media ad finem, ad quem omnia ordinantur.... Hinc sequitur alia ratio: nimirum quod per res creatas in cognitionem Dei creatoris adducimur, tanquam per effecta ad causam....

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF GOD

The Point of Departure

The preceding chapter has shown the striking similarity between Zanchi and Thomas Aquinas in their definition of natural knowledge and the way in which it can be employed to obtain knowledge of God. Before proceeding further, an important difference must not go unmentioned. Thomas launches his inquiry from the basis established by the five proofs of God's existence. That the existence of God should become a problem for Thomas, had two reasons. In the first place, there are those who mistake their very belief in God for proof of his existence; whereas Thomas maintains a careful distinction between faith and knowledge. Secondly, there are those who consider the existence of God as immediately self-evident, and it is this latter group to whom Thomas addresses himself.[1] By pointing out their basic error which exists in wrongly identifying the effects of God with God himself, Thomas means to prove at the same time that existence is something which must be demonstrated, and the only course open for us to demonstrate the existence of God is to demonstrate it from God's effects. Having done this, we can then proceed to use the proofs of God's existence for forming notions concerning his essence.

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1. ST I.2.1.

Now Zanchi certainly does not hold that the existence of God is self-evident to the human intellect, nor does he ever confuse faith with rational knowledge. Indeed, as we have seen, he is in full agreement with Thomas that in order to gain any (intellectual) knowledge of God's nature we must start with his effects. Yet Zanchi omits to demonstrate the existence of God, nor does he ever mention the proofs of God's existence. Instead, he chooses as his point of departure the Scriptures, thereby affirming again his fundamental regard for the supreme authority of the Scriptures as the basis for all theological inquiry. If theology is divine revelation received into human understanding, then revelation must provide the only proper point of departure. Therefore, instead of introducing the doctrine of God with the proofs of his existence, Zanchi introduces it with a treatise on the names of God as revealed in Scripture. To believe that God is what these names say he is, is, indeed, sufficient for our salvation, Zanchi assures us.[1] But to understand (intellegere) what God is and how, or in what manner he is, is something else again. For such an understanding we must fall back on the resources of the intellect and its natural object, the sensible world which, as God's effect, is meant to lead us to an understanding of the invisibilia Dei.[2]

We can say, then, that for Zanchi the role of Scrip-

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.83.
2. Ibid.; supra p. 93.

ture consists in providing the proper point of departure for all theological inquiry in the sense that it poses the very objects to be obtained and embraced by our understanding. From there on, however, it falls upon the intellect to provide the means as well as to determine the way of approach toward obtaining those objects intelligently. In this sense the biblical names of God reveal the object, the nature of God in its various aspects. But the procedure followed by Zanchi in obtaining this object of knowledge is the dual procedure of Thomas Aquinas: that of negation and of analogy.

"Ego Sum Qui Sum"

In his discussion of the divine names found in Scripture, Zanchi draws a basic distinction between those names that are predicated of God only, and those that are predicated of God and creatures alike.[1] In correspondence to these two groups of names, Zanchi then employs the two ways of apprehending the attributes and perfections which those names designate in God: the way of negation, and that of analogy, described in the preceding chapter.

Among all the names predicated of God only, Zanchi agrees with Thomas in regarding the name God revealed to Moses in Exodus 3:14 as the one most appropriately attributed to God. Along with the Septuagint Zanchi understands it to mean ὁ ὤν -- qui est -- thus signifying the simple, perfect, and eternal essence of God, per se and ex se existing.[2] This

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.6 f.
2. Ibid., 64.

name -- identical in meaning with the name Jehovah -- signifies the divine simplicity, a notion which Zanchi then proceeds to establish as the first and -- as we shall observe time and again -- the most important and fundamental one for him.

Since our intellect has already been shown to be incapable of conceiving anything but compositions, there is, consequently, no possibility for us to form any positive concept of a pure simplicity such as God's. The only way, then, to affirm the divine simplicity is to demonstrate the absence of any kind of composition in God. Zanchi's analysis of the nature of the various compositions found in the structure of created being, and the reasons he gives for their absence in God, again provides us with a close parallel to Thomas Aquinas.[1]

In turn, Zanchi analyzes and then eliminates the compositions of body, of matter and form, act and potency, substance and accidents, frequently following Thomas' arguments almost verbatim, even though Thomas is not quoted directly nor even referred to by name.[2] It is not necessary for us to discuss each of these arguments here, since they are of minor importance in comparison to that which follows. Throughout his analysis Zanchi is leading up to a point at which he now reveals his Thomistic heritage most clearly and unmistakably:

There remains a last composition,

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.65; cf. ST I.3.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.65.

> which the philosophers call [the composition] of existence [esse] and essence.[1]

From the preceding analysis had already emerged the fact that in all substances, composed of matter and form, of substance and accidents, their substance and essence are not really identical. Essence, according to Zanchi's definition, is "that by which something is that which it is."[2] Furthermore, essence is only that which all substances of a certain species have in common, and not what each substance possesses as an individual. Using the same illustration as Thomas, Zanchi explains: "The humanity, by which I am man, is my essence."[3] Humanity, in other words, includes everything by which man is man, an animal composed of soul and body. Thus man is man by virtue of his humanity. However, humanitas includes not the very body and the very soul possessed by a particular individual. Of these particular, individual determinations, which belong to man and without which he would be incapable of existing, Zanchi says: "That is my being [esse] of substance."[4]

From this is follows that there is more in the substance man than in the essence humanity. Ergo, they are not identical. But God, as has been shown previously, is not com-

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.65. Restat postrema compositio, quae a philosophis appellatur: ex esse et essentia.
2. Ibid. Essentiam vero id, per quod quidque est id, quod est.
3. Ibid. Humanitas vero, per quam homo sum: est mea essentia.
4. Ibid. Hoc est meum esse substantiale.

posed of matter and form. The distinction, therefore, of substance and essence cannot be made in God. We cannot say that God is God by virtue of his deity, as man is man by virtue of his humanity. Thus Deus and deitas, or anything else that can be predicated of God are all one and the same.

> God, however, is an essence completely immaterial... therefore God's being [esse] and his deity are identical.[1]

This is precisely the conclusion reached by Thomas.[2]

Yet Zanchi does not stop here. In his analysis of the composition of act and potency he has already asserted that such a composition is incompatible with the divine nature, for God is "pure act, existing per se."[3] We must therefore, go beyond the identification of God's substance and his essence, and establish the identity of his essence and his esse. What does Zanchi mean by esse? According to his definition, "esse [is] that, which something is in actu, either substantially, or accidentally."[4]

Apparently Zanchi in this definition refers to esse as used in forming a predicate. As such it designates the actuality of the form in a given subject, be it substantial or accidental. Thus in the statement "Ego sum homo... hoc est meum esse substantiale," sum indicates the form "man" as

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.66. Deus autem essentia est extra omnem materiam.... Ergo esse Deum et Deitas ipsa, idem sunt.
2. Cf. ST I.3.3.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.65. ...actus purus, per se existens.
4. Ibid., 66. ...esse... [est] id, quod quidque actu est: sive substantiale, sive accidentale sit.

the constitutive part of my substance. On the other hand, in the statement "...quod sim calidus, hoc est meum esse accidentale"[1] it signifies the actual determination of the subject (ego) by this accidental form calidus. The verb esse, therefore, designates the composition of a form with the subject which it determines, thereby giving expression to the actuality of the form. It does this precisely because esse itself signifies actuality, namely, "that which something is in actu."[2]

From this it follows that in any individual subject, essence and esse must be distinguished:

> Any individual is composed of esse, i.e. of that which it [actually] is, and of essence, i.e. of that, by which it is.[3]

If the act of being man is different from the essence humanity, or the act of living distinct from the essence life,[4] then the composition of form and subject in a created being leads us to the necessary assumption of the composition of esse and essentia in the existing creature:

> Form and subject cannot be identical in created things, because what they are in substance they have by participation... no existing thing is itself the very essence through which it exists. It is clear, therefore, that all created things are composed of esse and essence.[5]

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.65.
2. Ibid., 66. ...quod quidque actu est.
3. Ibid., 66. Unumquodque individuum compositum est ex esse, id est, ex eo, quod ipsum est, et ex essentia, id est, ex eo, per quod est.
4. Ibid., 85.
5. Ibid., 66. Forma enim et subjectum idem esse non possunt in rebus creatis: quia et quod sint substantiae et quod sint tales substantiae, totum hoc habent per participationem... nulla res existens est ipsa sua essentia per quam est. Quare manifestum est, res creatas omnes compositas esse ex esse et essentia .

At this point a difference between Zanchi and Thomas emerges which should not be overlooked. Although the distinction between *esse* and *essentia* is undoubtedly Thomistic, Zanchi's definition of *esse* -- at least up to this point -- appears to stop short of Thomas' full analysis. Thomas clearly distinguishes between being of existence and that of predication. To him the first and proper meaning of the verb *esse* is the act of existing: "'Est,' simpliciter dictum, significat 'in actu esse.'"[1] Precisely because *esse* signifies primarily actual existence, it signifies, secondarily, the existence of a subject as determined by a form. In other words, *esse* means, first of all, simply "to be," and, secondly, "to be something."[2]

Zanchi, apparently, does not distinguish between these two senses of *esse*. According to Gilson Aristotle, too, did not draw that distinction. For him, to say that a man is just, and, that a just man exists amounted to the same thing, namely, that a man exists with the determination: to be just.[3] The same appears to be the case in Zanchi. *Esse*, in his definition[4] is the act of being of something (*quid*), not simply the act of being taken by itself. *Esse* is thus understood by Zanchi within the context of the composition of form and subject.

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1. Cited in E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, New York, 1956, p. 448, note 33.
2. Cf. Gilson, *op. cit.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
4. *De natura Dei*, *Opera*, 2.65.

It would seem, then, that Zanchi remains -- more consistently than Thomas -- within the natural limits of the intellect which "primo apprehendat composita, deinde, remotione partium compositionis, in cognitium simplicium veniat."[1]

Esse, the act of being, is therefore to our understanding first of all the act of something having existence. Only by removing this composition of form and subject can we arrive at the simple and undetermined act of existence which is God. This is the way Zanchi goes. Emphasizing the significant fact that in the name Ego sum qui sum, which was revealed to Moses, esse is attributed to God "without any predication,"[2] Zanchi finds in this the affirmation that in God "the esse of God and God's essence are not diverse."[3] God is "he who is, simply ex se, per se and in a supremely perfect way, pure act and removed from all composition."[4] Thus it can be said only of God that he is suum esse suaque essentia,[5] that his essence is identical with the pure act of being, without any cause or determination whatever. His being is nothing else than that by which he is, namely, ipsum esse, the pure act of being itself.

And so Zanchi and Thomas Aquinas arrive at the same conclusion about the divine essence, a conclusion which Thomas

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.83; cf. supra, p. 85.
2. Ibid., 64. ...sine ullo praedicato.
3. Ibid., 66. ...esse Dei et ipsa Dei essentia non sunt diversa.
4. Ibid., 64. ...ille qui est, nempe simpliciter, ex se, per se, et perfectissime... actus purus, ab omni compositione prorsus remotum.
5. Ibid.

calls a sublimis veritas,[1] and which he, too, finds confirmed in the name qui est that God revealed to Moses.[2] It is, therefore, only natural, that Zanchi and Thomas should agree that this name is the one most proper to God.[3]

By denying the existence of this "last and most subtle of all compositions,"[4] i.e., that of esse and essentia in God, Zanchi affirms the perfect simplicity of the divine essence which is ipsum esse, the pure act of being, causa primaria et fons omnis esse, the first cause and fountain of all esse.[5]

It is this notion of the simplicity of the divine essence based on the name qui est and understood as totally free of any composition -- including that of essence and existence (essentia and esse) -- which constitutes the very heart of Zanchi's doctrine of God. All the remaining notions and statements concerning the divine nature are derived from and must be understood on this premise.

By way of conclusion, we turn to Calvin's remarks on the name of God, which reveal the utter contrast of Calvin's approach to that of Zanchi. Calvin does not deny that the name Jahweh expresses the "eternity and primary essence of God."[6] Commenting on the passage in Exodus 3:14, Calvin has this to say, however:

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1. Summa contra Gentiles, I.22.
2. Ibid.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.33; cf. ST I.13.2.
4. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.33. ...postrema... et subtilissima omnium compositionum.
5. Ibid.
6. Comm. Ez. 1:25-26 - CO 40.53.

> How would it have profited Moses to gaze upon the secret essence of God as if it were shut up in heaven, unless, being assured of his omnipotence, he had obtained from thence the buckler of his confidence?[1]

Not the incomprehensible essence of God, but rather his power and government are to be seen in this name, according to Calvin. The name of God

> ...is to be understood of the knowledge of him in so far as he makes himself known to us, for I do not approve of the subtle speculations of those who think the name of God means nothing else but God himself. It should rather be referred to the works and properties by which he is known, than to his essence.[2]

The above comments speak for themselves. Calvin's sole concern is with the Deus erga nos, with the manifestations of his power, goodness and righteousness,[3] by which he reveals himself to us. But God's essence and the knowledge of it we should leave to God himself.[4] To us it remains a mystery, even if we know his name.

The Perfect and Infinite, Immutable and Eternal God

Proceeding from the premise of God's perfect simplicity, Zanchi arrives at a second affirmation concerning the divine essence, one that follows directly and necessarily from the first: God's perfection. Although our intellect cannot conceive of a perfect being, since the compositions which we

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1. Comm. Ex. 3:14 - CO 24.44.
2. Comm. Ps. 8:1 - CO 31.88.
3. Comm. Ps. 77:15 - CO 31.71.
4. OS III.53.18-23.

know are by their very nature imperfect; we must nevertheless affirm God to be perfect, because there is no composition in him. Obviously, "that which is simple, is in itself perfect."[1]

Now, a thing is perfect according to the measure in which it is a certain perfection. Whatever, therefore, is of a higher degree of simplicity is also recognized as being more perfect and noble. For example, the wine with the least quantity of water is also the most perfect.[2] Thus the degree of perfection in a thing corresponds to its degree of actual being: "Eatenus aliquid dicitur perfectum quatenus est ens actu."[3] A thing is white, for example, in that it participates in whiteness. It is, therefore, not perfectly white. Now, if there existed a whiteness outside a subject and by itself, whose being consisted precisely in being white, it would be perfect, because it would not lack whiteness in any degree but be whiteness pure and simple.[4]

The same is true with respect to *esse*. Since a thing receives *esse* by participation, it is not its own *esse* and is, therefore, imperfectly. God, however, is the simple and pure act of being in whom *esse* and *essentia* are identical. He, therefore, lacks no perfection whatever, inasmuch as God -- being pure act and *primum Ens* -- is the cause of all perfections. For whatever is the cause of any being is by necessity

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1. *De natura Dei*, *Opera*, 2.72. ...quod simplex est, id in suo genere perfectum est.
2. *Ibid.*, 140.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, 66; cf. ST I.4.1.

of a higher degree of perfection of that being. Since God is the first cause of all things, he is also prima perfectio.[1] Furthermore, every effect is produced in the likeness of the agent producing it: "Omne agens agere sibi simile."[2]

For that reason, whatever perfections we find in creatures, therefore, must necessarily pre-exist in God who created them. But an effect which pre-exists in its cause is imperfect. God, on the other hand, in whom all perfections pre-exist, is thus universally perfect.[3] Again, the entire argument follows that of Thomas.[4]

If God is "Esse itself, and that most perfectly and most simple,"[5] that is, pure and undetermined actuality, it follows that he is necessarily infinite. "Whatever exists in such manner is necessarily infinite."[6] If it is established, then, that God is infinite, it means that he is present everywhere and in all things.[7] This fact which is so important for Thomas[8] is of equal significance for Zanchi, since it has important bearing upon his view of nature and creation, as well as of providence and predestination. The main argument for affirming the divine omnipresence for Zanchi as for Thomas is God's all-causality. For God, if he is perfectissimum et sim-

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.140.
2. Ibid., 143; cf. ST I.4.3.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.143.
4. ST I.4.2-3.
5. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.93. ...suum Esse, illudque perfectissimum et simplicissimum.
6. Ibid. Quod autem tale est, infinitum sit necesse est. Cf. ST I.7.1.
7. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.94.
8. ST I.8.1.

plicissimum Esse, suaque essentia, is the universal cause of all being as well as the very life of all that exists.[1]

According to Thomas, God is the esse of all existing beings not in that he is their essence but rather their cause: "God is the esse of all things, not essentially, but causally."[2] Similarly, Zanchi sees God as the cause of all existence, who omnibus dat Esse.[3] Therefore, as the very cause of the being of all things, God must necessarily be present in all things as long as they are. "Nulla res ullibi locorum esse potest, quin in ea sit Deus." God is, therefore, in all places, i.e., in everything that exists in any place and which could not, indeed, exist without God being in it.[4]

How is this presence understood by Zanchi? "God is truly present everywhere by his total essence, and by his power."[5] The emphasis here is on the tota essentia, and in this connection Zanchi criticizes Thomas for not saying enough: God is present in all things not only in that he gives them esse and operates through them (Thomas), but, indeed, tota sua essentia eoque sua potentia.[6] Actually, Thomas' position is not at all different from that of Zanchi, for, since God's essence is his Esse, which is the being (esse) of

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.94.
2. I Sent. 8.1.2. Deus est esse omnium, non essentiale, sed causale.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.102.
4. Ibid., 94.
5. Ibid., 95. Deus ubique vere est, tota sua essentia, eoque sua potentia, praesens.
6. Ibid.

all created *esse*, God is also present in all things by his essence and *potentia*, for *esse* and *essentia* are identical in God. As the cause of the being of each thing, God is also the cause of its actions and operations.[1] Thus, Zanchi and Thomas mean the same thing, namely, that God is present everywhere *tota sua essentia, potentia et praesentia*, in that he is the pure, simple act of being by which all things are, act, and operate.

In all this it is important to remember that God, because of his perfect simplicity, never enters into any composition with the creature: "...[God] is not mixed with the creature,"[2] but he is present as *causa efficiens, conservans, movens*.[3]

To say that God is infinite and present in all places means that he is also immovable:

> For everything, which is moved in any manner, moves to a place where it was not before.[4]

But God who "fills all things everywhere, is, therefore, also immutable... for if he is altogether immovable, he is necessarily immutable."[5]

Yet Zanchi sees, like Thomas, the ultimate reason for

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1. ST I.8.3.
2. *De natura Dei*, *Opera*, 2.95. ...neque tamen propterea in mixtus est rebus.
3. *Ibid.*, 96.
4. *Ibid.*, 79. Omne enim, quod ullo modo movetur, ullo motu pertingit ad id, ad quod antea non pertingebat.
5. *Ibid.* ...ubique omnia implet, ideo etiam immutabilis est.... Si omnino immobilis est, immutabilis sit necesse est.

God's immutability not in his immobility, but rather in his being pure act. Change involves passing from potency to act. All things are therefore changeable because they exist constantly in potency to some other thing.[1] But God, on the other hand, since he is pure act, can in no way change, for he is not in potency to anything:

> Since God is pure and simple act and in no way in potency to something else, it follows that he can in no way change.[2]

A comparison with Thomas Aquinas reveals the same argument and conclusion there.[3]

God who is <u>omnino immutabilis</u> is, by the same token, "truely and properly eternal."[4] All created things, as we have seen, are subject to change, since they always exist in potency to something. The very composition of act and potency in creatures involves constant change or motion, a mode of being in a continual succession of before and after. But God, who is pure act and completely immovable, knows therefore in his being of no before and after, and of no succession:

> He is outside any motion, remaining always immobile. He is, therefore, outside any succession, remaining always the same.[5]

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1. <u>De natura Dei</u>, <u>Opera</u>, 2.78. Omnis res mutabilis est: quia... [est] constans ex actu quo est, et potentia passiva, qua potest non esse.
2. <u>Ibid</u>. Cum igitur Deus purissimus sit et simplicissimus actus, et nullo modo in potentia ad aliquid: evincitur, Deum nullo modo mutabilem esse.
3. ST I.9.1.
4. <u>De natura Dei</u>, <u>Opera</u>, 2.79. ...vere et proprie aeternus.
5. <u>Ibid</u>., 75. Est vero... extra omnem motum, immobilis permanens. Est igitur extra omnem successionem... idem semper manens.

Furthermore:

> God calls himself "he who is," which means that he exists by himself and through himself and his own essence. Thus he has been, is, and will be always the same and, therefore, truly eternal; for he can change neither in substance, nor in place, nor in any other way.[1]

In a manner closely similar to that of Thomas,[2] Zanchi thus describes God's eternity as the very stability of the divine Esse. Consequently, God's eternity is his essence. For whatever we affirm to be in God, "all of them are the divine essence itself."[3] For this reason, Zanchi rejects Boethius' idea that God is ante aeternitatem, as well as the statement of Augustine, that God is the autor aeternitatis. Since God's eternity is his essence, Zanchi concludes: "Neque enim potest esse autor sui ipsius, et fuisse ante seipsum."[4]

We have seen how the preceding affirmations or attributes concerning the divine essence have come about, in fact, by way of negation, that is, by denying any kind of composition in God. As this is the same as saying that there is no multiplicity in him, the above attributes all affirm the perfect unity of the divine essence.

> From that simplicity comes the confirmation of the doctrine concerning the one God... for whatever is simple is in no way

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.76. Deus sese vocat "Est" ... quod sit sua ipsius essentia a se, et per se existens. Idem igitur semper suit, est, et erit, ac proinde vere aeternus: quia, nec substantia, nec loco, nec ulla ratione mutari potest.
2. Cf. ST I.10.1-2.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.77. ...omnia haec sunt ipsa divina essentia.
4. Ibid., 77.

composed nor multiple; thus God is one.[1]

To say that God is one is simply to say that God is the being that he is.[2]

Again and again Zanchi repeats that God is Jehovah -- Qui Est -- meaning: "ipsum esse, per se et a se existens, sua ipsius essentia."[3] He is his own nature, his own essence, his own esse, pure and simple. Whatever affirmations we make concerning the divine essence, whatever perfections we attribute to him can be summarized with the basic notion of God as pure and simple being, supremely one and supremely undivided. This, too, corresponds precisely to the position of Thomas.[4]

The Perfections of God

As was pointed out previously, Zanchi distinguishes between two groups of divine attributes, namely, those that can be attributed to God only and those that belong to both God and creatures.[5] Consequently, the first group to which belong the divine simplicity, and the other attributes discussed above, can be understood and grasped by the intellect by way of negation only; for we have no way of readhing a direct, positive concept of a pure and simple mode of being such as God is.

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.72. Ex ista simplicitate, sequitur confirmatio doctrinae de uno vero duntaxat Deo.... Quod enim simplicissimum est, id nullo modo compositum est, eoque nec multiplex: Unus igitur tantum Deus.
2. Ibid., 78. ...quia suapte nature et per se talis est.
3. Ibid., 76.
4. Cf. ST I.11.4.
5. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.6 f and 50 f.

The case is different, however, with those perfections that are predicated of God and creatures alike. For whatever perfection is found in a creature we can and must attribute to God as the first cause, namely, by way of analogy. Among the perfections that can be attributed to God analogically the most important ones are knowledge or intelligence, will, and life, which will later prove to be highly significant for Zanchi's view of providence and predestination.

Zanchi has already shown God to be supremely and universally perfect in that all the perfections of creatures have their cause in him and must therefore be attributed to him. And since of all perfections and operations of an intelligent being the "action of the intellect, which is the act of knowing, is the most outstanding of all operations,"[1] how, then, could this intelligence be denied of God who is the very cause of it in man?[2]

If intelligence or knowledge must thus be attributed to God, it must be attributed to him in the highest degree. In man we distinguish between two kinds of knowledge, sensory knowledge and intellectual knowledge. Since God is completely immaterial, the former must be denied of him.[3] Intellectual knowledge, on the other hand, which is of a much higher degree of perfection, since its objects are first and uni-

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.195. Actio intellectus, quae est cognoscere, [est]... praestantissimum omnium operationem.
2. Ibid., 198.
3. Ibid., 196.

versal principles,[1] is the kind of knowledge we have to attribute to God, yet in an infinitely more perfect mode than it exists in man.[2] Knowledge, in man, is actual as well as potential (aut habitus aut actus); whereas God is pure act and there is nothing potential in him.[3] Furthermore, in man the intelligible must be distinguished from the intellect apprehending it, since it perfects the intellect.[4] Whatever is in God, however, is the divine essence itself, which is "perfect and simple, and cannot be perfected by anything."[5] Consequently, God's intelligence and knowledge is infinitely perfect, since it is one with the divine essence, and thus with the divine esse which is God himself.

From this identity of God's intelligence and of his intelligibility with his essence, it follows that God understands himself perfectly.[6] In man, however, the intelligible and the intelligent intellect must be distinguished, for one is in potency to the other, and they become united only in the act of intelligence. In God, on the other hand, since he is the supreme Intelligent as well as the supreme Intelligible,[7] both his intelligence and his intelligibility are one with his essence which is the pure simple act of being -- "first and perfect being, removed from all matter, simple and

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.197.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 200.
5. Ibid., 197. ...perfectissima et simplicissima essentia, quae a nulla re perfici potest.
6. Ibid., 199.
7. Ibid.

pure."[1] Thus God knows himself perfectly, since knowability and knowledge in him are one and the same with his very being.[2]

Zanchi now takes the next step and states that God not only has perfect knowledge of himself but of all other things as well. Since he is the first efficient cause of all things, God knows them all -- not in themselves -- but, more perfectly, in himself inasmuch as their intelligible form or exemplar exists in "the mind and intellect of God."[3] From this it follows that God as their first cause has perfect knowledge of all things in that they, as God's effects, pre-exist in his intelligence.[4]

This knowledge, furthermore, is not only of a general nature but extends to all particular and individual things or modes of being,[5] even to future contingents.[6] For since there is in God, who is eternal, no succession of before and after, it is necessary that he should know all things -- including future contingents -- as continually present and realized, and this all at once and at the same time.[7] In comparison, we find that Thomas' understanding of God's intelligence includes every point of Zanchi's argument.[8]

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.199. ...primum, perfectissimum Ens, ab omni materia alienum, simplicissimum et purissimum.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 201. Dei mente et intellectu....
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 202.
7. Ibid., 205.
8. Cf. ST I.14.

From the fact that there is intelligence in God it follows necessarily that we must attribute will to God. What constitutes man is the faculty of knowing and that of willing.[1] The beginning of will is knowledge of the good. Once the good is known, it is also will, since it is the good that constitutes the object of the will. Thus every intelligent being tends toward and desires that which its intellect has judged and established as good.[2] Furthermore, to this inclination toward the good as known is attached the complacency and delight in the good. Precisely this inclination toward the known good and the complacent rest and delight in it is what constitutes the will.[3]

Now in God in whom is supreme intelligence is therefore will as well. God, who knows, rests and delights in the good, wills it, therefore, at the same time.[4] And since it has been demonstrated before that God is simplicissima essentia, it follows that "will in God is therefore nothing else than the essence of God willing."[5] Just as God's intelligence is identical with his being, so is his will, and no composition is introduced in God by it.[6]

If the good as known is the object of the will, the supreme good is, therefore, the object of the divine will.

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.243.
2. Ibid., 244.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 246. Voluntas igitur in Deo nihil aliud est quam ipsa Dei essentia volens.
6. Ibid.

This means, then, that the immediate and first object of God's will is God himself.

> Thus the first and supreme good is willed by the will of God first of all. That [supreme good], however, is God himself.[1]

This, however, does not mean that God wills nothing outside himself. Just as in knowing himself God knows all other things, so he wills all things in willing himself. This can easily be demonstrated.

God is the first and final cause of all things, "from whom, by whom, and in whom are all things... hence, if God wills himself as an end, he also wills all things which he has destined toward that end."[2] Furthermore, all being exists by participation in the divine Esse, which is its cause. Consequently God by willing himself as the summum et primum Ens "wills all other beings because of himself."[3] Finally, all things that exist are good in that they exist, since they have their existence (esse) from God, as shown above. And since the object of the will is the good, it follows that God wills everything that exists, and that nothing exists in the world which God wills not.[4] This positive will of God again extends to all singulars and particulars.[5] Quite ob-

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.262. Primum igitur et supremum bonum cognitum, imprimis vult voluntas Dei. Hoc autem est ipse Deus.
2. Ibid., 263. ...a quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quem omnia.... Ergo si Deus vult seipsum, ut finem, vult etiam omnia, quae ad finem hunc destinavit.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

viously, Zanchi follows Thomas' argument without the slightest deviation.[1] Zanchi serves advance notice at this point that he considers the above observations of first importance for the doctrine of providence and predestination and that he intends to discuss them further within that context,[2] especially as regards the exercise of the divine will and its effect upon future contingents.

The existence of intelligence and will in the divine essence necessarily leads to the affirmation of life in God: "There is no act of knowing, willing, and loving except in living beings."[3] This is confirmed by the very definition of life. Among created beings all those who contain their own principle of motion are said to have life. Thus, according to Aristotle, even plants are said to live, inasmuch as their motion consists in growth (and the bearing of fruit -- so Zanchi reminds us.[4] Again, what manifests itself as life in animals is motion, not simply motion as such but motion by which the animal moves "itself."[5]

Motion, however, is not only of a physical kind. Indeed, all those actions whose principle is interior to the being performing them are considered motion, as Aristotle teaches in De Anima. Among these actions are intelligere, velle, amare -- actions which due to their purely interior

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1. Cf. ST I.19.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.263.
3. Ibid., 87. Intelligere enim, velle, amare: non nisi viventium est.
4. Ibid., 84.
5. Ibid. ...sed motus quo a seipso movetur animal.

principle of motion are of much greater perfection than animal or physical motion.[1]

Finally, if we ascend still higher, namely, to God, we must conclude that he who "knows and will through himself, just as he is his intelligence and his will, his knowing and his willing" must also be said "to be truly and perfectly living."[2]

But, whereas created beings live only in that they participate in the life that they have received, God who is <u>suum Esse et sua essentia</u> is also <u>sua vita et suum vivere</u>.[3] God is his life as one who lives by reason of himself and as the cause of the life of all other beings.

> He is, therefore, most properly called "life" and "living"; because he properly lives in himself as well as being the cause of all life in all living things.[4]

And so our inquiring intellect -- by way of the existing analogy between creator and creature -- again encounters a God whose supreme simplicity includes all perfections of created being. A God whose essence is his very act of being, whose intelligence his act of knowing, whose will his act of willing, and whose life is his act of living. A God who is first and supreme Being as he is the pure act of existence

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1. <u>De natura Dei</u>, <u>Opera</u>, 2.84.
2. <u>Ibid</u>. ...per se ipsum intelligit et vult: ita ut etiam sua sit intelligentia et sua voluntas, suum intelligere, suumque velle... [must also be said] ...vere et perfectissime vivere.
3. <u>Ibid</u>., 88.
4. <u>Ibid</u>. Propriissime igitur vita quoque et vivere appellatur: quia et prōprie ipse vivit et causa est omnis vitae in omnibus viventibus.

and thereby the first and final cause of all that exists and has its being in him. It is the God who thus revealed himself to Moses and the people of Israel when he said "Ego sum qui sum." This is how Thomas Aquinas understood him to be, and this is how Zanchi conceives of him.

Any comparison with Calvin's teaching concerning the attributes of God turns out to be necessarily brief. Characteristically, Calvin devotes one of the shortest chapters of his Institutes to the subject. In the words of Exodus 34:6 f. Calvin finds a summary of all that "is possible for men to know" concerning the nature of God.[1] The "celebration of his attributes," which we find there, is meant to give us "a description, not of what he is in himself, but of what he is toward us, that our knowledge of him may consist rather in a lively perception, than in vain and airy speculation."[2] The perfections Calvin finds there are, according to him, the same that are displayed in creation, namely, God's "clemency, goodness, mercy, justice, judgment, and truth." Of these, there are three things which are for us the most important to know, and which are described by Jeremiah:[3]

> Mercy, in which alone consists all our salvation; judgment, which is executed on the wicked every day; and righteousness, by which the faithful are preserved and most graciously supported. When you know these things, the prophecy declares

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1. OS III.86.9-10.
2. OS III.86.17-19. Quibus nobis describitur non quis sit apud se, sed qualis erga nos: ut ista ejus agnitio vivo magis sensu, quam vacua et meteorica speculatione constet.
3. Jeremiah 9:24.

that you have abundant reason for glorifying God.[1]

This is God as Calvin knows him, not as he is in himself and in his essence, but how he is in relation to us, how he reveals himself in his actions and dealings with men. It is a knowledge, furthermore, which is not based on an ontological relation of cause and effect, as in Zanchi and Thomas, but rather on the personal encounter between God and man. This knowledge of God, the only kind of knowledge "which is afforded us in the Scriptures, is designed for the same end as that which we derive from the creatures: it invites us first to the fear of God, and then to confidence in him; that we may learn to honor him with perfect innocence of life, and sincere obedience to his will, and to place all our dependence on his goodness."[2] Thus the knowledge of God as he is toward us, a knowledge derived from God's encounter with man in his revelation must result in our response to that encounter. The end of a true knowledge of God is not to know. It is to obey and to trust.

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1. OS III.87.2-7. Misericordia, qua sola consistit nostra omnium salus: Judicium, quod in flagitiosus quotidie exercetur... justitia, qua conservantur fideles, et benignissime foventur. Quibus comprehensis, te abunde habere vaticinium testatur quo possis in Deo gloriari.

2. OS III.87.14-19. Porro non in alium scopum destinatur, quae in Scripturis nobis proponitur Dei notitia, quam quae in creaturis impressa nitet: nempe ad Dei timorem primum, deinde ad fiduciam nos invitat: quo scilicet et perfecta vitae innocentia, et non simulata obedientia colere illum discamus: tum ab ejus bonitate toti dependere.

PART TWO

ZANCHI'S DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE AND PREDESTINATION

CHAPTER III

THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE

It is of no small significance that Zanchi should choose to discuss both providence and predestination as part and conclusion of his doctrine of God, thereby following the example of Thomas rather than that of Calvin's final edition of the Institutes. Already in an earlier, shorter treatise, "Confessio de praedestinatione sanctorum,"[1] which Zanchi had submitted to the City Council of Strassburg in defense of his doctrine, he had followed the same pattern by introducing predestination with a brief discussion of the divine attributes -- a procedure which he declared necessary for a proper understanding of predestination.[2]

This very statement may well serve as additional evidence in support of our thesis, that the key to Zanchi's theological position must not be seen in the Predestinarian dogma itself, nor, indeed, in the alleged Calvinistic principle of the sovereignty of God, but rather in the ontological premises upon which Zanchi's doctrine of God is founded, from which his thought proceeds, and the historic origin of which must be looked for in the Thomistic tradition. We have already seen how Zanchi's entire theological edifice rests upon

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1. "Confessio de praedestinatione sanctorum," in Miscellanea, Opera, 7.1.279-336.
2. Ibid., 279.

his concept of God as causa efficiens and causa finalis[1] of all things, of a God whose all-causality is nothing but the unfolding, so to speak, of the pure act of being that he is. This will become increasingly apparent as we turn to Zanchi's treatment of providence and of predestination. For just as God's causality extends to the very existence of all beings, so it extends to all their operations and actions. Hence it is impossible properly to understand the effects of God's actions and causality without first having considered God himself in the pure actuality of being that he is.

The Relation Between the Divine Essence and God's Actions

The above already indicated why Zanchi counts God's actions among the divine attributes.[2] Because of the perfect simplicity of God's nature, in whom essence and existence are identical, the divine actions cannot be seen as different from the essence of God and cannot be rightly understood apart from it.[3] For God is actus purus who always acts through himself as the one who knows, wills, and governs all things. He does this, furthermore, through one and the same simple, eternal, and continuous action, which remains so despite the fact that diverse effects extra Deum follow from it.[4] In a similar

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1. Cf. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.431.
2. Ibid., 426.
3. Ibid., 426-427. Quod vero de proprietatibus scripsimus, idem de actionibus quoque sentiendum esse docemus: nempe sicut essentiales proprietates, sic etiam actiones... ab essentia ipsa divina propter summam ejus simplicitatem, re ipsa non differre, sed differre tantum ratione quadam, tum ab illa, tum inter sese....
4. Ibid.

manner, the Sun through one and the same action of its light produces different effects in different subjects.[1]

In nature, specifically in man, two kinds of action need to be distinguished, namely, *immanens* and *transiens* action. The former is one which, in acting, remains within the being performing it, and produces no effects outside of the acting being. For example, *sentire* remains within the senses, *intelligere* within the intellect. *Transiens* action, on the other hand, produces effects, outside the being performing it, in something or someone else.[2]

Both actions belong properly to God, although in him they are, because of the simplicity of his nature, the same simple and pure act of being that is God who eternally knows, wills, and loves himself in himself and all other things, inasmuch as they are in him as their first and final cause. In time God has, however, caused effects outside of himself. He has created the world, rules and operates all in all, justifies and regenerates.[3]

On this basis Zanchi considers providence and predestination as properly belonging to the first group of actions, since they are actions immanent to the divine essence in its eternal act of being, knowing, and willing. Creation and the government of the world (*gubernatio*) as well as the other effects of God's activity including redemption, belong to the

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1. *De natura Dei*, *Opera*, 2.426-427.
2. *Ibid.*, 427.
3. *Ibid.*

second group of actions, inasmuch as they constitute effects outside of God's being.[1]

This is a distinction which clearly shows the influence of Thomas upon Zanchi's thought in its more far-reaching consequences. Thomas makes this very distinction, upon the same basis and with the same conclusion.[2] With this in mind we now turn to Zanchi's description of providence proper, for a further clarification and definition of Zanchi's teaching.

Ordinatio and Gubernatio

Providence must, according to Zanchi, be understood first of all as the foreknowledge of things and of needs. This necessarily includes the memory of the past as well as knowledge of the present.[3] Providence is therefore a part of prudence; for prudence consists mainly of these two things: remembrance of the past and understanding of the present. And from this results providence, inasmuch as we learn to provide for the future from remembering the past and from understanding the present.[4] Aquinas defines providence in precisely the same way. Zanchi is well aware of Aristotle's argument against the divine providence and replies in the same terms as Thomas: prudence and providence are certainly proper to God, since they are in God in a way which excludes all imperfection, such as taking counsel and inquiry which are part of

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.427.
2. ST I.22.1, Reply Obj. 2; cf. I.22.3.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.429.
4. Ibid.

prudence in creatures. Prudence must therefore be said to be in God in terms of certain knowledge and decree: scientia, sed sine discursu; decretum, sed sine deliberatione.[1]

Besides foreknowledge, there belongs to providence the will to provide for the future and to direct or order things to an end.[2] And finally, providence includes the action itself, by which things are cared for and ordered to their end.[3]

With respect to all three points, it must be asserted that providence belongs to God and is in God. As was demonstrated before, God as the supreme intelligent knows all things and their necessities, simply by knowing himself. At the same time, having created all things, God has willed and ordered all things toward their end. The divine providence is to ordain all things toward their end and to provide for all the means necessary to reach that end.[4] Thus Zanchi compares God's providence with the prudence of a father who provides for his family, or with that of a prince ruling over a city, or of a king administering the affairs of his kingdom -- a parable found also in Aquinas.[5] As such, divine providence not only includes the universe in general, but extends

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.456; cf. ST I.22.1, Reply Obj. 1.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.429; cf. ST I.22.1.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.429; cf. ST I.22.1.
4. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.430. Haec est aeterna in Deo ipso providentia; rei ad suum finem deputatio: et eorum omnium, quae ad finem consequendum necessaria sunt, mediorum praeparatio.
5. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.432, 434; cf. ST I.22.1.

to every single part of it, whether great or small, noble or poor, men or animals, animate or inanimate things.[1] Indeed, nothing exists or happens in the world which has not, before the foundation of the world, been foreseen by God's foreknowledge and ordained to its end by the divine will.[2]

We now reach the point where Zanchi makes his distinction between that part of providence which he calls the eternal ratio or plan that exists in the mind of God concerning the order of all things toward an end, and the other part which is the actual execution of God's eternal plan. The former is divine providence properly so call; the latter is God's actual government of the world.[3] As was pointed out before, Thomas makes that distinction in precisely those terms.[4] The first part of providence Zanchi defines further as ordinatio or dispositio, which is the same as God's eternal and unchangeable decree (decretum).[5] As such it belongs to that genus of action described above as immanens, i.e., action remaining within the agent. It is the action of the divine foreknowledge and will both of which are eternally in God; hence, providence inasmuch as it consists of both foreknowledge and will must be considered as it is eternally in God,[6] i.e., as eternal decree or ratio of the order of all things toward their ends.

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.432, 434; cf. ST I.22.2.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.438, 440; cf. ST I.22.2.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.440.
4. ST I.22.3.
5. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.440.
6. Ibid.

The second part of providence, defined as the actual divine government of the world (gubernatio actualis), like the act of creation, is part of the transiens actions, i.e., actions producing effects outside the agent. As such it is of a temporal nature. It is the execution or the necessary effect of the eternal ratio and decree of providence.[1] Although both parts cannot be entirely separated, inasmuch as God is the efficient and final cause of each, yet they must be distinguished. Consequently, Zanchi discusses the divine government at the conclusion of his doctrine of creation, following Aquinas' example.[2]

The above distinction between ordinatio and gubernatio is repeated by Zanchi in his treatise on the Gubernatio Mundi, as follows:

> Providence consists of two parts, the former of which is the eternal and unchangeable disposition and ordination by which God, before the creation of the world, proposed in himself... to administer and govern the world toward its end, namely to his own glory, to the salvation of the elect, and to the common good of the entire universe... the other part, which is temporal, is the administration of the world itself. ... Thus we have in this thesis the efficient, material, formal, and final causes [of God's government]. The efficient cause is the governing God; the material cause the governed world; the formal cause the form of that government as defined and ordered eternally in the mind of God; and the final cause, the governing of the world to the glory of God, the salvation of the elect, and the common good of the whole universe.[3]

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1. De natura Dei, Opera 2.440.
2. De Gubernatione Mundi, Opera, 3.2.847 ff.; cf. ST I.103 ff.
3. De Gubernatione Mundi, Opera, 3.2.849-850. ...Illa prior, est ipsa aeterna et immutabilis dispositio atque ordina-

Ordinatio and gubernatio as the two parts of providence are thus linked together as well as distinguished within the order of causes. Both are linked in God as the efficient and final cause (inasmuch as the salvation of the elect and the good of the universe serve the glory of God), but distinguished in terms of the material and formal causes. The ordinatio, ratio, or eternal providence proper is the "form" of the gubernatio mundi, as it exists eternally in the mind God. For this reason, the divine providence is properly called an attribute of God, and to be considered as it is in God.[1] This corresponds with the definition of Thomas, that "this type of the order of things towards an end is therefore in God called providence." Again, in the same passage: "It is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and this type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking providence."[2]

In comparison with the position taken by Zanchi and Thomas, one could well argue that Calvin, too, teaches the

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tio: qua Deus constituerat ante conditum Mundum, in seipso, Mundum hunc... continenter in finem usque administrare ac regere, idque ad gloriam suam, Electorum salutem, communeque totius universi bonum... altera pars, est ipsa, quae in tempore coepit, Mundi administratio.... Itaque in hac thesi habemus et causam efficientem, et materialem, et formalem, et finalem. Efficiens, est Deus regens atque administrans; materialis, est Mundus ipse administratus; Formalis, est illa administrationis formae, quae ab aeterno in mente Dei fuit definita atque praescripta. Finalis... gubernari scilicet Mundum ad gloriam Dei, salutem Electorum, communeque totius universi bonum.

1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.427.
2. ST I.22.1.

distinction between ordinatio and gubernatio, between the eternal decree and the execution of the decree. In fact, there is a statement in which he makes precisely that distinction:

> We consider God the Arbiter and Governor of all things, who, in his own wisdom, has, from the remotest eternity, decreed what he would do; and now, by his own power, executes what he has decreed.[1]

There are other references to God's "eternal ordination" (aeternae suae ordinationi)[2] to the "secret providence of God" (occulta Dei providentia)[3] and to the "counsel of God" (Dei consilio).[4] Nowhere, however, does this implied distinction lead to actual separate treatises on providence as it is in God and on the divine government, respectively. The eternal ordinatio in God, God's hidden and mysterious counsel, the secret will of God -- all of these are never legitimate objects of investigation for Calvin. Rather they point up the limits beyond which we must not reach. They are postulates of faith; they constitute the invisible background of God's manifest government and preservation of the world. Although there is a secret will, a hidden and mysterious counsel of God, there is no abyss of mystery "in what he has condescended to reveal in his Word, but a way in which we may safely walk."[5]

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1. OS III.198.26-199.1. Deum constituimus arbitrum ac moderatorem omnium, qui pro sua sapientia, ab ultima aeternitate decrevit quod facturus esset: et nunc sua potentia, quod decrevit exequitur.
2. OS III.219.7.
3. OS III.200.34.
4. OS III.200.6-7; 11-12.
5. OS III.204.23.

As Moses has expressed so eloquently, "the secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but those things which are revealed belong to us and to our children."[1] The "great abyss," however, the ratio gubernandi mundi, being concealed from us, ought not to be the object of our vain curiosity, but rather the object of our adoration.[2]

> None, therefore, will attain just and profitable views of the providence of God, but he who considers that he has to do with his Maker and the Creator of the world, and submits himself to fear and reverence with all becoming humility.[3]

For Calvin, then, the doctrine of providence is nothing but the continuation of the doctrine of creation, in that it is God's preservation of creation in terms of his active, special volition in every event, from the fall of a drop of rain to the will and thought of man.[4] Thus the doctrine of providence, by continuing that of creation, in Calvin occupies the very place which in Thomas and Zanchi is assigned to the gubernatio mundi. Despite scattered references to God's eternal ordinatio, hidden counsel and eternal decree, providence for Calvin means God's actual government and concrete care of the world by his omnipotence, rather than the eternal ratio or form of this government as it exists in God himself in terms of foreknowledge and will. Again Calvin points to the Deus erga nos, as he did before, and throughout his theology. Not

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1. OS III.204.28-29 (Deut. 29:29).
2. OS III.204.25-27.
3. OS III.203.18-21.
4. OS III.195.25 and 221.24 ff.

God's actions as they are in God himself, but as they are toward us and involve us, are at the heart of Calvin's doctrine of providence.

Necessity and Contingency

Since for Zanchi the divine providence is the eternal ratio of God ordaining all things to their ends, it is unchangeable as anything in God is unchangeable. This means nothing less than that every action and effect in the world has God as its necessary cause. It is, on the other hand, equally true that God's providence operates "ordinarily" through secondary causes.[1] The problem then arises whether the divine providence does not impose necessity upon all things, thereby denying their own efficiency and contingency.

First, it must be affirmed that the nature of every effect is bound to the nature of the cause which produces the effect. Thus every cause acts according to its own internal principle or nature. The Sun, for example, necessarily shines because it cannot not shine. Therefore, the Sun is a necessary or definite cause. On the other hand, there are indefinite causes which are also called contingent. Contingency, by definition, is that which can or cannot happen. Man, for example, is an indefinite or contingent cause of writing. By nature he can or cannot write.[2]

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.140.
2. Ibid., 449 f.

Thus all secondary causes operate in accordance with their own nature. "God does not destroy the nature of things, although he moves them according to his will, because he moves everything according to its nature."[1] In this some operate necessarily, others contingently.[2] At the same time, with respect to God every secondary cause must be considered necessary and definite inasmuch as God is the first efficient cause.[3] If Judas, for example, according to the natural order was the contingent cause of Christ's betrayal in that he could or could not betray him, yet with regard to God's providence he was the necessary cause of the betrayal.[4]

Thus we arrive at an apparently absurd and contradictory conclusion, namely, that a single secondary cause can under diverse aspects be contingent as well as necessary: Contingent according to its own internal principles and nature, and necessary according to the unchangeable divine providence. Likewise, an effect can proceed from two causes: from God as the first cause and from the natural agent as the secondary cause.[5]

In this way Zanchi seeks to maintain God's universal causality while at the same time preserving the efficacy and causality of the creature in its own operations.

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1. De gubernatione mundi, Opera, 3.2.853. Deus autem non tollit rerum naturas, etiamsi eas moveat quocunque vult: quia unumquodque movet secundum suam naturam.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.451.
3. Ibid., 450.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 449.

> God is the first cause and the first mover and thus by his providence moves, rules, and governs all things; in the meantime, he applies no force to anything, ...but allows and wills them to move and operate by their own nature.[1]

This is precisely the concern of Thomas whose argument Zanchi has followed throughout.[2] But there is yet another reason for Zanchi's strong emphasis on the contingency and efficacy of secondary causes. For it is on this basis that he can deny the divine authorship of sin and stress human responsibility. God is, indeed, the first cause of human action as action, in that he excites and moves man to his action as such. But what causes the action to become sinful is man's own sinful nature.[3] This problem of sin and human responsibility is taken up again later under predestination. Zanchi mentions it here only briefly in support of the principle that the creature's efficacy is not destoyed by providence. God governs by allowing the creature to operate ex sua natura.

There can be no denying the fact that Calvin leaves a place for contingency in his doctrine of providence, for example, when he firmly upholds man's responsibility to use the means God has provided for him in preserving his own life:

> Now, it is evident what is our duty. If God has committed to us the preservation of our life, we should preserve it; if he offers

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2. 451. Deus enim tanquam prima causa, primusque motor, ita omnia sua providentia secum trahit, movet, regit, moderatur: ut interim rebus nullam inferat vim: ...sed eas sinit et vult, ex sua quamque natura, moveri et operari.
2. Cf. ST I.22.4.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.451.

> supplies, we should use them; if he forewarns us of dangers, we should not rashly run into them; if he furnishes remedies, we ought not to neglect them.[1]

Thus God uses human prudence and folly to carry out his intentions.

> Therefore it has pleased God to conceal from us all future events, that we may meet them as doubtful contingencies, and not cease to oppose to them the remedies with which we are provided, till they shall have been surmounted, or shall have overcome all our diligence.[2]

In the same way, Calvin asserts that God uses "evil instruments for the accomplishment of good purposes... even thieves, murderers, and other criminals, are instruments of divine providence, whom the Lord uses for the execution of the judgment which he has appointed."[3] Yet this does not excuse criminal action in any way and no blame falls upon God. He merely makes legitimate use of human wickedness and operates by its means.[4]

Having said this, it would, however, be wrong to conclude that Calvin is interested here in the efficacy of inferior causes. His sole concern is with the believer's assurance that in everything that appears fortuitous or contingent by nature he has to do with God's providence at work, which "never permits any event which it will not overrule for [the Christian believer's] advantage and safety... With respect to men, whether good or evil, the [the believer] will

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1. OS III.207.12-16.
2. OS III.207.32-36.
3. OS III.208.21-27.
4. OS III.208.28 ff.

acknowledge that their deliberations, wills, endeavours, and powers, are under his control, so that it is at his option to direct them wherever he pleases, and to restrain them as often as he pleases."[1]

Providence consists of action, and Calvin leaves no doubt that he sees God's providence directly and immediately active in what seem to be contingent actions of creatures. Hence, his protest against the view which maintains "that God by his power inspires [man] with motions, enabling him to act according to the tendency of the nature with which he is endued."[2] To Calvin this means to attribute to God "a government of a confused and promiscuous kind, acknowledging that God revolves and impels the machine of the world, with all its parts, by a general motion, without peculiarly directing the action of each individual creature. Yet this error is not to be tolerated."[3]

As we have seen, Zanchi is one of those who commit that "intolerable error" in asserting that God is the first mover who by his providence moves all things, but in a way that allows creatures to operate according to their own nature without being forced by God.[4]

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1. OS III.209.13-21.
2. OS III.193.8-10
3. OS III.192.22-193.4.
4. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.451.

CHAPTER IV

PREDESTINATION

After having explained before that providence and predestination must be counted among the divine attributes, inasmuch as they are in God as immanent actions of the one, simple, and eternal act of being which is God, it comes as no surprise that Zanchi places predestination immediately after the doctrine of providence, since for him the two are intimately related. This constitutes a most significant departure from Calvin, and again a direct parallel to the pattern followed by Thomas Aquinas.[1]

According to Zanchi, providence is the very foundation of the whole doctrine of election and reprobation. Indeed, the very term providence includes that of predestination.[2] The only real difference between the two is not one of principle, but is constituted by their respective objects:

> Providence is the decree of God directing all things toward their ends. Predestination, however, is the direction pertaining to rational creatures. Hence predestination, obviously, is a part of providence and contained in the latter as a species in its genus.3

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1. ST I.23.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.477 f.
3. Ibid., 478. Providentia enim decretum Dei est de rebus omnibus ad suos fines deducendis. Praedestinatio autem de ipsis duntaxat rationalibus creaturis... perducendis. Proinde hinc manifestum sit, praedestinationem partem esse providentiae Dei et in ea, tanquam speciem in genere, contineri.

The Nature and Cause of Predestination

As a part of the divine providence, predestination -- like the former -- includes God's foreknowledge and will.

> Foreknowledge signifies the knowledge by which God foreknows all things before they came and come to pass, that is, before the foundation of the world.[1]

It is, therefore, "the eternal foreknowledge of all future things."[2] Without such foreknowledge neither providence nor election and reprobation would be possible.[3] Again we notice Zanchi's emphasis on God's knowledge as the first element in providence and predestination. The reason for this is the relationship between intellect and will which he has defined earlier in Thomistic fashion, as we have seen. Precisely because God, in foreknowing all things, wills them at the same time, are foreknowledge and will closely related elements of predestination:

> ...[Foreknowledge] rather than signifying mere knowledge, is joined together with the will.[4]

On this basis, Zanchi defines predestination as follows:

> Before the foundation of the world God first proposed to himself from the entire human race to elect some to eternal salvation

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.478. Praescientia aliquando significat cognitionem, qua Deus omnia antequam fierent et fiant, hoc est, ante mundi constitutionem, praenovit.
2. Ibid. ...omnium rerum futurarum praecognitio aeterna.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. ...[Praescientia] non simpliciter notitia, sed cum voluntate... conjuncta, significatur.

> in the Son, and to reject others; then, to direct the elect to a pre-fixed goal through proper means, while leading the others to their appointed place through their own sins.[1]

Zanchi is quite aware of the fact that he is in agreement with Thomas, and does not fail to point this out: "Thomas follows that interpretation."[2]

The above definition already indicates what Zanchi calls the "pure order which can be established between the parts of the whole mystery of our predestination."[3] Besides foreknowledge and will, predestination presupposes two other elements, namely, love and election. Thomas explains the same order of predestination as follows: Since predestination to eternal life presupposes that God wills the eternal life of the predestined, then this involves both election and love: love inasmuch as God wills them this particular good of salvation, and election since he wills this good to some and not to others. Thus predestination presupposes election, and election presupposes love.[4] In the same words Zanchi declares:

> Predestination presupposes election, elec-

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.479. Primum quidem Deum, ante mundi constitutionem, constituisse apud se, ex omnibus hominibus, alios sibi et in filio et ad salutem aeternam eligere, alios vere rejicere. Deinde, quos elegit, ad praefixum scopum per debita media dirigere: reliquos vero ad suum etiam locum per sua ipsorum peccata deducere.
2. Ibid., Thomas hanc sequutus est interpretationem. Cf. ST I.23.1.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.480. ...verus ordo qui statui potest inter partes totius mysterii de nostro praedestinatione.
4. ST I.23.4.

> tion, love; love, foreknowledge and the sovereign divine will.[1]

Therefore, predestination cannot be separated from election, love, will and foreknowledge of God. But the roote of this ordo must be seen in the divine will:

> The root of all these is the free and sovereign proposal of the divine will....[2]

Since predestination has thus its ultimate root and first cause in the divine will, it follows that all its elements described above are one in God, as the will of God is one with his essence.

> Wherefore it is manifest, that in God all of these are one and the same. They differ, however, in terms of order [ratio] and the proposal of the will, as the root of all that follows, precedes them. It is a most certain principle that whatever is last in execution is first in intention, i.e., in the proposition of the mind.[3]

Again we meet Zanchi's basic notion of the divine simplicity. For in God, whose essence is his act of being, his will is nothing but his act of willing: "...propositum voluntatis est in volente et proponente."[4] Hence it follows that, as Thomas

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.481. Praedestinatio supponit electionem: electio dilectionem: dilectio praescientiam et beneplacitum divinae voluntatis.

2. Ibid. Proinde liberum hoc voluntatis divinae propositum, seu beneplacitum: radix est eorum omnium....

3. Ibid. Quare manifestum est, licet in Deo haec omnia unum sint reipsa: rationem tamen aliqua differe: et propositum voluntatis praecedere, tanquam omnium, quae seguuntur, radicem.... Est autem regula certissima: Quod ultimum est in executione, illud primum esse in intentione, hoc est, in animi proposito. The regula certissima to which Zanchi refers is a common Aristotelian slogan of the thirteenth century Scholasticism.

4. Ibid.

puts it and Zanchi repeats after him predestination is in the one who predestines and not in the predestined, precisely since it is a part of providence.[1] In Zanchi's words: "If predestination is part of the divine providence... it must necessarily be in God and not in men."[2]

Thus it follows from the nature of predestination and its various elements that its first and efficient cause is God in the free and simple act of his will.

> The first and principal cause of the whole of election is the sovereignty of the divine will. Outside of God, no efficient cause of election can therefore be assigned which would move God to elect us....3

Again, in order to confirm and support his own view, Zanchi calls upon Thomas Aquinas and, by giving a summary of the latter's doctrine concerning the cause of predestination (from Summa Contra Gentiles III.163), Zanchi notes the complete agreement between Thomas and himself.[4]

The Effects of Predestination

Predestination, by its very definition and nature, means to prepare and direct things toward a fixed and determined end and goal -- "ad praefixum scopum per debita media

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1. ST I.23.2.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.481. Si praedestinatio pars est divinae providentiae... praedestinationem quoque in Deo esse, non autem in hominibus ipsis, necesse est.
3. Ibid., 496. Haec est prima et principalis causa totius electionis...: beneplacitum nimirum voluntatis divinae. Proinde nulla efficiens cause electionis extra Deum assignari potest, a qua Deus permotus sit ad nos eligendos....
4. Ibid., 533 f.

dirigere."[1] This end and ultimate goal is nothing but God himself and his glory, and in this Thomas and Zanchi both agree.[2] The will of God is, therefore, causa prima as well as causa finalis of predestination.

But if predestination is directed toward an end, it must also include the means toward that end.

> It is certain that predestination not only includes an end, but also the means toward that end. Thus the term predestination signifies the decree to save someone as well as the decree to lead him to salvation through proper means.[3]

Since God through his will is the cause of predestination as well as its end, the media toward that end are therefore effects of the divine decree of predestination. These effects are vocation, faith, justification, sanctification, and good works.[4]

With this we have reached a point in Zanchi's doctrine of predestination where the deep-rooted contrast between Calvin and Zanchi becomes most apparent. At the beginning of this chapter we pointed out the significant deviation from Calvin that must be seen in the very place which Zanchi assigned to the doctrine of predestination as part of providence and as a divine attribute. That this location of the doctrine was not accidental but based on strictly ontological presupposi-

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.479.
2. Ibid., 533; cf. ST I.23.5.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.479. Ac certum est, praedestinationem esse non solum de fine, sed etiam de mediis ad finem. Proinde nomine praedestinationis, significatur decretum aliquem servandi: et decretum ad salutem per talia media deducendi.
4. Ibid., 535 ff., cf. 496.

tions has become sufficiently clear from Zanchi's definitions considered so far, in which he firmly anchored predestination in God as the first and efficient cause of all things through his foreknowledge and will. Predestination, like providence, as the eternal supralapsarian decree of God must therefore precede the doctrines of creation and redemption in Zanchi's theology, as it does in most of the theological systems of Reformed orthodoxy.

We now see Zanchi going a step further by considering predestination in terms of its end which is, ultimately, God himself, as we have learned, and immediately, man's salvation. Having laid the foundation in terms of God as causa efficiens and causa finalis, Zanchi can then proceed to develop the entire ordo salutis within the causal scheme, whereby vocation, faith, justification, sanctification and good works become the effects as well as the means of predestination.

In direct contrast, "Calvin does not build the ordo salutis on predestination in itself, but rather on the stable fundamentum Christi."[1] It is of greatest significance that Calvin never attached predestination to the doctrine of God. The various relocations of it in the development of the doctrine show that Calvin's goal was a "strongest possible christocentric tie,"[2] which he reached in the final edition of the

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1. P. Jacobs, Prädestination und Verantwortlichkeit bei Calvin, Kassel, 1937, p. 54. This and subsequent quotations represent my own translation.
2. Ibid., p. 71.

Institutes.

It is, of course, true that Calvin's view is supralapsarian, but the fact that his doctrine of predestination appears at the end of his soteriology indicates how this must be understood: God's eternal decree is that of our election in Christ. If Christ is the sole foundation of our eternal election then we should not curiously inquire about God's secret decree but be content with Christ, in whom alone our salvation is exhibited.[1] The whole tenor of Calvin's main chapter on the doctrine of election[2] is "that divine election is to be viewed exclusively in terms of our own salvation, which exists solely 'in Christ.' Regardless of the fact that the decrees 'precede' creation, sub specie aeternitatis, the only saving relation with God is through Christ in faith. No one but the believer can even speak of God's decrees, and then only because he knows himself elect through faith in Christ."[3]

Perhaps the strongest affirmation of Calvin's christocentric view of predestination coupled with a stern indictment of all speculation is given in his commentary on John 6:40, to which we have referred above:

> Whoever is not content with Christ, but indulges in curious inquiries about eternal predestination [quisquis non contentus Christo

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1. Comm. John 6:40 - CO 47.147.
2. Institutes III.24 - OS IV.410 ff.
3. E.A. Dowey, The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology, New York, 1952, p. 187.

> de aeterna praedestinatione curiose inquirit]... desires to be saved contrary to the purpose of God. The predestination of God is in itself hidden and secret, and the Lord manifests it when he bestows it upon us by calling. They are insane who seek their own salvation or that of others in the labyrinth of predestination not keeping the way of faith proposed to them [Quare insaniunt qui suam vel aliorum salutem in labyrintho praedestinationis quaerunt, propositam sibi fidei viam non tenentes] Moreover, by this preposterous speculation they endeavor to overturn the force and effect of predestination -- for if God elected us to this end, that we may believe, take away faith, and election will be mutilated.... To every man, therefore, his faith is a trustworthy attestation of the eternal predestination of God, so that it is sacrilege to inquire further; for that man offers a grave insult to the Holy Spirit who refuses to assent to his simple testimony.[1]

Similar statements we find throughout the 24th chapter of the Institutes:

> But if we are chosen in him [Christ] we shall find no assurance of our election in ourselves; nor even in God the Father, considered in himself, abstractedly from the Son. Christ, therefore, is the mirror, in which we should contemplate our election....[2]

Again we read:

> If we attempt to penetrate to the eternal decree of God, we shall be engulfed in a profound abyss....[3]
>
> Such temerity, therefore, should be restrained by the sobriety of faith, that we may be satisfied with the testimony of God in his external word respecting his secret grace.[4]

Calvin calls it "seeking in a wrong way, when miserable man

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1. Comm. John 6:40 - CO 47.147.
2. OS IV.415.39-416.4.
3. OS IV.413.22-23.
4. OS IV.414.1-3.

endeavors to force his way into the secret recesses of divine wisdom and to penetrate even to the highest eternity in order to discover what is determined concerning him at the tribunal of God."[1] Doing so, man will only find himself in an "abyss of total darkness."[2] And so Calvin concludes:

> Let this, then, be our way of inquiry: to begin and end with the calling of God... for by [adoption] as by a token, God chooses to confirm to us all that we are permitted to know of his counsel.[3]

Only after we have become assured of our adoption through faith in Christ can we, in retrospect, as it were, speak of God's eternal decree. For Calvin, the two doctrines of faith and election meet in the concept of the call or illumination.[4] "Christ is the point of contact, and neither can be discussed apart from him."[5]

If this strong christocentric setting of Calvin's doctrine is clearly seen, then it must be admitted that Calvin has formulated and defined his views frequently in terms of God's eternal counsel and of the double decree which has led and continues to lead to a misunderstanding of him. Yet even the decretum horribile cannot be taken out of the soteriological context in which Calvin discusses predestination as a whole. The central fact remains, that for Calvin the doctrine of predestination must "be meditated upon in his Revelation,

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1. OS IV.414.13-16.
2. Ibid., 19.
3. OS IV.415.3-4 and 8-10.
4. OS IV.416.40-417.1; cf. Dowey, op. cit., p. 187.
5. Dowey, op. cit., p. 187.

which is Christ, and not speculated upon apart from him."[1]

It hardly needs to be pointed out that Zanchi does precisely what Calvin warned against in the strongest possible terms: he discusses predestination as considered in God himself. This he carries through consistently, as we shall see, when it comes to the effects and means of predestination. Zanchi begins his discussion of the effects of predestination with reference to Ephesians 1:5.[2] "Nos in ipso [Christo] ante Mundi constitutionem fuisse electos" -- that means, according to Zanchi, that Christ was elected first in order to be the mediator of our election and of all the effects of predestination, which are communicated to us through Christ.[3] In this sense, Christ is not the electing God -- to use a term of Karl Barth[4] -- but rather the first effect of God's predestination:

> Christ is the first effect of predestination, from whom all other [effects] proceed and through whom they are communicated to us.[5]

The first cause of our election and predestination remains the act of God's free will. We are not elected because Christ died for us, but Christ was predestined to die for us, because in him we were elected from eternity.[6] This interpretation by Zanchi is the same as that of Thomas, who discusses

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1. Dowey, op. cit., p. 188.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.496 and 535.
3. Ibid.
4. K. Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik, Bd. 2:2, 3. Aufl., Zollikon-Zürich, 1959, p. 111.
5. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.535. Christum esse primum praedestinationis effectum, a quo reliqua omnia profluxerunt et per quod nobis communicantur.
6. Ibid.

the predestination of Christ in his Christology.[1] If we consider predestination with regard to the very act of predestinating, Thomas declares, then God alone is the efficient cause of it, since by one and the same act he predestined Christ and us. But, if we consider predestination with regard to its end, then Christ's predestination is the cause of ours, according to the order and mode in which God decreed our predestination to be accomplished in time, namely, through Jesus Christ.[2]

Zanchi argues in precisely the same way. Christ's predestination, according to the order of effects, is the first effect of God's predestinating act, and at the same time the mediator and -- in that sense -- the cause of our predestination. Accordingly, all the other effects of predestination must be considered, first, in relation to God's eternal act of predestinating, in which sense he is the sole efficient cause of each effect; second, in their relation to each other, in which sense one effect is the cause of the subsequent effect.[3]

The sole efficient cause of each effect of predestination is God's free will. All effects are media designed to achieve the end of God's decree in their given order. God

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1. ST III.24.
2. ST III.24.4.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.534. Praecedens causa efficiens, vel saltem materialis, effectus insequentis: quatenus sequens oritur ex praecedente. Insequens vero causa finalis praecedentis: quatenus praecedens donatur propter insequentem ut eijus finem. Altero modo fieri non potest.

calls the predestined to justify him, justifies him in order to glorify him. Vocation, in this sense, is the cause of justification, not the efficient cause, but rather the material or instrumental cause:

> These effects of election, therefore, are also called instrumental causes, through which we come to the ultimate effect of election, which is eternal life.[1]

It is within this order that the bona opera, too, find their legitimate place and rightful understanding. In view of God's predestinating act good works are nothing but an effect of predestination, and in no way can they be the cause of it. But inasmuch as one effect of predestination is the instrumental cause of the subsequent one, vocation is the cause of faith, faith the cause of justification, justification of sanctification, sanctification of good works, and ergo -- good works the cause of eternal life; yet only in this order: "praecedens [causa instrumentalis est] subsequentis, non autem contra."[2]

For that reason good works can never be the cause of justification, because they do not precede it, but follow it. But, on the other hand, they can rightly be said to be the cause of eternal life, inasmuch as they precede it in the order of effects:

> If one take the name predestination

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.496. Idcirco haec electionis effecta, causa etiam juvantes appellantur: quibus scilicet ultimum electionis effectum, qui est vita aeterna, consequamur.

2. Ibid., 514.

> with regard to eternal life to which we are predestined... good works can be said to be the cause of predestination.[1]

Again we find Zanchi on the side of Thomas Aquinas,[2] rallying to his defense against the charge that human merits, inasmuch as they are foreseen in the foreknowledge of God, are credited by Thomas with being the cause of predestination. To prove that Thomas shares his own view as described above, Zanchi quotes him directly as saying:

> If you consider predestination, vocation, justification and glorification together, then their cause is the will of God.[3]

That, on the other hand, good works can, in a certain sense, be said to be the cause of salvation, Zanchi has demonstrated in his previous argument. If Thomas uses the term "merit" instead of "good works" then simply because it was the term commonly used by the Fathers as, for example, by Augustine, Zanchi assures us.[4] The arguments which Zanchi and Thomas present are labelled "petty sophism" by Calvin in an attack upon the position of Aquinas, the very position which Zanchi felt called upon to defend, as we have just seen. Calvin, assuming, as he calls it, "a contention of subtlety" claims to be at no loss to refute the "sophistry" of Aquinas.[5] If

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.515. Si ergo aliquis nomen praedestinationis accipiat pro aeterna vita, ad quam sumus praedestinati... dici possunt bona opera causa esse praedestionationis.
2. Cf. ST I.23.5.
3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.534. Si considere praedestinationem, vocationem, justificationem, glorificationem simul, horum causa est Dei voluntas. Cf. ST I.23.5.
4. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.534.
5. OS IV.389.31-390.21.

Thomas contends, says Calvin, "that glory is in a certain sense predestinated for the elect according to their merits, because God predestinates to them the grace by which glory is merited," then it can be replied, that predestination to glory is the cause of predestination to grace, and not vice versa, that grace is predestinated to those to whom the possession of glory has been already assigned.[1] Actually, Calvin quite misses the point in his attempt at subtlety. If Thomas speaks of merits as cause of glory or eternal life, then only in the sense in which an effect is the cause of a subsequent effect -- precisely as Zanchi explained it. Thomas as well as Zanchi would be quite prepared to agree with Calvin that with regard to God's predestinating act, merits -- inasmuch as they are in themselves an effect -- are indeed subordinate to the efficient cause, which is the will of God alone. Yet this controversy only serves to illustrate the distance between the thinking of Calvin and that of Zanchi. The very fact that Calvin apparently confuses the elements in the causal order shows how foreign this kind of thinking is to him.

The Knowledge of Predestination

How can we know and become certain of our election and predestination? Zanchi's answer is: from the effects.

> It is therefore clear, that the certainty of election is confirmed in the elect from the effects of predestination.[2]

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1. OS IV.389.31-390.21.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.509. Manifestum ergo est, ab effectis praedestinationis, certitudine electionis in electis confirmari.

And again:

> Through the effects [of predestination] we recognize the causes....[1]

For if predestination, as Augustine testifies, is the preparation of benefits by God, through which we are saved, then whoever experiences these benefits in himself can be certain of his predestination.[2]

At this point, we encounter a marked deviation toward Platonism in Zanchi's argument, in that he suddenly introduces intuitive knowledge and takes recourse to the relation between image and model, imprint and form. Obviously, he is forced in this direction in order to establish an epistemological basis suitable for his purpose, which is, to introduce the religious experience of the individual as valid evidence for his own eternal election, which is in God, and to which our knowledge has no direct access:

> Those effects are not simply effects of predestination, but effects also in the sense that they are signs of predestination: the living form and image of God's foreknowledge, love and election regarding us, imprinted in us.[3]

Through the intuition of the images of God's knowledge, love, and election which he has imprinted in us, can we have certain knowledge of their models and prototypes which are in God:

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.507. ...tum quia effecta sunt praedestinationis: per effecta cognoscuntur causae....
2. Ibid., 506.
3. Ibid. Haec effecta non sunt effecta simpliciter praedestinationis: sed etiam effecta talia sunt, ut sint vera illius sigilla: vivam scilicet Dei nos praecognoscentis, amantis eligentis formam atque imaginem in nobis imprimentia.

> Therefore, although God's proposal itself and his foreknowledge, election, predestination concerning us we cannot see in God himself, yet we can perceive the true images of them imprinted in us by God; and thus, through the perception of their forms and types in us, we come easily to the knowledge of the prototypes which are in God.[1]

For this reason, we may see our certain election which is in God, not only from the effects as their necessary cause, but also from the types or the imprints as their prototype and form.[2] This use of Platonic thought by Zanchi belongs to the same inconsistencies that we can find in Thomas Aquinas, who also employs intuitive knowledge, as we have seen, with regard to the concept of the act of being, which he never demonstrates.

The Infallibility of Predestination

As part of providence, predestination includes the divine will and foreknowledge. God's will and foreknowledge, however, are unchangeable and infallible as has been shown. Predestination, inasmuch as it is in God, is therefore certainly unchangeable and infallible.[3] This is, furthermore, also evident from the order of secondary causes prepared by God to achieve the end of predestination:

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.507. Ac proinde, etsi propositum ipsum, praescientiam, electionem, praedestinationem Dei de nobis, non videmus, nec videre possumus in ipso Deo... horum tamen omnium certas imagines, nobis a Deo impressas, intueri possumus: atque ita ex harum formarum et typorum qui in nobis sunt, intuitu: facile in cognitionem πρωτοτύπων, quae in Deo sunt, perducimur.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 492.

> From the established firm order of the many causes prepared for our salvation the infallibility and inevitability of our salvation necessarily follows.[1]

Thomas Aquinas, in very similar terms, asserts that predestination, as everything that can be attributed to God, is certainly infallible.[2] For both Thomas and Zanchi this causes no conflict with regard to man's free exercise of will, for as we have seen before, God does not destroy the contingency and efficacy of secondary causes. Indeed, Zanchi asserts, the immediate and acting cause in us is the liberum arbitrium, which by its very nature always acts contingenter et mutabiliter.[3] In no way does God change this nature of human will. He imposes no necessity or constraint upon it, but his influence upon man's will is that of gently causing a change in its direction so that it becomes inclined toward God, yet freely and without being forced in any way.

> Humanae tamen voluntatis naturam mutat numquam Deus. Facit enim eam, quam vult ser-

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.492. Ex isto enim certo et firmato multarum causarum, ad salutam nostram praeparatarum, ordine: necessario sequitur infallibilis et inevitabilis salus nostra. Closely connected with this is the doctrine of the perseverantia sanctorum in fide which plays a very important role in Zanchi's theology, and which he develops in terms of the Scholastic concept of habitus, which we have met before in Zanchi's doctrine of faith. In anticipation of a planned separate study on Zanchi's doctrine of perseverance I have not included it here. It should be pointed out, however, that Moltmann's interpretation of Zanchi's position is, to say the least, misleading -- due to the author's failure to recognize Zanchi's explicit use of the habitus concept (cf. J. Moltmann, Prädestination und Perseveranz, "Beiträge zur Geschichte und Lehre der Reformierten Kirche," XII, Neukirchen, 1961, pp. 72-106).

2. ST I.23.6.

3. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.492.

> vari, de volente volentem: suaviter flectendo, non autem torquendo. Ita fit, ut non possit non velle bonum voluntas nostra, quia sic inclinatur a Deo: et tamen libere vult, quia nullam patitur coactionem. Quare manifestum est, cum necessitate praedestinationis minime pugnare arbitrio libertatem.[1]

Therefore, all that are saved or condemned, are saved or condemned contingenter and not by constraint (coacte). Yet they are saved or condemned necessarily in view of God's eternal plan, which will be carried out infallibly, both by necessary and contingent means.[2]

Identical arguments and conclusions can be found in Thomas.[3]

Reprobation

Zanchi defines reprobation as belonging to predestination in a threefold way: First, as privatio gratiae electionis, a withholding of divine grace as well as its effects. For God is free to confer his grace upon whom he chooses. Second, as the destination and ordination to be used within the plan of God's providence. Third, as destination and ordination toward eternal punishment of the reprobate for their own sins. As God punishes because of sin, he also decrees from eternity to punish because of sin.[4]

Following Thomas, Zanchi draws a distinction between election and reprobation with regard to their causality. Rep-

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.492.
2. Ibid., 493.
3. ST I.23.6.
4. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.547.

robation is the cause of rejection from grace and of destination to punishment. The actual condemnation, however, is caused by the reprobate's own sin. In this sense, God is not the cause of sin, as he is the cause of good works. Yet reprobation and predestination as such have no other cause than the free will of God, who elects and reprobates men not on the ground of foreknown good works nor foreseen sins, but on no other ground than the free will of God himself.[1]

After quoting Thomas in confirmation of his own views, Zanchi remarks of Thomas' doctrine:

> [Thomas] writes in a most splendid way that there is no cause why God should elect one and reprobate another apart from the divine will itself.[2]

Zanchi's discussion of reprobation is necessarily brief since most of what he says on the nature and cause of predestination with regard to the elect relates to reprobation at the same time. The ontological basis for both is the causality of God with the one exception, that the sin of the reprobates is excluded from God's direct causality and is assigned an efficient causality of its own, inasmuch as God is not the author of sin and predestines no one to sin.[3] Reprobation as such, as was pointed out before, is rejection from the grace of election and the effects of it. From this it

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.546 f.; cf. ST I.23.3, 5.
2. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.553. Luculentissime scribit, nullam esse causam, cur Deus vel hunc elegerit, vel illum reprobarit, nisi ipsam Dei voluntatem.
3. Ibid., 554.

follows that the reprobate, destitute of grace, must be said to sin necessarily -- non posse non peccare.[1] God "permits" sin, but is not its author. He moves men to action as such, yet the sinful nature of the action is due entirely to the sinful nature of the reprobate himself.[2] For this reason Zanchi prefers to speak of the "consequences" rather than the effects of reprobation.[3]

Calvin argues much along the same lines, when he insists repeatedly that the causa and materia for sin are in man himself.[4] At the same time he maintains that the will of God is the causa for reprobation.[5] One can hardly deny that Calvin has trespassed the boundaries he established himself in treating the entire doctrine of election within a strict soteriological context. Nevertheless, his view of reprobation must not be taken out of the isolated place it occupies in Calvin's theology. It is not a philosophical venture into metaphysical speculation for Calvin, but rather a radical affirmation of the gratuitous nature of God's grace.[6]

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1. De natura Dei, Opera, 2.553 f.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. OS III.403.32-33.
5. OS III.397.15.
6. Cf. Dowey, The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology, p. 218 f.; Jacobs, Prädestination und Verantwortlichkeit bei Calvin, p. 145 f.

CONCLUSION

It was the object of this study to examine the theology of Zanchi with regard to its roots within medieval thought -- particularly within the Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition -- in order to determine properly Zanchi's theological position in relation to that of Calvin.

In the course of our investigation of Zanchi's thought we have, indeed, encountered a striking congruity between his views and those of Thomas Aquinas on almost every point. This congruity is not merely one of form and method, but rather the result of common ontological and epistemological presuppositions provided by the philosophy of Aristotle in its modified Thomistic form.

It was this Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition in which he had been reared, that provides Zanchi with the philosophical categories which largely influence his thinking. Far from considering these categories obsolete and inadequate, Zanchi finds them to be not only useful but even necessary for the proper understanding of biblical truth.

The key to Zanchi's theology and its unifying principle is the concept of causality. It dominates his doctrine of God; it determines the relation between Creator and creature; it underlies the analogy by which knowledge of God is possible, and it characterizes the doctrines of providence and predestination. In fact, it would be quite possible to present Zanchi's entire doctrines of Scripture, God, creation,

providence and predestination without ever mentioning Christ, and they would suffer little or no distortion from doing so.

Not much more than that needs to be said to indicate the difference between Zanchi and Calvin. Despite the double decree, Calvin's theology has at its center God's revelation in Christ, which forbids any metaphysical speculation. The ordo cognoscendi for Calvin is determined and limited by the ordo revelationis, rather than an ordo essendi. Apart from God's revelation in Christ there is no legitimate knowledge of God.

If, on the other hand, Zanchi sees the relation between God and creature in terms of cause and effect, then it is not surprising to find a conspicuous absence of christocentric thinking, as, indeed, we did in Zanchi's doctrine of God and predestination.

In the theology of Zanchi, at the very point of transition from Reformation to Orthodoxy, the spirit of medieval Scholasticism has thus begun to replace that of the Reformers at a point where it counted most. To the extent to which -- under the influence of the Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition -- the christocentric orientation of Calvin's thinking shifted toward a metaphysics of causality in the thought of his successors, Reformed theology ceased to be a theology of revelation. It seems that this aspect should determine the scope of future studies in the field of Protestant Orthodoxy.

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